Diplomatic historians
and leftists alike seem to view the conditions for history from an academic
perspective and as a result frequently remove the human element from the
circumstances of their stories. This is particularly true in the case of both
Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman.
In the eyes of those
who want to shape a narrative the foreign policy failures of both men are
entirely due to their own blindness and are absent domestic realities. Truman
doesn’t have the burdens of either illegitimacy or conspiracy that surround
LBJ’s approach to foreign policy but there is a similar sense of detachment.
Harry Truman was, after all, ascending to the Presidency after twelve years
when the sole occupant had been FDR a man who many considered inseparable from
the job. He had led the nation through the Great Depression and through the
Second World War and on the verge of victory in Europe he had died shockingly
(though less so to the people around him).
In addition to the
understandable pressure any man who have under those circumstances Truman was
coming to the White House having only met with the President once since the
election. He knew as much about FDR’s negotiations with Stalin and Churchill,
his plans for a post-war world and the global situation as the average member
of Congress – which is to say, almost nothing. He was not privy to any of the
decisions that FDR had been since he had been named Vice President, and there’s
an argument his predecessor Henry Wallace knew more about what was going on
during the War than the current one. (Wallace had been named Secretary of
Commerce as a consolation prize for being denied the Vice Presidency in 1944.)
And as a reminder of just how in the dark Truman was about global plans, it
wasn’t until after he was sworn in that he learned about the Manhattan Project.
Harry Truman not only
had the immense burden of having to learn on the job it wasn’t until he was
sworn in that he began to learn the nature of the thicket he was in. Truman’s
first decision was to retain FDR’s cabinet and to keep on almost every adviser
FDR had entrusted over the past several years when it came to World War
II. That many of these people had
different opinions, many of them based on what FDR had told them, and that many
of them would, like so many other Americans, judge Truman poorly for the simple
fact of not being FDR, does not seem to factor in to many historians when it
comes to judging Truman’s policy going forward. The fact that FDR had left no
clear guideline behind for a post-war world and had, as has been mentioned,
seemed determined to base his entire foreign policy entirely on his false
judgment of the nature of Stalin, is absent from this consideration as well.
Indeed much of the
blame on Truman by historians seems to hold him in contempt for the same reason
many Americans and his contemporaries did: Truman was not FDR. They seem to
have taken the same view that FDR did regard to the White House: that he was indispensable
and no one else could follow in his footsteps. On a personal level, I now
consider much of FDR’s behavior during his final year in office as something
very close to a grievous dereliction of duty. He was aware of the state of his
health and yet seemed to have no interest at all in the process of naming a
vice president who would succeed him when he died. Furthermore, he made no
effort to prepare his likely successor for what was going to lie ahead of him,
nor give any impression up until the very end of what his plans were for a
post-war Europe. That so much of his foreign policy seemed to be built more on
personal relationships then defined policy – something that would not survive
him – doesn’t seem to have entered his mind at all.
The kindest defense of
FDR’s actions are that he was so focused on the end of the war and the peace
that he neglected everything else. In that case, the burden must be shared by
his inner circle who knew all too well the condition ‘the boss’ was in and did
nothing to try and prepare for a day when he was gone. That is most likely
because his own people were in awe of FDR and refused to believe he was mortal
or fallible. (Bess Truman, it should be noted, was less inclined to be understanding
in later years she made it clear she regarded Roosevelt’s isolation of her
husband and his concealment of his health in the exact words I have: “a serious
dereliction of duty.’)
So when Truman was
sworn in, he knew that many of FDR’s inner circle already judged him harshly.
After he was sworn in David Forrestal,
murmured: “Poor little fellow, poor little fellow.” Truman was unprepared, bewildered
and frightened as his biographers have stated. One is reminded of the burden on
Andrew Johnson after he was sworn in after Lincoln was assassinated. Most of
FDR’s inner circle had a low opinion of Truman. They no doubt would have had a
similar low opinion of Wallace, Jimmy Byrnes, William O. Douglas or any of the
men who were considered for the Vice Presidency.
Truman had, as has been
reported, the hallmarks of the everyman: he had a distaste for complexity and a
preference for clear and fixed standards, along with a hesitation to engage in
creative or conceptual thinking. He had
a very straight-forward approach to policy making. He never acted
precipitously or erratically on major matters of policy, foreign or domestic.
Despite the appearance of quick decision making, he was slow and cautious on
important things. And he would lean more on his advisers than FDR ever did. He
believed in the importance of keeping your word.
All of these, it should
be noted, are things that at least theoretically the left and academics
admire and none of them were traits that
FDR had. Yet the left tends to prefer FDR’s nebulous thinking towards policy rather
than Truman’s decisiveness. This is ironic because particularly in his first
weeks in office and much beyond that Truman made it clear he was going to try
and handle the course FDR had set. He told press secretary Steve Early that he
intended to follow through with the San Francisco conference on April 25th.
Before he went to sleep that night, he issued a statement assuring the public:
“The world may be sure that we will prosecute the war on both fronts, east and
west, with all the vigor we possess to a successful conclusion.”
On his first full day
on the job he familiarized himself with
Roosevelt’s objectives and while he embraced the goals of his predecessor, by
necessity of his near ignorance he was forced to alter the manner of their being
implemented. He turned to his diplomatic advisers for guidance, and without
knowing it altered the course of foreign policy decisions forever. Until
Roosevelt, the President had personally determined the direction of American
diplomacy and then told the State Department how to react. Truman
reversed the practice and made policy after consultation with his
foreign affairs experts.
He would meet with
Secretaries Stettinius, Stimson and Forrestal, General George Marshall and
Admirals King and Leahy. While the Eastern front looked to be brought to an end
with six months, they believed Japanese surrender could not be expected for
another year and a half. It was Japan that was his bigger problem. They were
still engaged in fierce resistance despite the fire bombing of the cities. The
only way to end the war there was an invasion of the home island which was
certain to result in huge numbers of American casualties.
Truman would go to
lunch with Congressional leaders for an informal luncheon. One of his goals was
continued bipartisan support for the conduct of the war and the peace that
would follow. He secured endorsement of his plan to address a joint session of
Congress and informed Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan that he would not
go to personally open the UN conference. He also sought assistance from men he
believed had greater knowledge of his predecessors plans. One of them was Jim
Byrnes, who in their meeting he made clear he wanted him to serve in his new
administration, perhaps as Secretary of State. (Byrnes would indeed ascend to
that office in the weeks to come.) Stettinius was clearly nervous about the
tenuous nature of his position but in the initial weeks following Truman’s
ascension to the Presidency he was critical in the early process of decision
making.
Stettinius and Charles
Bohlen spent much of Truman’s first full day in office briefing him on the
‘deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union’. Stettinius’s weaknesses
were critical as he considered that not only Stalin was under influences within
his own country and the victim of anti-Western forces within his own regime. He
went out of his way to sing the praises of Harry Hopkins as the most critical
men to explain his predecessors relationship with the other two members of the
Big Three.
Truman sent two
telegrams to Churchill in which he expressed the pressing problems of both
Poland the negotiations involving Moscow. He claimed knowledge of FDR’s plans
going forward (he didn’t) but he urged Churchill caution about making
anti-Stalin statements on the floor of the House of Commons. The fact that
Stalin had decided to send Molotov to San Fransico seemed to be a sign of hope.
In preparation Averill Harriman was recalled to the United States.
Stettinius presented
Truman with two lengthy memoranda, the first on the conference in San Francisco
to develop what would be the United Nations parliamentary makeup. The second
responded to Truman’s request as to principal foreign policy problems facing
America. Truman took that one back home and spent the night reading it. It
dealt with Churchill’s policy being in accord with America and its
interpretations and his (apparently) rigid attitude towards Stalin. Truman also
learned of how Stalin had already begun to chip away at the agreements in Yalta.
What the new President’s private reactions are unknown. But he had other
issues, many of which would be major strains on Soviet-American relations in
the weeks and months to come. These included, but were not limited to, the
composition of the Polish government, the occupation policy for Germany and
Austria, and the new threat of Yugoslavia on Trieste.
The next day was FDR’s
funeral. With his wife and daughter unable to join him, his companions to meet
the train bearing FDR’s body back to DC were Henry Wallace and James Byrnes the
former vice President and the man who had been the leading contender for
Truman’s position. Afterwards Truman met with a seriously ill Harry Hopkins and
asked for as much of a briefing on his experiences with FDR at all of the
meetings involving the leaders. Hopkins’s description of Stalin was very
telling. He referred to him as a ‘forthright, rough tough Russian…who could be
talked too frankly.” Hopkins compared him to a tough political boss along the
lines of Tom Pendergast, assured him of FDR and Stalin’s good relations and to
do his best to maintain them. There is no sign, either then or later on, that
Truman ever did anything but treat Hopkins’s opinion with total respect or that
he had any intention of discounting them.
Later that day he
received his first communique from Churchill in which the PM went out of his
way to agree with Truman’s message as well as make it very clear that the
‘Lublin Government was resolved in independence’ and was opposed to the
Stalin’s version.
On April 16th
just before he was about to address Congress for the first time as President,
he met with Anthony Eden, foreign secretary. Both Eden and Churchill were
hoping to use Molotov’s visit to break the logjam on Poland and they were less
optimistic than the American government that this was a sign that the Soviets
were more inclined to see reason. When Eden and Truman met they agreed easily
upon a joint telegram to Stalin contesting the Soviet implementation of the
Yalta agreement on Poland. While this was happening Harriman was meeting with
Stalin and the Russian leader was brassily suggesting that Poland could be
solved by the ‘Yugoslav formula” which was essentially a Marxist government. Harriman
rejected it outright and the ambassador made it clear that to Stettinius that
Molotov’s deputy was preparing a Soviet-Polish treaty of mutual assistance –
completely counter to what had been discussed at Yalta. Truman would later
claim this was an impetus for him to harden his attitude towards Molotov but at
the time he gave no sign of immediate protest.
By the time Harriman
returned to DC he was determined to challenge the policy of accommodation
towards the Soviet Union that had been in effect to that point. He had none of
the illusions that many of FDR’s chief advisers as well as the former President
himself had about Stalin, making it clear:
“…the basic and
irreconcilable difference of objective between the Soviet Union and the United
States was (the Soviet Unions) urge for its own security to see Soviet concepts
extend to as large an area of the world as possible.”
Much of this had
happened during the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin already and
was already well underway by the time of FDR’s death. Harriman informed Truman
(who he barely knew) that American generosity had been ‘misinterpreted’ and
that the United States ‘had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that
were of real importance to us.” Unlike his predecessor Truman, he was receptive
to Harriman’s ideas, heard him out on what Soviet control of a foreign country
was like and that he had to take a firm stance in negotiations. Truman admitted
that he was not up on all details of foreign affairs and he would rely on his
advisers for help. Harriman took Truman aside and told him he’d rushed back to
make sure he understood – “as I had seen Roosevelt understand that Stalin is
breaking his agreements. “
It was with this new
insight Truman would have his first meeting with Molotov on April 22nd.
Truman met with Molotov warmly and tried to encourage him firmly to hold to
existing agreements. He assured him that he stood behind everything FDR stood
for and that would so everything he could to follow along that path. His
approach was that of trying to facilitate relations between the three foreign
secretaries – Molotov, Eden and Stettinius – going forward. The meeting was
perfectly polite and their was no sign of discord. Truman walked away genuinely
believing that he had fulfilled that firm approach. That he might have done so
ineffectively is less important then the fact that he did so.
For the next two days there
was no progress in any part of the negotiations between the three governments.
Molotov absolutely refused to budge on any point that either the British or
American teams might bring up. With the fate of the San Francisco conference in
jeopardy, Eden wired Churchill and said that if there was no progress at the
next day’s meeting the President should send for the three of them and himself
speak plainly with Molotov. Eden expected Truman to send for the three foreign
secretaries but Stettinius and Truman decided to see Molotov alone. They hoped
that this proposed conversation would lead to a more reasonable attitude by the
Russians. Regardless of it, the Polish talks should continue in San Fransisco. Truman
had a meeting with his senior diplomatic and military advisors before this. All
of the people he met with were FDR’s own people. He then asked for their
opinions.
Admiral Leahy reported
that the consensus made it clear the time had arrived to take a strong American
attitude towards the Soviet Union and that no political harm could be done to
our war prospects. The only dissenters from this were Henry Stimson and George
Marshall, who had reservations. Truman had received independent confirmation
from a military point of view that there was no reason to fail to stand up to
the agreement at Yalta. His task was to make this clear to Molotov. He was not
going to depart from FDR’s policy; his issue was whether he could hold the
Soviets to agree to.
At 5:30 Truman received
Molotov. Immediately he zeroed in on the Polish matter, emphasizing the United
States government could not agree wot be a party to the formation of a Polish
government which was not representative to Polish Democratic elements. He
warned that if their was a failure of the allies to agree with the Yalta accord
on Poland it was cast doubt on their unity in the post-war world. American
policy needed public support and this was especially true in economic
collaboration. When Molotov spoke in vague terms and attempted repeatedly to
blame Poland for working against the Red Army, Truman interjected three
separate times to the effect that all the Americans were asking was that the
Soviet government agree to the decision on Poland. Despite this Truman
continued to insist on his desire for the friendship of the Soviet government
but observed this could only be on the basis of mutual observation of
agreements and not on the basis of a one way street.
According to Truman’s
memoir Year of Decision the meeting ended with an acrimonious exchange
between Molotov and Truman. Molotov protested that: “I have never been talked
to like that in my life” and Truman responded: “Carry out your agreements and
you won’t get to talked like that.” In the years that have followed many
historians have ceased on that exchange as the critical moment of a shift in
policy between FDR’s conciliatory approach during the War and the breakdown
between communications that would lead to the Cold War. There are several flaws with this idea.
The first is it may
very well have been added by Truman for the purpose of spicing up his memoirs.
Charles Bohlen, who was present at the meeting, has no record of it in his
official minutes and it is only after Truman left office that he added it to
his memoirs and there is no record of it in either the American minutes or
Soviet minutes of the meeting. There is a strong possibility that future
historians chose to cease on this exchange as the clearest example of events as
there is little evidence in the historical record that follows of such a
change.
The second argument is
that does much to diminish what we know of the Soviet Union, not just in the
case of Stalin but Molotov. It is hard to imagine either man being such
shrinking violets that they would take this single insult as enough to decide
to immediate reverse a policy in which they had been getting everything that
they had wanted from the previous administration. It also ignores the fact that
this initial meeting would not like have happened at all had FDR not passed
away as well as the fact that for months previous to this, the early path
towards building Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
And it goes against the
immediate reaction of Molotov who left seeming unperturbed and apparently with
the position the talks were going in a positive direction, Considering his
position as Stalin’s righthand, he expected hostility – open or veiled – from
leaders he considered imperialist. In his memoirs, he mocked Truman’s attempt
to talk tough as ‘rather stupid.”
The American reaction
at the time was mixed, depending on those involved. Stettinius thought Truman
had done well and that had taken a step forward. When he reported this to
Vandenberg, the influential Republican was thrilled and confided in his diary
that F.D.R’s appeasement of Russia was over. Harriman was slightly surprised
about how hard Truman had gone at Molotov but that may have been due to his not
being present for the discussion between Eden and Stettinius that led to the
initial meeting.
The major
difficulty - and what gives what little
credence to historians about the exchange – was that it changed nothing
afterwards. The meeting ended with Molotov remaining as inflexible about Poland
as before, something that Eden telegraphed London with at the end of
negotiations that night.
And finally, for all
the effort to consider this some kind of major reversal, is belied by Truman’s
determination to fulfill the pledges FDR had made before. While it is highly
unlikely the more urbane Roosevelt would have been more diplomatic in his language
Bohlen himself would say that Truman was ‘simply saying what Roosevelt would
have said had he been alive. In any case the following day Stalin bluntly
rejected the joint telegram sent by Truman and then accused America and Britain
as ‘colluding to dictate terms to the Soviet Union.” When the meeting at UN did
occur American objected but only verbally. After his initial response Truman
backed away from further confrontation with Stalin. He avoided Churchill’s
pressing for an early meeting of the Big Three, having no desire to engage in
summit diplomacy while he was still obtaining a grasp of American policy. That
approach remained firmly in effect as the War in Europe began to reach its
inevitable end.
In the next part of
this series I will cover the next two months of Truman’s term,
how diplomacy began to shift after the war in Europe ended and how all
of that changed in the leadup to the conference at Potsdam.