There's a belief that's a big part
of revisionist historians about Theodore
White and JFK. The right wing as I said in the introduction argues that White
was in the tank for Kennedy from the start to the point that they all but
accuse him of getting him elected. That's laughable considering the book was
published in March of 1961 and no one, least of all White, could have predicted
just how successful it would become. It's like a conspiracy theorist suggested
that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was staged not by the CIA or the
neo-conservatives but ABC because Ted Koppel wanted the anchor's job on the
nightly news and they decided to stage the hostage crisis to give him something
to do at 11:30. (I really hope that I didn't start something on the Dark
Web with this.)
Even if you wanted to believe White
was in the tank for Kennedy from the start, it collapses if one actually reads
the book. Yes White was with JFK and his camp on election night 1960. But
he was one of two nominees for President. Somehow I doubt if he'd been with
Richard Nixon the right would have argued his presence was responsible for
Nixon losing. Because having read the book White spends as much time covering
the Republicans as he does the Democrats, giving basically the same number of
pages to Kennedy and Nixon in the fall campaign.
To a larger point, and I've written
this multiple times, White may have been the own member of the 'Georgetown
Elite' who went out of his way to give Nixon a fair shake. He would later
acknowledge he had been taken in by him as President but in the 1960 edition
(and indeed in the following two publications before Nixon was elected
President) he went out of his way to treat him in a fair and balanced method.
If he had any prejudice towards Nixon at the time I don't see it in his writing,
if anything in the 1964 book he expresses sympathy and empathy for Nixon's
political fortunes to that time.
Yes he did cover Kennedy extensively
but that doesn't per se mean he was in awe of the man's charisma and aura. If
there is a candidate he clearly admires in that book its Adlai Stevenson who
gets by far the most sympathetic treatment in the boo. We see a similar
approach to all four of the other candidates White follows for 1960: Rockefeller
on the Republican side; Humphrey, Stuart Symington and LBJ on the Democratic
side. He clearly has respect for those men and their accomplishments at the
time (he would later write that he believed Stevenson, Humphrey and Rockefeller
were more than qualified to be President) and I have little doubt had any of
the also-rans been the nominees of their party who would have treated them with
the same respect he did Kennedy.
The other argument from revisionists
(I've made it myself at times) is that White was so taken in by the charisma
and charm offensive of the Kennedy family that he overlooked so many of their
sins that we now know about. The first is foolish, of course: White didn't have
the benefit of more than sixty years of hindsight to do the research and judge
them. There's also the fact that much of this is the issue of so many writers
who wouldn't exist without White as their foundation judging their predecessors
for not looking with today's glasses, which is a tail as old as time.
And most importantly there's the fact
that it's not like this would have been a failure that existed solely to
Theodore White. To this day, there are people of a certain age and even younger
ones who will overlook, if not excuse, the truths we now know about JFK with
that saying: "It was a different time." That was true, I should be
clear, of the journalism of the era. Back then, the idea of looking into the
bedrooms of political candidates was considered the stuff of tabloid journalism
and exploitation. (And as we shall see White would indeed end up covering the
first prominent effect of this on Presidential politics in his next book and do
so relatively clear-eyed.)
Now its clear that White was granted
an unparalleled amount of access to the Kennedy campaign – or to be more
accurate the kind of controlled access that they allowed the media and the
public to see for consumption. They were crafting an image that has held to
this day in some circles and for a journalist writing his first major book (one
whose success he couldn't possibly imagine) White would have been a fool to
ignore. But that said having read his book multiple times its clear that while
the Kennedys did much to curry favor with him he was pretty close to impartial
when it came to reporting the bare facts of their campaign and it didn't stop
him from talking with every candidate and having more empathy for some than
others.
Having read the books its clear that
while he may admire Kennedy and what he's doing he clearly has more sympathy
for Humphrey during the primary fight. He admits that the Kennedy's wealth and
stature appear as remarkable to the masses and actually argues that his
ordinariness hurt him: "Humphrey was just like everyone else and a
President, unfortunately for Humphrey, must be different from everyone
else." Not for White is the belief in the likability of a candidate; he
would mock the idea of the appeal of a President being based on whether you'd
want to have a beer with him that has now become gospel.
Kennedy's ability did seem
preposterous in Wisconsin in the winter of 1960. White relates how he went out
of his way to shake the hands of so many people on the campaign trail and by
and large they were aloof, even hostile, to him. The Kennedy charisma that won
over the masses in the fall was not present to White in Wisconsin during that
period. He acknowledges that the main reason Kennedy one was not so much a
charm offensive but an organizational one, which money was the main driving
factor. The Kennedy family did put a hue amount of resources into Wisconsin.
And as White reports the Kennedy
family knew how badly they'd failed. They did win with 56 percent of the vote
to Humphrey's 44 percent but it broke down on religious grounds. The four
heavily Catholic districts all voted for him and he lost the four that were
heavily Protestant. White makes it clear that Kennedy knows this at the time
how badly he's failed.
What does that mean?" asked one
of his sisters.
"It means," (Kennedy) said
quietly yet bitterly, "that we have to do it all over again. We have to go
through every one of them – West Virginia and Maryland and Indiana and Oregon,
all the way to the convention.
Even
at the time, it’s worth noting that even if Humphrey won in West Virginia, he
had no chance of being nominated after he lost in Wisconsin: the fact he
couldn’t win in a neighboring state crushed hopes of his electability. Indeed,
if Humphrey had gotten out right then, there’s a real chance the Kennedy
machine might have stalled right there: the primary path that they were
travelling would have been meaningless if there were no viable contenders
challenging them.
If
realizing this, Humphrey had withdrawn at that moment, Kennedy would have faced
zero opposition in West Virginia, thus any Kennedy victory there would have
been worthless and been meaningless in terms of gaining power vis-à-vis the
Eastern bosses.
White
knew of what he spoke. In the 1952 Democratic primaries Estes Kefauver had won
the lion's share of the Democratic primaries against limited competition. And
because of that fact the party bosses had been sure he couldn't win and
withheld their support at the convention, thus setting up the circumstances for
Adlai Stevenson's eventual nomination on the third ballot.
Symington
and LBJ had decided not to compete in the primaries, holding out for a
convention deadlock. Aside from Humphrey there were no real candidates in any
of the other states Kennedy was competing against. In a footnote White points
out that Kennedy's only competition in the New Hampshire primary – the first
primary in the nation – had been basically uncontested with Kennedy's only
opposition coming from a ball-point manufacturer he doesn't even bother to
name. Wayne Morse and Mike DiSalle might have had some more political weight
behind them but no one considered them serious contenders for anything in
Oregon or Ohio, respectively.
And
it is worth noting that White is
ambiguous at best at how much the wins in the primaries in the states Kennedy
campaigned in were to the long term strategy. As he points out in a footnote of
the seven states that Kennedy chose to openly contest, five of them ended up
going to Nixon in the general election. (For the record, those five states
were New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Indiana,
Oregon and Nebraska. Only Maryland and West Virginia went for Kennedy in 1960 –
and one wonders how much of that vote was driven by the presence of Lyndon
Johnson as Vice President.)
During
the lead-up to the Democratic convention and the convention itself White spends
much of his time with the Adlai Stevenson campaign – one which, I should add,
is basically going on without Stevenson agreeing to lead it – then he does with
the Kennedy campaign itself. He clearly admires their efforts; however futile
they end up being and there's an argument his heart truly is with Stevenson.
And while he follows the Kennedy campaign from behind the scenes he makes it
very clear that not even they were certain of a first ballot victory: it took
until Wyoming, the last state in the role call for them to get the 763 votes
they needed to clinch the nomination. White makes it very clear that for all
the brave front they put forward no one was sure until the end of the role call
that they got the nomination.
And
it's worth noting that for all his clear admiration for Kennedy, White makes it
clear it was Nixon who started the fall campaign like gangbusters and that
Kennedy's faltered in the early weeks. He makes it clear that Nixon's vow to
campaign in all 50 states clearly impressed the voters in a way that Kennedy's
campaign struggled to in what he calls 'Round One. At the end of the Republican
convention Nixon was ahead 53 percent to 47 percent in the Gallup polls and it
took until September for them to build momentum. And its clear he has more
sympathy for Nixon then Kennedy because of 'a series of episodes that wrung
sympathy for him even from his most embittered opponents." He focuses on
how Nixon struck his kneecap on a car door in North Carolina that became
infected and eventually forced him to spend nearly two weeks in Walter Reed. He
makes it clear how badly it hurt his health. And White makes it clear from the
vantage of the press corps just how much contempt the press held for Nixon –
making it pretty clear that Nixon's contempt for them may well have been
justified.
Its
worth noting while the verdict on the Kennedy-Nixon debates as to how important
they were, White himself thinks that they little to actually educate the
audience. And he makes it clear that throughout the campaign neither campaign
did much to contrast the difference between their views on the issues he
considers important to the voters. In a sense he agrees that perception of
Kennedy to Nixon was importance but never once does he think Kennedy ever did
anything to clarify how he was different than Nixon on the issues. In his book on the 1972 campaign White gives
a list of the four Presidential elections that he believed offered the greatest
contrast between the two candidates – and 1960 is not one of them. (I will
mention which four later on.) At the end of the day he thinks Kennedy won the
election because he seemed to win a popularity contest, not because he was
necessarily more qualified to be President.
He
comes to the conclusion at the end of the book that he doesn't know whether
Kennedy's election is a consequential one in American history and he has no
illusion about the fact that Kennedy didn't get a mandate as the Republicans
gained two seats in the Senate and 25 in the House of Representatives. The
Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress by a considerable margin but Kennedy
had not provided his party with that most glorious things: coattails.
If
the Democratic Party at best, in 1960, held even with the Republicans and at
worst suffered a defeat, then only one lesson can be drawn therefrom: that this
was a personal victory for John F. Kennedy and not his Party.
And
White is unclear at the end of his book if that is a good thing for the country
or a poor one.
Ted
White acknowledges Nixon’s campaign was more successful as part of a general
map: he divided the country into eight regions, and said Nixon carried five.
The three Kennedy carried were New England, the Northeast, and the South.
Indeed when it comes to the total number of states carried Nixon carried 26 to
Kennedy's 22. And he makes it clear the real accomplishment Kennedy managed was
convincing the overwhelming majority of Protestant voters – who had famously
rejected Al Smith, the previous Catholic candidate for President in an
electoral landslide – to end up choosing to vote for him to provide his narrow
margin of victory. And he makes it clear how it
Like
everything else related to the Kennedys I think Making of A President came
to be viewed as a favorable portrait looking back through history and after the
assassination. To be sure White reports
all of the well known anecdotes, puts up a favorable look at both the candidate
and his family on the campaign trail and off and makes him sound knowledgeable
on subjects. But that's no different then the other candidates he talks to
during the book or indeed many of the ones that will come in the future. He's
clearly impressed by Kennedy's accomplishment and winning both the Democratic
nomination and the Presidency against seemingly impossible odds but that means
little once when has power. He ends the
book the way he will all that follow: looking at the obstacles the President
will have to face and whether he is up to it. And after giving a picture of the
country and the world this what he says about the man's ability to do so:
It
can be certain only, at the incumbency of the now 35th President of
the United States, that he would certainly try.
That's
essentially a variation of what George W. Bush would say about Obama when he
took the Presidency in 2008: "I want him to succeed." That's all
White is prepared to say even after spending a year in his company. He has no
idea of the future any more than the rest of us would and no certainty that he
will.
In
the next part of the series I will look at how White viewed both Robert and Ted
Kennedy in his books in a way that makes it very clear that they he never
looked at either man as part of 'the Restoration of Camelot' future generations
would.