What History Gets Wrong - And Right - About Andrew Johnson, Part 6: How The Impeachment Had Nothing to Do With High Crimes OR Misdemeanors

 

I remember in the winter of 1998 when the votes were being counting for the impeachment of Bill Clinton the discussion of how historic an occasion this one. The fact that Clinton had become only the second President in history to be impeached naturally led to mention of Andrew Johnson and how the model for his trial in the Senate was going to be the model Congress went through in the weeks and months to come.

I don’t know if they talked to any historians about the circumstances that led to Johnson’s impeachment – cable news was far more focused on the how then the why – but if they had they would have realized the irony was far greater than the parallels. The Radical Republicans had been wanted to impeach Johnson since at least 1866 not because they believed Johnson was corrupt or treasonous but because they disagreed with his politics. The pretense that they used to start the process was a pretense to get at the President they disliked. And unlike Clinton’s impeachment, which was considered pure theater almost from the start, the Radical Republicans was more dire: for all intents and purposes, they were attempting a show trial in order to enact what amounted to a coup d’etat.

In retrospect the Tenure of Office Act could not have been more blatantly designed to impeach Andrew Johnson if it had in fact been given that name going forward. The irony is the accusations of the Radical Republicans for impeachment amounted to Johnson abusing the power of his office when the Tenure of Office Act was a far more blatant abuse than Johnson ever did. The decision for the hiring and firing of Cabinet officials is solely the business of the executive branch. The Senate can advise and consent when it comes to approval of the President’s nominees but they have no say as to whether the President can fire any head of the Cabinet.  And given the exact wording of the bill, it was clearly done so that Johnson – who had asked all of Lincoln’s cabinet to stay on after the assassination – could not remove them. I have little doubt that if Johnson had not chosen to challenge this act – which he had vetoed and they had overridden as a rebuke to him – they would have repealed it after Johnson’s Presidency. It was merely done to bait Johnson so they would have an excuse to remove him from power.

And to be clear, they would have been doing so in what amounted to a kangaroo court. The next in line for the Presidency, with the Vice Presidency vacant, was the President pro tempore of the Senate. That position was held by Ben Wade, one of their own. This fact actually hurt whatever chances for impeachment were possible: the moderate branch of the party did not agree with Johnson but making Ben Wade President was a bridge too far.

Aggravating the problem was Johnson’s relationship with Edwin Stanton, Lincoln’s Secretary of War. Stanton was a dyspeptic man to work with on a good day and even Lincoln had difficult relations with him. Stanton was also working in combination with Grant to undermine the president’s Southern policy from within. Johnson considered firing him but he respected him too much. Stanton did not want Johnson to appoint his successor.

In the first impeachment inquiry, there seemed to be no grounds and when a federal court released Jefferson Davis on bail on May 13^th, the House Committee investigated whether Johnson was impeding the prosecution. After learning Johnson wanted Davis tried, a bipartisan majority voted down impeachment charges and the committee adjourned in June.

Later that month Johnson and Stanton battled over whether the military officers in command of the South could override the newly appointed civil authorities. Johnson’s got the Attorney general to back the position he could not and then tried to pin Stanton’s position down on it. Stanton evaded the issue. After Congress reconvened the next month, it passed a Reconstruction Act supporting the civil authorities and then overrode his veto. This legislation was, if anything, more designed to remove Johnson’s authority saying the President could not control the Army in the South.

Johnson decided to fire Stanton and relieve one of his military commanders Philip Sheridan. Johnson was deterred initially over a strong objection by General Grant but on August 5^th he demanded Stanton’s resignation. Stanton refused to resign with Congress out of session. Johnson suspended him, pending the next meeting of Congress and named Grant his temporary replacement, something he did reluctantly. He also issued a proclamation pardoning most Confederates, exempting those who held office or served in federal office before the war had breached their oaths. The off-year elections generally went Democratic, with voters in Ohio, Connecticut and Minnesota turning down propositions for African-American suffrage.

Despite this rebuke at the polls, when Congress met again in November the Judiciary committee reversed itself and passed a resolution of impeachment against Johnson. It failed by a margin of 108 against to 57 in favor. In the aftermath Johnson notified Congress of Stanton’s suspension. In January of 1869, the Senate disapproved and reinstated Stanton, contending the President had violated the Tenure of Office Act. Johnson promptly dismissed Stanton and appointed Lorenzo Thomas to replace him. Stanton refused to leave his office and on February 24, 1868, the House impeached the President for intentionally violating the Tenure of Office Act.

It's hard not to look at how things played out to see that Congress had designed these actions in order to play on Johnson’s break with them over Reconstruction. Regardless of what you may think of Johnson’s actions regarding the management of Reconstruction, the fact remains that Congress led by men such as Butler and Stevens had decided to usurp his authority and put it in place of their own. This was overreach but it was done by the legislative branch not the executive.

They were enabled by Stanton, who was one of the more vehement opponents of Johnson’s policy regarding Reconstruction and who it could be argued was exceeding his authority as well. Johnson had wanted to dismiss Stanton for a long time and replacement with General Sherman and with the Tenure of Office Act in place, he chose to flaunt his disregard for Johnson knowing he was protected. Even Lincoln’s cabinet was divided about Johnson’s decision: William Seward argued against it, but Salmon P. Chase – who had served as Treasury Secretary and now served as Chief Justice offered support for Johnson’s actions. Considering that Stanton was also in poor health after seven years in office as well as suffering from poor finances, it might have been in Stanton’s best interest to step down; indeed he died just two years after Johnson fired him. But his stubbornness and intractability – problems he held throughout his tenure in public life – made him refuse to give in.

The day after Johnson attempted to replace Stanton, the House Select Committee on Reconstruction released a report recommend Johnson be impeached on high crimes and misdemeanors. It passed 126-47.

After the vote Stevens submitted a pair of resolutions creating a two-person committee tasked with presenting to the Senate bar the impeachment resolution that had been passed and creating a seven person committee to prepare a report articles of impeachment. The House approve 126-42, on a strictly party line vote. Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House, appointed John Bingham and Stevens to the two person committee and Bingham, Stevens and George Boutwell to the seven person committee. (Bingham and Stevens had all been members of the House Select Committee on reconstruction.) Stevens later described the subcommittee’s approach as reflective of its members egotism: he witnessed each member individually write their own articles of impeachment, the committee then sorting through the resulting articles and aggregating them together.

They would eventually create eight articles, which might have been a misstep as they all focused on Johnson’s actions with Stanton. The ninth accused him of violating the Command of Army act when he had supposedly pressured General William Emory to ignore Grant as acting secretary and instead take orders from Johnson.

When the debate took place on March 2, House Republicans were disappointed how badly constructed the articles were produced and reduced the nine articles to seven. Stevens was infuriated that the committee had been too gentle with Johnson saying that they had omitted many crimes about Johnson imperiling the governing structure of the United States. That the context of these articles were based primarily on Congress’ own overreach was an irony that Stevens either did not see or chose to ignore as he delivered vituperative remarks on these justified charges that needed to be approved to remove the ‘unfortunate man’ occupying the presidency.

On March 5, the trial began in the Senate. Boutwell, Butler and Stevens were essentially the prosecutors and William Evarts, Benjamin Curtis and the former Attorney General were his defense counsel. Chase was the presiding judge. The defense relied on the provision of the tenure of office act that made it applicable only to appointees of the current administration and therefore did not apply to Stanton because Lincoln had appointed him. His counsel insisted that he make no appearance at the trial, nor public comment on it. Instead, he maneuvered behind the scenes to gain an acquittal.

Senators were reluctant to impeach because Wade was a lame duck and was considered too radical for many Americans. Among other things Wade supported woman’s suffrage which most Radicals did not support. And as many Senators expected Grant to run for the Republican nomination in 1868 and therefore take the White House, they did not want Wade to impede that.

On May 16^th, the Senate voted on the eleventh article of impeachment, accusing Johnson of firing Stanton. The vote was 35 guilty, 19 not guilty. Ten Republicans voted Not Guilty. The Senate adjourned for the Republican National Convention where Grant received their nomination for President. When they returned on May 26, the Senate voted on the second and third articles and received the same results. Johnson’s opponents, led by a bitter Stevens, gave up and dismissed proceedings. Stanton relinquished his office and as Johnson had promised, he appointed the respected John Schofield as his replacement. At the time and later allegations were made of bribery. Benjamin Butler investigated but could find no proof.

Two months later Johnson sought renomination at the Democratic National Convention. Still popular among Southern Whites, he issued a pardon ending the possibility of criminal proceedings against any Confederate not already indicted. On the first ballot, he was second only to former representative George Pendleton, his Democratic opponent for Vice President in 1864. His support mostly came from the South and dwindled away as the ballots passed. After 22 ballots, former New York Governor Horatio Seymour was nominated. That November Grant would defeat Seymour for the Presidency, mainly because African-American voters in the South gave him the margin of victory. Johnson did little campaigning.

In his first message to Congress Grant urged the repeal of the Tenure of Office act but it was not repealed until Grover Cleveland’s election in 1884. Cleveland was a supporter of civil service and wanted to repeal the spoils system, a policy that had led to much corruption for more than sixty years. When he suspended hundreds of office holders for cause, Senate committees request information from Cabinet members regarding the reasons for the suspensions. Cleveland refused to provide it, in early 1886 explaining that this position impinged on the independence of the executive. It was formerly repealed the next year.

In the epilogue I will deal with the ramifications of Johnson’s Presidency, the flaws behind so much of the ideas of Radical Reconstruction and the true consequences of the impeachment.