In
his 1964 book White makes it clear that while no one could tell just how great
the Republican disaster of that year would be the prospects were already dark
in it he described what he considered the two differences between the two major
parties – and like so much else he has written it is basically still true more than
six decades later:
The
Democrats believe in government – government as an instrument to do things…a
party that guarantees to do things.
The
Republicans' impossible dilemma is that they have never sorted out properly
what it is that government should and should not do – and at what level…The
Republicans largest client group, business, wants the government to do nothing
– to leave it alone ; other client groups, chiefly inspired by the old
Protestant ethic of individual salvation, feel morally the individual must be
left the master of its own destiny. They campaign, generally, against government,
the Democrats campaign, generally, for government.
Then
in one of those quintessentially Theodore White lines he sums up the difference
between the two parties:
The
Republicans are for virtue, the Democrats for Santa Claus.
And
ever since the New Deal had been created and well into the 1960s everyone
believed in Santa Claus. It would be another twenty years before a Republican
could sweep into power by arguing purely for virtue. But the difficulty was
ever since the New Deal the Republican Party had been split between 'the
Eastern establishment' and 'the primitives. The Eastern Establishment was
essentially set in New York involving Wall Street and Madison Avenue. At the
time it was the center of business and many of the major government allies in
domestic and foreign policy should received their education there. And ever
since 1940 it had basically dictated who would be the standard bearer for the
Republican Party as President: Wendell Willkie in 1940, Thomas Dewey in 1944
and 1948, Eisenhower in 1952, Nixon in 1960. They had managed to keep the
conservative wing in the Midwest, most notably Robert Taft away from the
Presidential nomination.
This
should have led to favorable conditions for Rockefeller, but they'd had no use
for him in 1960. However since they had lost with Nixon in 1960 by such a
narrow margin he still had popular momentum. But they were just as repulsed by
Goldwater they knew they were headed for a collision course.
And
Rockefeller had two major problems. The first problem, his moderation and his
principles, the fact that he was too far to the left for where the party was at
the time and where it was heading. Still
he might have been able to overcome it with the voters had it not been for the
scandal that basically destroyed his run for the Presidency that year.
Considering
the nature of politics in my lifetime where men can be accused of extramarital
affairs and achieve the Presidency even before the 20th century was
over Rockefeller's undoing is very much a product of his era. Rockefeller had
divorced his first wife in November of 1961 and it didn't stop him from winning
reelection to the governorship in a landslide. Nor was the problem that he
remarried. It's how.
Margarita
Murphy, who would soon become known to the world as 'Happy' had been part of
the Rockefeller circle as far back as his father. She had married a scientist
who worked in the Rockefeller institute. Her husband was insanely jealous of
her and they'd undergone was passed for counseling in the 1960s. She'd worked for Rockefeller's first campaign
for governor and moved up in his circle.
White's
sensibilities don't go into when the affair between the two began; it is clear
it was going on at the time he chose to divorce his wife. The divorce followed
was incredibly ugly and a spectacle for the New York press which was just as
vitriolic and scandal ridden then as it is now.
Yet even that didn't prepare the people when Rockefeller announced that,
in secret, he and Happy Murphy had married on May 4th 1963.
Almost
immediately he was censured by many of his most loyal followers. Prescott Bush,
the future father and grandfather of Presidents, branded him 'a destroyer of
American homes'. And for the next year
the more conservative voters made it very clear what they thought with the
sexism that was so typical of the time: "I ain't gonna to vote a woman to
the White House who left her children." This would lead to Rockefeller
being hung on the 'morality issue' which is bizarre because of how it was
framed:
"Here
were two marriages already actually broken, already destroyed and at an end.
Here were two people in love. Should they marry publicly or have a clandestine
love affair? A man of Rockefeller's wealth can have a love affair on any terms
he wants. But he didn't want Happy that way. He wanted it open, she as his
wife. He kept holding off hard delegate commitments until he could announce his
remarriage – so that they could make up their minds with the facts on the
table."
Rockefeller
actually sounds noble when he told his advisers when they told him he would be
putting his chances of nomination at risk and said, "He would not give up
the woman he loved, even for the Presidency." Even given that the
infidelities would end up continuing after his marriage there's something
gallant about this, even if his faith in the public turned out to be horribly
misguided.
Rockefeller's
organization had gotten off to a good start throughout the spring of 1963 as
White recounts going forward. But the moment his remarriage was announced his
numbers plummeted. Prior to the remarriage he was the first choice of 43
percent of all Republicans polled, while Goldwater had just 26. In May
Goldwater now had 35 percent, while Rockefeller had dropped to 30 percent. The
following months showed no improvements with the Republican base. So it was
clear when Rockefeller announced his candidacy the only hope he had was through
the primaries.
On
November 7th 1963 he announced his candidacy. Two weeks John F.
Kennedy was assassinated. About ten days later White interviewed him and found
him in a reflective mood:
The
chances were slim. No one, he felt, would vote for him unless a national crisis
forced him too. The new Mrs. Rockefeller did not want him to run for the
Presidency; no one, in fact, wanted him to run except himself. If the people
wanted him, they would take him.
Multiple
people at the funeral, not just of Kennedy but one of his predecessors for
governor Herbert Lehman had reacted positively to him.
The
Kennedy assassination had shocked the country; Rockefeller thought it wanted
leadership. But did it want him? Was this public turning to him or something
deeper? And since it was obvious that the politicians did not want him,
he must, as Kennedy had done, show them his muscle at the polls, in the
primaries.
Indeed
the politicians did not like him and they didn't like Goldwater either. But
there weren't many obvious choices. Nixon was still possible, but he'd
disastrously lost the California governor's race the previous year. George
Romney, governor of Michigan, had no taste for it. Henry Cabot Lodge, Nixon's
choice for Vice President was a possibility (more on him later) and some
considered William Scranton, governor of Pennsylvania. All of their names would
be on the ballots in many states but during this period none were active in the
traditional sense.
So
the Eastern establishment waited through the primaries to see the clash between
Goldwater and Rockefeller which we see play out in the chapter White titles
"Duel to the Death'. In the opening paragraph White tells us what we were
going to see:
Presidential
primaries are always savage. But the Presidential primaries of 1964 were to
exceed in savagery and significance any other in modern politics….When the duel
was over, the Republican Party was so desperately wounded that its leaders were
fitter candidates for political hospitalization then political office.
There
were seventeen primaries in 1964: sixteen plus Washington DC. White chooses to
focus on the three he considers the most critical: New Hampshire on March 10th,
Oregon on May 15th and California, the last one on June 2nd.
A
brief recounting of what unfolded elsewhere is worth detailing. Despite not
being an active candidate (I'll get to that below Lodge would prevail in New
Jersey and Massachusetts. As favorite son Scranton won the Pennsylvania primary
and 52 delegates. Rockefeller would win DC and West Virginia. Goldwater would
win Texas, Indiana, Illinois and Nebraska while Margaret Chase Smith took the
primary in her home state of Maine.
Well
before the campaign as White details the Goldwater campaign had been hard at
work getting delegates at a state level. They did enormously well in the South
and would do so even as it became clear how damaged Goldwater was becoming as a
candidate to the public. But for all the
work F. Clifton White and other members of the Goldwater campaign was doing
they knew it would come to nothing if Goldwater couldn't notch at least one
major primary win against Rockefeller, who they viewed as everything they despised.
If they couldn't win at least one race then at the convention the party elders
would have every reason to take everything they worked for away from them and
they knew it. And indeed as the primary campaign went on their own candidate
did much to argue for it.
It
was clear in the primary from the start that the majority of those who attended
Rockefeller rallies had come 'not because they loved Rockefeller, they were
seeking an alternative to Goldwater." Because in those first three weeks
of the campaign the story was Goldwater's candor which destroyed him. Briefly
White sums up that by January 'he had shocked New Hampshire men into realizing
there were several kinds of conservatives – and that he was not their
kind."
A
month before Kennedy's assassination he had suggested the use of atomic
weaponry by NATO commanders; a week later he suggest the TVA be sold off. He'd
already advocated withdrawal of recognition from the Soviet Union and abolition
of the income tax. He said American missiles were undependable, that he wanted
to make Social Security voluntary, called Eisenhower's administration a dime
store New Deal. Goldwater was very much a victim of the press because of his
candor and the first person it was a gift to was Rockefeller. Yet he was still
too liberal for New Hampshire and they still were focused on his wife.
What
happened in New Hampshire was unparalleled in politics before or since. A group
of amateurs, led by a man who was an expert in direct mail, organized a
write-in vote candidacy for Henry Cabot Lodge. It was done entirely without
permission or even the presence of the candidate: Lodge was serving as
Ambassador to Vietnam at the time and had in fact already endorsed Rockefeller
before his departure. Yet this campaign received enormous support from those in
that state who were desperate for an alternative.
And
on March 10th Henry Cabot Lodge, who never set foot in New
Hampshire, won the primary with 33,000 votes, 12,300 more than Goldwater.
Rockefeller finished a distant third with 19,500. (Richard Nixon, also a write
in candidate, received 15,600 votes.
White
said that if the Lodge campaign hadn't happened he believed Rockefeller would
have won by a flat majority, won by a bigger margin in Oregon and almost
certainly beaten Goldwater in California. Instead Rockefeller knew he had no
real chance of winning the nomination but now he had to run in order to make
sure Goldwater was rejected,
Goldwater
had been just as disheartened. He'd basically had no taste to run after
Kennedy's assassination but had been talked into by Clifton White and his
colleagues. "He'd relied on local advisers as inexperienced in
Presidential politics as he was himself, and they had misled him." He made
it clear he would skip campaigning in Oregon entirely, and concentrate entirely
in California, even briefly considering dropping out.
The
victory had made Lodge the choice of the rank and file among Republicans and by
the time the first polls in Oregon came out he had 46 percent of the vote to
Goldwater's 14 and Rockefeller's 13. (As a measure of just how low both men had
fallen Nixon, still undeclared, was ahead of both men with 17 percent of the
vote.
Yet
during this campaign and particularly in Oregon Rockefeller found his voice.
The newsmen respected his courage when he said: "I don't care any longer
if I win – but I feel strongly about these things."
He
made it clear he was for federal aid to schools, for Social Security and
Medicare, that he wasn't a man who might set off war unwillingly. He was aided
by John Lindsay's campaign manager who released him for this campaign and put
up a direct mail effort that overmatched the Lodge campaign. There had been a
civil war among Oregon Republicans between the extremists and liberals and in
Portland, the machinery had been snatched by the former.
And
as a result you could see the momentum shifting. On election night Rockefeller
won decisively with 15,0000 more votes than Lodge. Goldwater had been
completely humiliated, receiving just 50,000, only 2000 more than an organized
write in for Nixon campaign got. And so, as White puts it "it was on to
California for the final phase of the duel in the sun."
Conservative
historians can be just as revisionist and biased about the past as their far
left counterparts but when it comes to their political successes they can see
with remarkable clarity. For that reason they know just how vital Goldwater's
victory in the California primary was for the conservative movement, even if
the fall election was a disaster.
White
makes it very clear just how well Goldwater's team had organized in California
for weeks in the leadup. He acknowledges just how organized they were
throughout the state and just how much work they had to do to keep "the
real kooks' from formal campaigning. It was extremely well organized from the
bottom up.
The
problem was the momentum seemed to shift from day to day as White made it
clear. Prior to the Oregon primary Goldwater had a comfortable lead with 48
percent to Rockefeller's 39. Immediately
afterwards the momentum moved entire to Rockefeller who would lead anywhere
from nine to eleven points in the polls. Rockefeller was barnstorming the state
those last ten days. But as White reports:
But
to counterbalance all this was the knowledge that the support Rockefeller had
expected in California from other liberal Republicans – from Romney, from
Scranton, from Nixon – had disappeared. If Rockefeller was indeed to win, as
the polls now seemed to indicate, then the other Easterners felt it unnecessary
to add to his margin by their support. Their attitude could be read simply: Let
Rockefeller dispose of Goldwater in California, then we will finish off
Rockefeller at the convention.
A
century earlier the first Republican President famously said: "I don't
confess to have control over events, but I confess they have control over
me." Rockefeller knew this better than anyone: because Happy was pregnant
with their first child who was due any day now.
Rockefeller was not flying back to New York every weekend; that would
draw attention to the marital situation they wished to have ignored.
Rockefeller
had bad timing in politics. In this case Happy gave birth to Nelson Junior on
May 30th three days before the primary. Goldwater immediately seized
on it as did his campaign. The effect in the polls was crystal clear;
Rockefeller's advantage disappeared almost literally overnight. The day before
the primary the two men were tied at 44 percent apiece with 12 percent still
undecided.
The
result was clear. Goldwater emerged the narrow winner with 51. 6 percent of the
vote to Rockefeller's 48.4 percent. Rockefeller ended up carrying 43 of
California's 47 countries but Goldwater won because of a 207,000 vote margin in
Los Angeles and Orange County.
The
power brokers behind the party instantly panicked. None of the liberal guard
had done anything to support him during the campaign because they'd been sure
he would defeat Goldwater and then they could move in and put up an
alternative. But now Goldwater had beaten Rockefeller and the power brokers
were suddenly aware of just how much work Clifton White and his colleagues had
done building alliances over the last three years. They'd managed to lock up
the South and the West but in order to win the Midwest those in power were only
willing to sign on if Goldwater won in California. When he did, the nomination
was all but locked up.
What
followed was so disastrous in its planning and action as the Stop Goldwater
movement tried desperately to stop a coup that had already happened.
Rockefeller, however, chose to step aside. He knew he wasn't going to be
President, bemoaned the disaster that was sure to happen in the fall and with a
certain mix of wit, allowed himself to enjoy the spectacle. He would sit out
the governor's conference in Cleveland that would become a spectacle that would
end up being a farce.
It's
possible that if Rockefeller had chosen to sit the convention at the Cow Palace
out, he might well have ended up getting the Republican nomination four years
later practically uncontested. He did attend as part of the platform committee
and he was willing to try in a backhanded way to helped the doomed campaign for
William Scranton to snatch the nomination from Goldwater.
However
he was chosen to read and defend the first of three drafts to the minority
report. This is how White describes the famous scene:
The
slight ripple of normal applause as he rose was almost immediately drowned by a
wave of boos, and then a billow of howling, and then by explosion. "We
want Barry! We want Barry!" the galleries shouted.
His
five minutes were allotted to the topic of extremism – and as with absolute
zest in the first minute, he swung into his call, the audience exploded again.
It was as if Rockefeller were poking with a long lance and prodding a den of
hungry lions – they roared back at him. This was the face of the enemy – more
important then columnists or switchblade hoodlums; this was the man who had
savaged Barry from New Hampshire to California all through the spring. This was
the man who called them kooks, and now, like kooks, they responded to prove his
point.
White
himself was in the galleries for Goldwater and eventually they became so loud
that he, in the kindest of euphemisms, "uncomfortably left…for the safety
of the floor." That was relatively quiet and he heard the speech:
"As
Rockefeller, enjoying the spectacle and combat a lock of his full hair tumbling
over his forehead taunted them (This is still a free country, ladies and
gentlemen") they yelled even louder. "These things", called
Rockefeller above the tumult, "have no place in America. But I can
personally testify to their existence. And so can countless others who have
also experienced anonymous midnight and early morning telephone calls, unsigned
threatening letters, smear and hate literature, strong arm and goon tactics,
bomb threats and bombings…infiltration and take-over of established political
organizations by Communist and Nazi methods." They yelled back at him and
strained in their seats as if trying to grab him and he shot back jauntily:
"Some of you don't like to hear it, ladies and gentlemen, but it’s the
truth."
The
Goldwater men did everything they could to control the galleries anger that was
being covered on TV from coast to coast. And what it showed was as White says:
"This
was a new thing in American conventions – not a meeting, not a clash, but a
coup d'etat." Goldwater was about to lead the nation to electoral
disaster. And Rockefeller's campaign has essential provided LBJ with all the
opposition research he could ever want for free.
The
party basically chose to treat their standard bearer as if he smelled bad.
Goldwater himself knew it was a doomed campaign. "If I had a pint of
brains," Goldwater himself said after the election, "I should have
known in San Francisco that I had won the nomination and lost the election
right there. As it was, it wasn't until August that I knew it was
hopeless." Goldwater's campaign will be the subject of its own article
down the road. For now, all you need to know is that when Goldwater came to New
York "the Rockefeller troops ignored Goldwater as if he were spoiled
refuse and concentrating on reelecting Senator Kenneth Keating, who openly
disassociated himself from the national ticket. Keating would run 860,500 votes
ahead of Goldwater in New York – LBJ got 68.6 percent of the popular vote
there- and yet he would still lose to Robert F. Kennedy by nearly 700,000
votes."
And
that as a reminder was a decent performance by Goldwater in 1964. LBJ
would win in a landslide with 61 percent of the popular vote and a margin of 16
million over Goldwater. He would carry 44 states and the District of Columbia
with 486 electoral votes. Goldwater had carried only six states: his home state
of Arizona and five Southern states, the most progress a Republican had made in
that region since Reconstruction. As White put it in the final chapter:
"The elections of 1964 had left the Republican Party in desperate
condition…The Republican Party requires a strategy; and no one yet has
persuaded the party of a strategy that can move it."
Outside
events, of course, would give them a strategy. But no one knew it at the time.
In
the final part of this series I will deal with how Rockefeller approached 1968
and how he may have come the closest in his three bids for the Presidency to
getting the nomination – and still missed.