As long as I
can remember the left has always been outraged by the Supreme Court. And while
they’ve had legitimate reasons to be so in the past decade, I think that much of their outrage is based
in their rigidness in their ideology.
Like everything
else, those on the left believe that their interpretation of how society should
operate is the only correct one. There is no more room for nuance on that then
there is for those extremists on the right. This has always been destructive
but it is particularly troubling in regard to the law which is more often than
not is entirely about nuance.
I’m not saying
that the GOP’s action over the past several decades in regards to both the law
and the Supreme Court in particular have not been the kind of thing that
deserve lambasting. But what it hides is the fact that when it comes to the law
the left can be just as devoted to ideology as the right is. This is true in so
many of the notices you receive for fundraising that dealing with decisions
about gun control or LGBTQ rights or gerrymandering or any of the other trigger
points. One of the first mentions in their articles is whether the judge was
appointed by a Republican President. The message is never stated
directly but it couldn’t be clearer: judges are Republican or conservative
first and anything else second. Like
everything else when it comes to identity by the left, it argues that your
political affiliation biases any other part of your life. It also argues by
default that only a judge appointed by a
Democrat can see the law the right way. That the left will then argue in
similar articles that there are two systems of justice in America with a
straight face is another kind of hypocrisy.
And because in
the eyes of the left, separation of powers and checks and balances only apply
when you can check ‘the right’s power’ and never the other way around, we are
constantly deluged with fundraising appeals for things that even a partly
rational person knows is impossible. Cue the demands to impeach Clarence Thomas
or Brett Kavanaugh (impossible to do in a Republican House); the demands to
investigate justice for ethics violations (a good idea but with no groundwork
as to do it) and their argument for judicial ‘reform’. One of their favorite
ones is that Biden should be allowed to appoint four Supreme Court Justices
before the 2024 elections to counteract the conservative majority. This is fantastic, completely beyond the
scope of the executive branch (they often just want him to make the order
bypassing Congress) and leaves out a big gaping hole (what’s to stop the
Republicans from appointing a similar number of justices when they regain
power?)
When it comes
to this particular argument progressive websites will frequently bring up as a
historical guidepost FDR’s attempt to pack the Supreme Court in 1937. The left
is as guilty of cherry-picking history as the right can be, but in this
particular case it leaves everything out.
For one thing,
it fails to consider that this was by far the most controversial decision of
FDR’s entire term in office, one that divided not merely Congress or his party
but the entire country. It leaves out the face that even though both houses of
Congresses had essentially supermajorities there was an extreme amount of
division in leadership about doing this to the point that many senators who
were terrified of the consequences were afraid Roosevelt was so popular he
would be able to do it anyway. And it particularly leaves out the fact that if
FDR had in fact managed to do it, it very well might have been the kind of
‘victory’ that was the first step towards turning America into embracing the
waves of fascism that was sweeping the world.
This series
will illustrate a complete history of FDR’s decision to pack the Supreme Court:
why he thought he had to do it, what his plan was, the battle that would plague both the White
House Congress for nearly six months in 1937 and how both Congress and FDR
reacted when it was all over. And we’ll start with explaining both the makeup
of FDR’s Democratic Party and the Supreme Court at the time, because those who
want to make comparisons between then and now have clearly forgotten the make
up of both in the 1930s.
The left has always
been torn about how to celebrate FDR. They obviously love the New Deal and all
the programs that came from it, they celebrate his setting up the social safety
net, they love his decision to take on fascism on the world stage. The problem is so much about FDR and the
Democrats during this era violate every value they stand for. Including the fact that if his name had
simply been Franklin Delano it is unlikely the man would have gotten
further than the state assembly. FDR had presidential ambitions very early – he
told his legal partners as early as 1908 as much – but they were inclined to
dismiss this cultured, partisan elitist as deluded. The only reason they didn’t
dismiss him outright was that his cousin Theodore was not only President but considered
by America the greatest one in history.
Because the
left likewise considers all Republicans since Lincoln corrupt and utterly
beyond redemption and will never hesitate to tell you such Theodore Roosevelt
has always left them in a quandary. How do you handle the legacy of a man that
most historians consider one of the five or six greatest Presidents in history,
who towered over America, whose monument is carved on Rushmore? And the answer
has been…by fundamentally pretending he never existed. This is frankly remarkable considering how
much of TR’s legacy involves all of the benchmark of the progressive
policy. His establishment of the Square
Deal, his establishment of the National Park System and created the first major
conservation movement in America, his creation of the Food and Drug Administration
and the Open Door Policy, his Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the end of the
Russo-Japanese War, his war on big business and trusts in general are the gold
standard for everything that the modern left adore. That he did all this while
being fundamentally loathed by many in his own party is another sign of how much
of a ‘maverick’ he was. But as it is the
current left’s decision to ignore any bit of history that makes the Republican
the good guy, the only time they mention
any part of it is to argue that today’s conservatives are attacking it.
The progressive
version of history is as much propaganda as the people’s history: Democrats are
always the good guys; Republicans always the villains. If you were to tell them
that the Progressive era where they have derived their name was fundamentally
handled by the Republican party in the 1890s and 1910s and that from the end of
the Civil War until the 1930s, the Democratic Party was as conservative as the Republican
party if not more so, they would probably tell you that this is not the
case. Similarly that FDR essentially got every major political office he did
until at least he became Governor of New York in part because of his last name,
they will ignore it. Indeed, when he ran for national office the first time –
as James Cox’s Vice President in 1920 – one of the major reasons he was put on
the ticket was because the Democrats were facing almost certain annihilation at
the polls and hoped that FDR’s last name would have the same pull as his
recently departed cousin. It didn’t, for the record; the Democrats lost to
Warren Harding in what was by far the biggest popular and electoral landslide to
that point in American history. And FDR was in a real sense calling on his
famous cousin when he first ran for President in 1932 and received the backing
of Progressive Republicans such as California’s Hiram Johnson and Nebraska’s
George Norris. Norris famously said during the campaign: “What this country
needs is another Roosevelt in the White House.”
Similarly the
left does not want to acknowledge FDR’s coalition to victory throughout his four
landslides. Because particularly in his election and first reelection campaign,
his biggest margins were in the South. That same region today’s left wants
to pretend is beyond redemption was where FDR had by far his greatest margins
of victory. This was particularly true in his 1936 landslide in which he received
more than sixty percent of the vote and carried every state in the Union except
for Maine and Vermont. In South Carolina, he received 98.5 percent of
the vote. In Mississippi, 97 percent. Louisiana, 88 percent. Georgia 87 percent, Alabama 86 percent. There
were entire small towns throughout the south where every single vote was for
FDR.
And FDR had
huge coattails. The Democrats already had 70 seats in the Senate, they would
gain 5 more in 1936. The only reason
George Norris, who had held his seat since 1913 as a Republican kept it was
because he changed his affiliation to Independent. The Democrats gained 12
seats in the House, dropping the number of Republicans to well below 90. And it
is not a coincidence that many of the same states that FDR carried by huge
numbers had entirely Democratic delegations.
Now the left
will argue as hard as they can that these Democrats were not representative of
the party of today. That is true as far as that goes. But as I have stated
numerous times, they were completely representative of the Democratic Party
from Reconstruction until at least the 1960s. It does not mean that these
Democrats were fundamentally unenlightened people: some of the greatest Senators
in history are from the era of the 1930s, including Alben Barkley of Kentucky,
Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, Richard Russell of Georgia and Joseph Robinson
of Arkansas. No one will pretend that many of them were not adamant racists and
segregationist but so was most of America and most were among the most fervent
supporters of the New Deal.
One of the undisputed
criticisms of FDR was that he did very little in office when it came to civil
rights. (Indeed Eleanor would often alienate her husband and his staff by
taking positions more on the side of civil rights that the party wanted to do.)
But FDR was a master politician who was also dealing with the worst crisis to
face the country since the Civil War. Many of the Democrats were far more
conservative then he was when it came to the New Deal; indeed his first Vice
President John Nance Garner, a Texas conservative famously had little use for
it. It was only because of the
unprecedented crisis facing the nation that many in his party agreed to go
along with methods that many found hard to stomach. As FDR’s second term began,
many of his earliest supporters from his first term would begin to turn against
it, and much of it would start with his plan to pack the Supreme Court.
This gets me to
the other critical fallacy in those who want to draw a parallels to this era
and the 1930s. The Supreme Court was fundamentally Republican, but no one was
pretending it had been stolen. With the exception of Woodrow Wilson, from 1896 to
1932 the White House and Congress had been Republican. And while many of the
judges were conservative, they were far from unqualified. Indeed, many of the
greatest justices in the history of the court are from this era.
Oliver Wendell
Holmes (who Democrats love to quote in regard to his famous line of ‘clear and
present danger’) had been nominated by TR in 1902 and had departed the office
at the age of 90 in Hoover’s last year. His replacement Benjamin Cardozo was an
esteemed justice in his own right. Calvin Coolidge would appoint Harlan Stone
the court after serving as his Attorney general. FDR would eventually named him
Chief Justice. Louis Brandeis was appointed by Wilson and made history as the
first Jewish-American appointed to the court. But the most significant member
of the Court at the time was Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. And it’s worth delving into his history
because he is a fascinating figure with ties to both Theodore and Franklin, as
well as much of Republican politics in the early twentieth century.
In the early
1900s, Hughes had led several investigations into the public utilities and life
insurance in New York. In 1906 Theodore Roosevelt, looking for a strong
candidate to defeat Newspaper mogul William Randolph Hearst for governor,
convinced the New York republicans to nominate Hughes. He was referred to as a
sane reformer. Hughes campaigned for an eight-hour workday and prohibitions on
child labor. He narrowly beat Hearst for governor and spent his term expanding
civil service position, increasing the power of regulation of public utilities,
and early work in campaign finance. He also recognized the New York state
Department of Labor, something many elected officials refused to do.
In 1908,
William Howard Taft asked Hughes to be his running mate. Hughes declined. He
was starting to tire of politics but Roosevelt and Taft convinced him to run
for reelection. He won, but his second term was less successful. Early in 1910
when associate justice David Brewer died, Taft offered him a vacancy on the
Supreme Court. Hughes jumped at the opportunity. On the court, Hughes quickly showed
his mettle former friendships with members like Holmes and John Marshall
Harlan. His record was fairly progressive, upholding state laws for minimum wage,
workmen compensation, and maximum hours for women and children. In a majority
opinion for a decision for McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway which
required railroads to give African-Americans ‘equal treatment’. Hughes would
likely have stayed on the court for the rest of his life then, but politics
would intervene.
Part of me
wonders just what today’s progressives would think of TR’s run for the White
House in 1912. Despite the fact that it was the first campaign where political
primaries were involved, that TR wanted to take the GOP in a more progressive
direction, and despite the fact that the ticket ran under the labor of The
Progressive Party, the cynical part
of me thinks that they would shrug it off as another example of a ‘Republican
not wanting to let go of power’ and ‘building a cult of personality’. The thing
is, I could not entirely blame them for thinking that because that was much of
the old guard though in 1912 and well beyond that. The fact that in the lead up
to the 1916 campaign, TR was trying to get both the nominations of the GOP and
the Progressives, primarily to run against Woodrow Wilson who he loathed, would
bolster that claim.
In the leadup
to this in 1916, several Republican leaders asked Hughes to run for President.
He initially declined the request, but the polls of Republican voters showed that
he was the preferred candidate, and despite refraining from interest Hughes
would win two Presidential primaries and his backers, without his consent,
began to line up delegates for him. Hughes led all contenders at the 1916 convention
and won the nomination on the third ballot. TR was nominated by the Progressive
Party but refused to accept it. The party, which had been founded on his involvement
and already in decline, collapsed not long after.
Hughes resigned
from the Court to run for President. While not a charismatic speaker, a bigger problem
was the baggage of TR and his faction of the party, most of whom wanted the
United States to enter the Great War. Hughes had to walk a tightrope between
isolating TR’s supporters and those independents who did not want to go to war
at all. He never managed to negotiate this successfully and TR’s speeches which
were more against Wilson than for Hughes (by now he considered him ‘the bearded
iceberg’) and were fundamentally bellicose hurt him more than they helped them.
The 1916
election was electorally the closest of the 20th century. On
election day, it looked very much like Hughes had won. The New York Times
published a headline saying as much and both Hughes and Wilson went to sleep
that night thinking so. But two days later, the results from California
revealed that Wilson had won the state by 1300 votes. The thirteen electoral
votes he received brought him up to 277 to Hughes’ 254.
Hughes was privately
relieved to have lost the Presidency and years later said that if had been
President at the time, it would likely have killed him much as it nearly did
Wilson. Furthermore his narrow electoral defeat was only the start of arguably
the greatest second act of any defeated political candidate. Early in 1920 he
declined any interest in the GOP nomination, which went to Warren Harding.
For all his
flaws Harding made some superb choices when he was in office. Two of the most
significant involved the two previous GOP nominees for President. He named
Hughes Secretary of State and basically gave him a great deal of discretion at
both the State Department and foreign policy. Hughes could not convince the
Senate to join the League of Nations, but was successful in preventing an arms
race between Britain, Japan and the U.S. He also negotiated peaceful
resolutions to territorial claims in the Pacific Ocean and China and sought
better relations with Latin America. Hughes stayed on after Harding’s death in
1923, but left office after Calvin Coolidge won election in his own right.
When Chief
Justice White died in May of 1921, Harding offered the job to Hughes who
declined. Instead he appointed William Howard Taft, fulfilling his lifelong dream.
Taft did much to reorganize the court over the next decade. When Taft fell in
February of 1930, Taft made it clear that his preferred successor should be
Hughes. Hughes had been progressive on the court but Taft believed he would be
conservative. Under Taft the court had
become more conservative and many progressives (who at the time were mostly
Republican) feared it would be more of the same. The vote was somewhat
closer than usual, but Hughes was confirmed three weeks later and he took
office.
At the time the
Court was divided between the Conservative ‘Four Horseman’ (Pierce Butler,
James McReynolds, George Sutherland and Willis Devanter) and the ‘Three Musketeers’
(Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone). The balance was between Hughes and Justice Owen
Roberts. Hughes was inclined to join the liberals, Roberts the conservatives.
It was this struggle over the New Deal that would start to turn public opinion
against the court over the 1930s and lead FDR to make his decision towards
reform after winning reelection in 1936.
In the next
article in this series I will deal with the decisions that led to dissatisfaction
with the court through FDR’s first term, his plan for reform in 1937 and why
that led to so much opposition despite the outrage many Americans felt towards it
at the time.
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