How Truman Didn't Start The Cold War, Part 3: Truman's Early Days In Office

 

 

Diplomatic historians and leftists alike seem to view the conditions for history from an academic perspective and as a result frequently remove the human element from the circumstances of their stories. This is particularly true in the case of both Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman.

In the eyes of those who want to shape a narrative the foreign policy failures of both men are entirely due to their own blindness and are absent domestic realities. Truman doesn’t have the burdens of either illegitimacy or conspiracy that surround LBJ’s approach to foreign policy but there is a similar sense of detachment. Harry Truman was, after all, ascending to the Presidency after twelve years when the sole occupant had been FDR a man who many considered inseparable from the job. He had led the nation through the Great Depression and through the Second World War and on the verge of victory in Europe he had died shockingly (though less so to the people around him).

In addition to the understandable pressure any man who have under those circumstances Truman was coming to the White House having only met with the President once since the election. He knew as much about FDR’s negotiations with Stalin and Churchill, his plans for a post-war world and the global situation as the average member of Congress – which is to say, almost nothing. He was not privy to any of the decisions that FDR had been since he had been named Vice President, and there’s an argument his predecessor Henry Wallace knew more about what was going on during the War than the current one. (Wallace had been named Secretary of Commerce as a consolation prize for being denied the Vice Presidency in 1944.) And as a reminder of just how in the dark Truman was about global plans, it wasn’t until after he was sworn in that he learned about the Manhattan Project.

Harry Truman not only had the immense burden of having to learn on the job it wasn’t until he was sworn in that he began to learn the nature of the thicket he was in. Truman’s first decision was to retain FDR’s cabinet and to keep on almost every adviser FDR had entrusted over the past several years when it came to World War II.  That many of these people had different opinions, many of them based on what FDR had told them, and that many of them would, like so many other Americans, judge Truman poorly for the simple fact of not being FDR, does not seem to factor in to many historians when it comes to judging Truman’s policy going forward. The fact that FDR had left no clear guideline behind for a post-war world and had, as has been mentioned, seemed determined to base his entire foreign policy entirely on his false judgment of the nature of Stalin, is absent from this consideration as well.

Indeed much of the blame on Truman by historians seems to hold him in contempt for the same reason many Americans and his contemporaries did: Truman was not FDR. They seem to have taken the same view that FDR did regard to the White House: that he was indispensable and no one else could follow in his footsteps. On a personal level, I now consider much of FDR’s behavior during his final year in office as something very close to a grievous dereliction of duty. He was aware of the state of his health and yet seemed to have no interest at all in the process of naming a vice president who would succeed him when he died. Furthermore, he made no effort to prepare his likely successor for what was going to lie ahead of him, nor give any impression up until the very end of what his plans were for a post-war Europe. That so much of his foreign policy seemed to be built more on personal relationships then defined policy – something that would not survive him – doesn’t seem to have entered his mind at all.

The kindest defense of FDR’s actions are that he was so focused on the end of the war and the peace that he neglected everything else. In that case, the burden must be shared by his inner circle who knew all too well the condition ‘the boss’ was in and did nothing to try and prepare for a day when he was gone. That is most likely because his own people were in awe of FDR and refused to believe he was mortal or fallible. (Bess Truman, it should be noted, was less inclined to be understanding in later years she made it clear she regarded Roosevelt’s isolation of her husband and his concealment of his health in the exact words I have: “a serious dereliction of duty.’)

So when Truman was sworn in, he knew that many of FDR’s inner circle already judged him harshly. After he was sworn in  David Forrestal, murmured: “Poor little fellow, poor little fellow.” Truman was unprepared, bewildered and frightened as his biographers have stated. One is reminded of the burden on Andrew Johnson after he was sworn in after Lincoln was assassinated. Most of FDR’s inner circle had a low opinion of Truman. They no doubt would have had a similar low opinion of Wallace, Jimmy Byrnes, William O. Douglas or any of the men who were considered for the Vice Presidency.

Truman had, as has been reported, the hallmarks of the everyman: he had a distaste for complexity and a preference for clear and fixed standards, along with a hesitation to engage in creative or conceptual thinking. He had  a very straight-forward approach to policy making. He never acted precipitously or erratically on major matters of policy, foreign or domestic. Despite the appearance of quick decision making, he was slow and cautious on important things. And he would lean more on his advisers than FDR ever did. He believed in the importance of keeping your word.

All of these, it should be noted, are things that at least theoretically the left and academics admire  and none of them were traits that FDR had. Yet the left tends to prefer FDR’s nebulous thinking towards policy rather than Truman’s decisiveness. This is ironic because particularly in his first weeks in office and much beyond that Truman made it clear he was going to try and handle the course FDR had set. He told press secretary Steve Early that he intended to follow through with the San Francisco conference on April 25^th. Before he went to sleep that night, he issued a statement assuring the public: “The world may be sure that we will prosecute the war on both fronts, east and west, with all the vigor we possess to a successful conclusion.”

On his first full day on  the job he familiarized himself with Roosevelt’s objectives and while he embraced the goals of his predecessor, by necessity of his near ignorance he was forced to alter the manner of their being implemented. He turned to his diplomatic advisers for guidance, and without knowing it altered the course of foreign policy decisions forever. Until Roosevelt, the President had personally determined the direction of American diplomacy and then told the State Department how to react. Truman reversed the practice and made policy after consultation with his foreign affairs experts.

He would meet with Secretaries Stettinius, Stimson and Forrestal, General George Marshall and Admirals King and Leahy. While the Eastern front looked to be brought to an end with six months, they believed Japanese surrender could not be expected for another year and a half. It was Japan that was his bigger problem. They were still engaged in fierce resistance despite the fire bombing of the cities. The only way to end the war there was an invasion of the home island which was certain to result in huge numbers of American casualties.

Truman would go to lunch with Congressional leaders for an informal luncheon. One of his goals was continued bipartisan support for the conduct of the war and the peace that would follow. He secured endorsement of his plan to address a joint session of Congress and informed Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan that he would not go to personally open the UN conference. He also sought assistance from men he believed had greater knowledge of his predecessors plans. One of them was Jim Byrnes, who in their meeting he made clear he wanted him to serve in his new administration, perhaps as Secretary of State. (Byrnes would indeed ascend to that office in the weeks to come.) Stettinius was clearly nervous about the tenuous nature of his position but in the initial weeks following Truman’s ascension to the Presidency he was critical in the early process of decision making.

Stettinius and Charles Bohlen spent much of Truman’s first full day in office briefing him on the ‘deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union’. Stettinius’s weaknesses were critical as he considered that not only Stalin was under influences within his own country and the victim of anti-Western forces within his own regime. He went out of his way to sing the praises of Harry Hopkins as the most critical men to explain his predecessors relationship with the other two members of the Big Three.

Truman sent two telegrams to Churchill in which he expressed the pressing problems of both Poland the negotiations involving Moscow. He claimed knowledge of FDR’s plans going forward (he didn’t) but he urged Churchill caution about making anti-Stalin statements on the floor of the House of Commons. The fact that Stalin had decided to send Molotov to San Fransico seemed to be a sign of hope. In preparation Averill Harriman was recalled to the United States.

Stettinius presented Truman with two lengthy memoranda, the first on the conference in San Francisco to develop what would be the United Nations parliamentary makeup. The second responded to Truman’s request as to principal foreign policy problems facing America. Truman took that one back home and spent the night reading it. It dealt with Churchill’s policy being in accord with America and its interpretations and his (apparently) rigid attitude towards Stalin. Truman also learned of how Stalin had already begun to chip away at the agreements in Yalta. What the new President’s private reactions are unknown. But he had other issues, many of which would be major strains on Soviet-American relations in the weeks and months to come. These included, but were not limited to, the composition of the Polish government, the occupation policy for Germany and Austria, and the new threat of Yugoslavia on Trieste.

The next day was FDR’s funeral. With his wife and daughter unable to join him, his companions to meet the train bearing FDR’s body back to DC were Henry Wallace and James Byrnes the former vice President and the man who had been the leading contender for Truman’s position. Afterwards Truman met with a seriously ill Harry Hopkins and asked for as much of a briefing on his experiences with FDR at all of the meetings involving the leaders. Hopkins’s description of Stalin was very telling. He referred to him as a ‘forthright, rough tough Russian…who could be talked too frankly.” Hopkins compared him to a tough political boss along the lines of Tom Pendergast, assured him of FDR and Stalin’s good relations and to do his best to maintain them. There is no sign, either then or later on, that Truman ever did anything but treat Hopkins’s opinion with total respect or that he had any intention of discounting them.

Later that day he received his first communique from Churchill in which the PM went out of his way to agree with Truman’s message as well as make it very clear that the ‘Lublin Government was resolved in independence’ and was opposed to the Stalin’s version.

On April 16^th just before he was about to address Congress for the first time as President, he met with Anthony Eden, foreign secretary. Both Eden and Churchill were hoping to use Molotov’s visit to break the logjam on Poland and they were less optimistic than the American government that this was a sign that the Soviets were more inclined to see reason. When Eden and Truman met they agreed easily upon a joint telegram to Stalin contesting the Soviet implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland. While this was happening Harriman was meeting with Stalin and the Russian leader was brassily suggesting that Poland could be solved by the ‘Yugoslav formula” which was essentially a Marxist government. Harriman rejected it outright and the ambassador made it clear that to Stettinius that Molotov’s deputy was preparing a Soviet-Polish treaty of mutual assistance – completely counter to what had been discussed at Yalta. Truman would later claim this was an impetus for him to harden his attitude towards Molotov but at the time he gave no sign of immediate protest.

By the time Harriman returned to DC he was determined to challenge the policy of accommodation towards the Soviet Union that had been in effect to that point. He had none of the illusions that many of FDR’s chief advisers as well as the former President himself had about Stalin, making it clear:

“…the basic and irreconcilable difference of objective between the Soviet Union and the United States was (the Soviet Unions) urge for its own security to see Soviet concepts extend to as large an area of the world as possible.”

Much of this had happened during the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin already and was already well underway by the time of FDR’s death. Harriman informed Truman (who he barely knew) that American generosity had been ‘misinterpreted’ and that the United States ‘had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that were of real importance to us.” Unlike his predecessor Truman, he was receptive to Harriman’s ideas, heard him out on what Soviet control of a foreign country was like and that he had to take a firm stance in negotiations. Truman admitted that he was not up on all details of foreign affairs and he would rely on his advisers for help. Harriman took Truman aside and told him he’d rushed back to make sure he understood – “as I had seen Roosevelt understand that Stalin is breaking his agreements. “

It was with this new insight Truman would have his first meeting with Molotov on April 22^nd. Truman met with Molotov warmly and tried to encourage him firmly to hold to existing agreements. He assured him that he stood behind everything FDR stood for and that would so everything he could to follow along that path. His approach was that of trying to facilitate relations between the three foreign secretaries – Molotov, Eden and Stettinius – going forward. The meeting was perfectly polite and their was no sign of discord. Truman walked away genuinely believing that he had fulfilled that firm approach. That he might have done so ineffectively is less important then the fact that he did so.

For the next two days there was no progress in any part of the negotiations between the three governments. Molotov absolutely refused to budge on any point that either the British or American teams might bring up. With the fate of the San Francisco conference in jeopardy, Eden wired Churchill and said that if there was no progress at the next day’s meeting the President should send for the three of them and himself speak plainly with Molotov. Eden expected Truman to send for the three foreign secretaries but Stettinius and Truman decided to see Molotov alone. They hoped that this proposed conversation would lead to a more reasonable attitude by the Russians. Regardless of it, the Polish talks should continue in San Fransisco. Truman had a meeting with his senior diplomatic and military advisors before this. All of the people he met with were FDR’s own people. He then asked for their opinions.

Admiral Leahy reported that the consensus made it clear the time had arrived to take a strong American attitude towards the Soviet Union and that no political harm could be done to our war prospects. The only dissenters from this were Henry Stimson and George Marshall, who had reservations. Truman had received independent confirmation from a military point of view that there was no reason to fail to stand up to the agreement at Yalta. His task was to make this clear to Molotov. He was not going to depart from FDR’s policy; his issue was whether he could hold the Soviets to agree to.

At 5:30 Truman received Molotov. Immediately he zeroed in on the Polish matter, emphasizing the United States government could not agree wot be a party to the formation of a Polish government which was not representative to Polish Democratic elements. He warned that if their was a failure of the allies to agree with the Yalta accord on Poland it was cast doubt on their unity in the post-war world. American policy needed public support and this was especially true in economic collaboration. When Molotov spoke in vague terms and attempted repeatedly to blame Poland for working against the Red Army, Truman interjected three separate times to the effect that all the Americans were asking was that the Soviet government agree to the decision on Poland. Despite this Truman continued to insist on his desire for the friendship of the Soviet government but observed this could only be on the basis of mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one way street.

According to Truman’s memoir Year of Decision the meeting ended with an acrimonious exchange between Molotov and Truman. Molotov protested that: “I have never been talked to like that in my life” and Truman responded: “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get to talked like that.” In the years that have followed many historians have ceased on that exchange as the critical moment of a shift in policy between FDR’s conciliatory approach during the War and the breakdown between communications that would lead to the Cold War.  There are several flaws with this idea.

The first is it may very well have been added by Truman for the purpose of spicing up his memoirs. Charles Bohlen, who was present at the meeting, has no record of it in his official minutes and it is only after Truman left office that he added it to his memoirs and there is no record of it in either the American minutes or Soviet minutes of the meeting. There is a strong possibility that future historians chose to cease on this exchange as the clearest example of events as there is little evidence in the historical record that follows of such a change.

The second argument is that does much to diminish what we know of the Soviet Union, not just in the case of Stalin but Molotov. It is hard to imagine either man being such shrinking violets that they would take this single insult as enough to decide to immediate reverse a policy in which they had been getting everything that they had wanted from the previous administration. It also ignores the fact that this initial meeting would not like have happened at all had FDR not passed away as well as the fact that for months previous to this, the early path towards building Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

And it goes against the immediate reaction of Molotov who left seeming unperturbed and apparently with the position the talks were going in a positive direction, Considering his position as Stalin’s righthand, he expected hostility – open or veiled – from leaders he considered imperialist. In his memoirs, he mocked Truman’s attempt to talk tough as ‘rather stupid.”

The American reaction at the time was mixed, depending on those involved. Stettinius thought Truman had done well and that had taken a step forward. When he reported this to Vandenberg, the influential Republican was thrilled and confided in his diary that F.D.R’s appeasement of Russia was over. Harriman was slightly surprised about how hard Truman had gone at Molotov but that may have been due to his not being present for the discussion between Eden and Stettinius that led to the initial meeting.

The major difficulty  - and what gives what little credence to historians about the exchange – was that it changed nothing afterwards. The meeting ended with Molotov remaining as inflexible about Poland as before, something that Eden telegraphed London with at the end of negotiations that night.

And finally, for all the effort to consider this some kind of major reversal, is belied by Truman’s determination to fulfill the pledges FDR had made before. While it is highly unlikely the more urbane Roosevelt would have been more diplomatic in his language Bohlen himself would say that Truman was ‘simply saying what Roosevelt would have said had he been alive. In any case the following day Stalin bluntly rejected the joint telegram sent by Truman and then accused America and Britain as ‘colluding to dictate terms to the Soviet Union.” When the meeting at UN did occur American objected but only verbally. After his initial response Truman backed away from further confrontation with Stalin. He avoided Churchill’s pressing for an early meeting of the Big Three, having no desire to engage in summit diplomacy while he was still obtaining a grasp of American policy. That approach remained firmly in effect as the War in Europe began to reach its inevitable end.

In the next part of this series I will cover the next two months of Truman’s  term,  how diplomacy began to shift after the war in Europe ended and how all of that changed in the leadup to the conference at Potsdam.