In America In Search of Itself Theodore
White does what so many people do at the end of their careers: he starts
picking his favorites. In this case after
covering seven campaign trails from 1956-1980 in which by his own
accounting he met 'a score of would be Presidents' he choses those who in his
words 'seemed most qualified for the leadership denied him."
He names four men who are among the
most significant political forces of that period of time: Nelson Rockefeller,
Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver.
In one of my earliest series on
politicians I covered Humphrey's long career in politics in detail and quote
White's Making of the President series at great length as to advocate
for it. Kefauver only appears in America in Search of Itself and while I
may very well cover his career in a later series there isn't enough material on
White to deal with it. That leaves Rockefeller and Stevenson.
Because Rockefeller was present in the
first four books in White's series and was critical to Presidential campaigns
in the first three it would seem beneficial to begin with him. I have long
considered writing a series on him for multiple reasons, not the least of which
I'm a resident of New York and Rockefeller is one of the longest and most
successful governors of that sate of either party. For the purposes of this
article Rockefeller's significance is that he was a controversial figure of the
party when it was about to reach arguably the most critical point in its
century long history. He represented
what had been the main center of power for more than two decades: the so-called
Eastern Establishment, one that had given the party respectability if not the
power it wanted after FDR landslided Alf Landon in 1936 and many believed the
Republican Party would go extinct. This was the more moderate-centrist wing of
the party, one that was anathema to the increasingly conservative wing in much
of it.
To understand Rockefeller's failure to
achieve the Republican nomination for President in three consecutive
Presidential cycles explains what the party was like during that period and why
the conservative movement began and would eventually take over the party so
thoroughly that by the time Ronald Reagan was nominated for President in 1980
Rockefeller, who had passed away the following year, was not even mentioned at
the convention.
So let's start where White did in the Making
of the President 1960. This is how Rockefeller describes the party as he
knew it 1960 – and in the first paragraph he refers to 'the spectacular
Republican schizophrenia which has baffled all observers:
Within the Republican Party are
combined a stream of loftiest American idealism and a stream of the coarsest
American greed. These two political streams have mixed their waters from the
days of the Party's birth when the undeniably pure New England abolitionists
let their conscience be joined with the skills of some of the most practical
veterans of the old Whigs to form a party that would end slavery.
He discusses its long proud structure,
how the party irrevocably split during the Roosevelt-Taft civil war of 1912
which left the liberal wing in exile save for occasional victories – with the
exception of New York state. He talks about Eisenhower's take over because of
that Eastern establishment that gave them the Presidency in 1952 after twenty
years in exile. And he makes it clear that by the 1958 midterms the Party has
sunk to its lowest ebbs since the 1936 FDR landslide. It is not just that Congress that is under a
Democratic near supermajority in both houses; it is nationwide. The Republicans
now have just 14 governorships and control only 7 of 48 state legislatures.
(Alaska and Hawaii wouldn't officially join the Union until 1959.)
Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice
President, is considering his campaign for the nomination which will almost
certainly be his given the state of just how few viable challengers there are
in the Party. He knows there are only two Republicans who have come out on the
1958 midterms with the power to challenge him. Barry Goldwater, who has just
won a massive reelection to the Senate in Arizona and is already the favorite
of the more conservative branch of the party. The other is Nelson Rockefeller,
who managed to win the governorship of New York by more than 573,000 votes over
the Democratic incumbent Averill Harriman.
This is how White first describes
Rockefeller personally, particularly compared to the solitary Nixon:
"(Rockefeller's attitude) is one
of total security, total confidence, total cheeriness. Born into what is
America's closest counterpart to a royal family, raised within the walls of the
greatest private fortune known to man, Rockefeller has escaped the weight of
wealth that makes all but one of his four brothers and sister such shy,
withdrawn, reticent people, instead the assurance of wealth has made him
radiant. Rockefeller is, in image and in actual person, one of the sunniest,
most expansive and outgoing personalities of American politics….His constant
smile is genuine, his great bear hug an authentic expression of delight in
meeting people.
Rockefeller had already served in some
form of politics under FDR, Truman and Eisenhower, but by early 1956 he had
quit the administration out of his belief that it was drifting from crisis to
crisis. He had served in appointive office for years but realized 'only the
people, voting at the polls, give a man true power in American government. For
that reason in 1958 he ran for governor because it was 'an executive post to be
won from the people directly. Not lost on him was the fact that as White puts
it 'in 21 national elections from the end of the Civil War and 1948 no less
then thirteen times did one or the other (and sometimes both) parties choose
its Presidential candidate a governor or former governor of New York. These
included both Roosevelts, Grover Cleveland and Tom Dewey, Eisenhower's
predecessor as Republican nominee for President.
Rockefeller knew that the pressure was
on the moment he was elected governor. He was going to be 52 in 1960 and if a
Republican won, then served two terms, he would be 60 in 1968. More than that
'he disliked Richard Nixon and considered him incapable in the role of
President'. (Boy was he on point.)
In December of 1959 Rockefeller began
to explore his options and his fortune as White says, "made it a far more
efficient headquarters then the Republican national headquarters.' And if was
efficient: Rockefeller was doing an exploratory campaign not trying to launch
one.
It makes clear what Rockefeller was
exploring: concern for the welfare of the United States which even then White
acknowledge was more important to the liberal progressive wing of the party.
The second was the mechanics and acquisition of delegates (more important then
primaries in 1960) and third financial exploration.
In it White is very much on point to
how Republican politics worked even in 1960:
The regular wing of the Republican
party depends for support on the executive class of great corporations… in
fact, they control it.
Rockefeller knew that his personal
fortune was more then enough to finance a Presidential campaign; it was, if
anything, large enough to dwarf the Kennedy fortune that was about to be
launched to gain the Democratic nomination.
But he also knew even if he was successful, it would be politically
worthless – and unlike so many wealthy Republican presidential candidates to
come Rockefeller had the morality that he wasn't willing to buy it. In any case he knew if business got behind
Nixon he couldn't stand against him. So this part was important.
Rockefeller's business team then went
to almost every major corporation, assuming that because they were the first
family in business and because they had spent much of their fortune on funding
the GOP, the favors would be returned. They were met with courtesy but the
doors were closed.
As one of Rockefeller's in-group said
in words of portent:
I'd always read these things Democrats
say about us and thought they were naïve. But here was the club, not only
against Nelson because he was a liberal but also committed to Nixon.
Business like Eisenhower and they
believed Nixon would be good for business. More to the point Nelson's money
hurt him – because he didn't need them.
Rockefeller made two scouting trips
between October and December and the reaction was generally the same: the
people liked him but the regulars who controlled the machinery ignored him.
So by mid-December the Rockefeller
clan was ready for its report. Nixon had the regulars sewn up, the delegate
brokers likewise and nothing from business.
Given the support he'd gotten on the
trail Rockefeller might well have made contest of it had he taken the route of
the primaries. But by this point he didn't want a primary fight, he actually
wanted to be a good governor. So Rockefeller chose to take an approach that was
almost impossible to think of today.
So on Christmas Eve Rockefeller read a
statement:
"I believe…that the great
majority of those will control the Republican nomination stand opposed to any
contest for the nomination…Therefore any quest on my part for the nomination
would entail a massive struggle in primary elections throughout the nation
demanding so greatly of my time and energy would make impossible the
fulfillment of my obligations as Governor of New York…My conclusion, therefore,
is that I am not, and shall not be, a candidate for the nomination for the
Presidency."
Everyone in Rockefeller's inner circle
knew that this wasn't entirely true. Rockefeller didn't want to give Nixon a
fight and knew if he did so the party would go more to the right. Besides there
were seven months to the convention.
And the Nixon campaign was anything
but thrilled by this. They'd planned for a primary battle against Rockefeller
in which Nixon would be the active campaigner and Rockefeller the punching bag.
They saw it as a way to enliven the spring, get the party invigorated for the
fall campaign, take media time away from the Democrats "and above all,
tune up the personnel and human machinery they would need for the fall
election. All this was now denied them."
Rockefeller was a good governor for
the next five months. Then on May 1st
1960 events began to intervene. Francis Gary Powers, while flying his U-2 plane
over Russia, was shot down and captured the first acknowledged American spy
seized by the Soviets. A summit that was scheduled between Eisenhower and
Khrushchev collapsed before it began, ending the possibility of a disarmament
summit. Relationship with the new leader of Cuba Fidel Castro collapsed as he
welcome the support of the Soviets. All this and much more led to a decided
shadow over the Eisenhower administration and its Vice President.
White would write about this affected
every candidate for President still in the race. And Rockefeller began to speak
out. Most notably he was eligible for a draft and his lieutenants then chose to
freeze the state which at that point commanded the biggest delegate prize from
Nixon to an uncommitted posture.
This movement, unknown to
contemporaries but far more common then, had been used by the Democrats just
eight years earlier to pick Adlai Stevenson, who hadn't sought the nomination,
as their nominee on the third ballot and Wendell Willkie in 1940. White mentions
this had to be part of Rockefeller's thinking but has no clear idea of anyone
other than Rockefeller himself actually believed it a possibility however
remote. Yet even then he refused to say if he was running for President.
Then on June 8th he issued
a statement in which he challenged the Republican party as being unable to meet
the needs, issued a nine-point program which for all intents and purposes
repudiated the Eisenhower administration. He gave a series of speeches over the
next five weeks in the leadup to the convention which was for all intents and
purposes "open warfare with the leadership of his own party and implicit
denunciation of its conduct over the last eight years."
And while it was too late to
realistically do anything there was clearly a public demand for it. A movement
to Draft Rockefeller was formed and the RNC would be overwhelmed by telegrams
and mail from the people demanding the delegates nominate Rockefeller.
Compared to the Democratic convention
in LA there was no real suspense over who would become the nominee. The
excitement as White makes clear, was over the platform. It was being designed by a man named Charles
Percy then a Republican businessman who in six years would be elected to the
Senate in Illinois. Percy had worked on the platform for the past several
months.
However when he flew to New York he
was completely unprepared for the force that was Rockefeller:
Mr. Rockefeller had a wide range of
national concerns, care for the aged, rights for the Negroes (sic) stimulation
of capital investment for growth of the economy and national defense…most
notably the Missile gap."
There was a problem:
In essence, Mr. Rockefeller insisted
that the platform on defense cry: EMERGENCY!
But in essence the Republican
administration of the country denied emergency.
White acknowledges something no
politician would
In the hard life of politics it is
well known that no platform nor any program advanced by either major American
party has any purpose beyond expressing emotion…All platforms are meaningless:
the program of either party is what lies in the vision and conscience of the
candidate the party chooses to lead it…The platform committees are harmless
exercises in both parties and flatter all the people appointed to platform
committees, in the belief they are important.
(Perhaps certain people should have
read this when they were so outraged that the 2020 and 2024 Republican
conventions had no platforms. It was the inevitable end point.)
Percy spent the next early part of the
convention trying to hammer out a compromise between the Nixon forces and
Rockefeller's. Many of his own delegation -mostly from the more conservative
upstate regions – were already annoyed by Rockefeller as governor and they knew
that Nixon's nomination was a foregone conclusion. The question was how long
could Rockefeller hold them before they broke to Nixon openly, thus humiliating
the governor publicly.
On Thursday evening the Rockefeller
delegation reviewed the draft of the platform and found it unsatisfactory. They
demanded a floor fight and the possible of 'open civil war on the convention
floor'. The following day Nixon called Herbert Brownell, one of the key
strategist of Eisenhower's victory and a colleague of former governor Dewey.
Brownell then called Rockefeller on behalf of Nixon to organize a meeting to
discuss the platform, saying he agreed with all of Rockefeller's terms.
This meeting that took place in New
York occurred in ignorance of the delegates in Chicago. What emerged was what
White referred to as 'the 14 points compact of Fifth Avenue." The exact
details are relevant more to historians: what matters for these purposes is
what Rockefeller did afterwards.
He issued a statement in which he made
it clear that he and Nixon had worked together to discuss the platform and
where the two men agreed.
Two explosions took place
simultaneously. The most significant was
in Chicago where the delegates on the committee were infuriated. Back then there was already a belief that 'the
Eastern Establishment' – then a code word for liberal as much for Republicans
as Democrats – had conspired to force their values down the throats of so many
Republicans. Barry Goldwater, already becoming their loudest voice, referred to
it as 'the Munich of the Republican Party'.
Eisenhower was quieter but no less
infuriated. For him this was a personal betrayal by a man who he had once
considered a personal ally.
By Sunday the Republican convention
was in chaos and Nixon was caught between the two extremes of the party as
White said:
Unless the Nixon men demonstrated to
Rockefeller that they could deliver a platform in the spirit of the Compact on
Fifth avenue, Rockefeller could cry treachery and still take his fight to the
floor. Yet if they rode roughshod over the platform committee, they would be
expose to the outriders of Goldwater crying 'Treason' or 'Tyranny' from the
right.
Eventually he came to take two
critical positions that accommodated Rockefeller. What may have been the most
costly, from an electoral standpoint,
was Rockefeller's position on civil rights. This was, it should be
noted, a more advanced one then the Democrats because it advocated support for
sit-ins and promised federal intervention to promote job equality.
White I should mention was very clear
on how things were going to play out when it came to civil rights and the
south:
If they adopt a civil rights program
only moderately more restrained then the Democrats, the South can be there for
the asking and with the South, if it comes permanent to Republican loyalties could
come such solid addition of electoral strength that would make the Republicans
again, as they were for half a century, the majority party of the nation and
semipermanent stewards of the national executive power. Furthermore since
the Northern Negro now votes habitually for the Democrats by overwhelming
margins, why seek to outbid the Democrats where they cannot be outbid?
As we shall see, just four years
later, that is exactly what Goldwater would do and it played out exactly as
White said it would for the Republicans for the next sixty years. White is
essentially saying what every single left-wing columnist has about what the GOP
did after the 1964 election. But whereas they see it as purely a moral
consideration and therefore evil, White sees it as 'one of trade: let us give
the Northern Negro vote to the Democrats and we shall take the South to ourselves.'
White himself believes that by
agreeing with Rockefeller on this it cost him the election, though he
acknowledges Nixon couldn't decide whether to campaign for Northern Negro or
Southern white and instead tried to get both. Say what you will about Nixon but
he clearly learned that he had to choose one or the other and he chose one that
he thought would win him the Presidency – and it did.
None of this concerned Rockefeller; he
accepted the compromise and by Tuesday announced he was withdrawing from the
race for President. What he didn't know was something White would tell us in
the next volume.
Before
the convention, they came to Goldwater, saying that they wanted to nominate him
for President and that they could provide 300 delegates to do so on the first
ballot. Barry Goldwater was many things but he was not idiot; he demanded those
same conservatives give him the names of the delegates. They could only come up
with 35, and he told them to back off. His address to the convention, with the
famous words: “Let’s grow up, conservatives!” was less a declaration of
interest for the Presidency and more of a warning to them about how they should
do things going forward.
Nixon
of course narrowly lost the election to Kennedy, seemingly ended his
Presidential prospects for good. Rockefeller now believed he had a better
chance for it – seemingly unaware of just how many enemies he'd made the first
time around.
In
the next article in this series I will deal with Rockefeller's plans for the
1964 nomination – and how his personal life would do as much damage as the
upcoming civil war in the GOP would.