How Truman Didn't Start The Cold War, Part 7: How Stalin's Actions Finally Forced The Administration To Abandon FDR's Position

 

 

So much of the revisionist history of America’s behavior in the post-World War II era tends to put the burden for what happened entirely at Truman’s feet. Truman and his cabinet ‘overreacted’ to Stalin’s ‘legitimate security needs’ in Eastern Europe, ‘forcing Stalin to cement his control over Eastern Europe. America then spent the next forty years purposely exaggerating the Soviet threat leading to the four decade Cold War.  As I’ve mentioned throughout this article both Truman and Byrnes basically followed FDR’s blueprint in refusing to contest the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

It's also worth noting that during the period between 1914 and 1947 the American leadership was wrestling with three major options as put forth by historian Walter Russell Mead:

“Should the United States supplement British power as it waned as it in turn propped up the global order? Should the United States instead stand back and let the world order look after itself? Or should the United States replace Great Britain as the gyroscope of world power, with all the political, military, and economic costs, benefits and responsibilities that role would entail?”

One would therefore wonder those academic truly believe America should have done but their own writings would seem to have answered this question – without answering it.

In the minds of the Zinns and Chomskys of the world America’s decision to embrace the third option was absolutely the wrong decision because it created far more destruction to the world order than the Soviets ever could have imagined – though in most of these arguments the actions of the Soviet Union are either ignored or at the most, considered not nearly as evil as what America was doing.

The left has already rejected the first option resoundingly – in their opinions the Western influence exerted by Great Britain had led to colonialism and the genocide of entire continents as a result of enriching their own pockets.

That would appear to leave the second option – essentially a policy of isolationism. The left almost never discusses this as a viable one, perhaps because they are aware that in the period after World War I that was for all intents and purposes America’s foreign policy – one that had led to the fascist dictatorships that had overrun Europe leading to World War II in the first place. This would have been vivid in the memories of every person in Truman’s administration and everyone in the country if not the world. The left constant argues that we keep making the same mistakes over and over; not even the most daring academic would argue that we should have actually done so here.

There were quite a few Americans, even as late as 1946, who truly did think the US was serving as a mediator between the British and Russia. Where Truman and his administration were in this period is hard to pin down but it is worth looking at the actions of Byrnes and Truman to try and interpret their thinking.

By November of 1945 Truman had announced he would meet with Prime Minister Atlee at William Mackenzie King of Canada to discuss international control of atomic energy, for which the three nations signed an agreement on November 15^th. The high-minded declaration observed that no nation could hold a monopoly on it and called on using atomic energy ‘for the benefit of all mankind.” A UN commission was assigned to deal with this is issues, with the initial goals of controlling the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and the eventual elimination of all atomic weapons from the world arsenal. This willingness to share atomic energy stirred up opposition in Congress and Byrnes realized that this proposed commission needed to be discussed with the Soviets before the first meeting of the General Assembly the following January in London.

Byrnes proposed a meeting in Moscow between the British, Americans and Soviet foreign ministers out of an idea to try and break the logjam by going directly to Stalin himself. However he proposed this meeting without any consultation with Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin. A surprised and angry Bevin responded in a teletype that he feared another such meeting without ‘adequate preparation would only lead to another failure’. Despite the skepticism of Bevins Byrnes was determined to meet with the Soviets. Bevin was reluctant to do so and on December 5^th made it clear that unless the foreign ministers met for preliminary discussion in Moscow, the would be courting a fiasco not unlike London. Only when Byrnes made it clear that he was going to go to Moscow with or without the presence of Bevin that the British reluctantly agree. The meeting was scheduled for December 13^th.

In the interim that American ambassador to China, General Patrick Hurley suddenly resigned and launched a barrage of criticism against the administration for supporting Mao in the looming Chinese civil war. Byrnes and Truman downplayed it and defended their department.

A key focus of Byrnes’s plan for the Moscow meeting was the UN’s commission on atomic energy matters, adopting a plan that would emphasize the exchange of scientific information and implying that they might be authorized before the safeguards called for by the November agreement were in place. Despite the concerns raised when Byrnes put it before key Senators on December 10^th, including Texas Democrat Tom Connolly and Michigan Republican Arthur Vanderberg – who would raise their concerns with the President – Truman declined to take up their suggestions and fully backed his Secretary of State. Despite his support Truman was getting irritated by Byrnes’s increasingly independent nature to the point he enlisted Joseph Davies to serve as an intermediary between the two. By late December Truman was considering replacing him.

Byrnes meeting in Moscow seemed to show the first signs of progress in months. By the end of the conference he had obtained from Molotov promises to support a resolution in the commission for atomic energy, continued Soviet support for Chaing’s government in China against Mao, support for troops in Manchuria and Soviet participation in control of Japan and reestablishment of a free Korea. However in doing so he backed away from his stance in London from his position on negotiating treaties in Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. All of this essentially surrendered most of Eastern Europe to Stalin behind the appearance of democratic procedures. By this point America was focuses on Western interests elsewhere, most notably Japan and the Middle East.

Then Byrnes overstepped himself. He requested that Dean Acheson arrange for a national radio broadcast for him without briefing the President first., rejecting the suggestion of Charles Bohlen and Averell Harriman that he provide written reports to Truman. When Moscow released the conference communique before Truman got a chance to read it, an angry Truman arranged Byrnes to report to him directly first which he did on December 29^th.

What happened at that meeting depends on who tells the story and when. In his 1950 memoir Truman claimed that Byrnes ‘got the real riot act after Moscow’ and told him that “our policy is not appeasement and not a one way street. In a later account Truman added that he complained about being left in the dark and wouldn’t tolerate a repetition of this conduct. According to Byrnes, Truman expressed ‘his hearty approval’ of his accomplishments and agreed that he should make his radio address. Furthermore Truman was so pleased that he invited Byrnes to stay for dinner at which he publicly endorsed him in front of their companions. Based on what happened its likely Byrnes’ interpretation is closer to the truth because he didn’t raise any objections to the substance of the report or alter the address he made.

On December 30 Byrnes made his address. In it he admitted that some of the agreements were hardly ‘ideal solutions’ but he made it clear he recognized the ‘real interest of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe’. He explained positively the settlements in Japan and Northern Asia and the groundwork for the first meeting of the UN General Assembly.

According to Truman’s memoirs on January 5^th he read Byrnes a letter in which he rehashed his concerns about procedure. Then he launched into a litany of complaints about Soviet behavior not only in Eastern Europe but Iran. He supposedly told Byrnes “unless Russia is faced with an iron fist…another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand – ‘How many divisions have you?” Then allegedly he added: “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.

Cold War literature has given iconic status to this letter. The problem is there’s only Truman’s word it even existed. Byrnes would later say that if he had been read this letter, he would have immediately resigned. It is more likely that Truman was focusing his outrage against Byrnes who by this point he was running out of patience with. And there is no evidence that when the meetings began in London that either Byrnes or Truman intended to alter their stance towards the Soviet Union at all yet.

When the Soviets attempted to occupy Northern Iran Stalin continued to make speeches arguing about the ‘imperialist rivalries’ leading to war. That February the State Department dispatched a request to one of the members at the Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan. In what became known as the Long Telegram Kennan made clear the basic features, background and prospects of Soviet rule. To Kennan Marxist dogma provided ‘the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability’ a cover for their tyranny – but at the bottom of the Kremlin’s ‘neurotic view of world affairs’ Stalin needed an enemy to justify his dictatorship. He predicted the Soviet Union would aim to increase its power that it was “neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to the logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. “ Coexistence was a charade. Only force would cause them to respond.

Kennan’s document did help a floundering State Department, still looking for a new intellectual mooring and it was helped that men in the department such as Harriman and Forrestal were willing to support it. It tore at the basic foundation of FDR’s believe that Stalin could be ‘domesticated’ and integrated into the post-war era, an illusion that had been going on well past the point of Roosevelt’s passing. By this point Byrnes himself was beginning to realize this when he arrived in London and in a late February address to the Overseas Correspondents Club said, “ we have a responsibility to see that other powers live up to their covenants.” The following day Arthur Vandenberg, overseeing foreign policy, gave a speech on the Senate floor arguing for a bipartisan foreign policy based on a tougher approach.

By the time Winston Churchill gave his famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in his visit to America that March Truman was more willing to listen, even as far-left Senators criticized that speech as warmongering. Yet even now Truman hesitated. In an Army Day speech given a month after Churchills he still refrained from explicitly identify the Soviet Union as the source of problems in the Middle East, the Far East and Europe. “In Korea we are even now working with our Soviet Allies and with the Korean Leadership to create a provisional democratic government” and “No country, great or small, has legitimate interests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be reconciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations” were hardly the words of a President willing to lead America against the Soviets.” The administration was becoming more firm the Soviets but it was still nowhere near certain. This was seen most notably with the American proposal to submit to the newly formed UN Atomic Energy Commission” which in order to attract Soviet support, gave a lot of leeway to obtain their cooperation. Only through the pressure of Bernard Baruch was the administration allowing the plan to involve inspections and sanctions – and only when he threatened to resign if they were not included – was Truman willing to go along.

Byrnes spent almost all of 1946 being incredibly patient with the administration’s floundering. He essentially held his nose and recognized the Soviet puppet states of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, negotiating treaties with them. The administration did everything in its power to give Stalin the benefit of the doubt – something he absolutely did not deserve.

We must now face the fact than any argument that Stalin who consider the Soviet dictator trustworthy run up against the actions of Stalin’s himself. After the war ended, rather then relax repression, he embarked on a new series of arrests, attacking the very soldiers who had fought loyally for him during the war.  Thousands among thousands of men, including Soviet Jews, were sent to the Gulag in a vain effort to reassure this horrible man. He saw no desire to cooperation with the Allies, only to impose a tighter control over his own people crushing any hope for change in the Soviet system in order to forge an empire. All of this was to put his horrific treatment of his own people as a necessity to maintain strict control over every aspect of Soviet life – by creating new images of enemies everywhere. In order to do so the Soviets would manipulate east European leaders, bully and deceive the populations, arrest and kill the opposition. By the end of 1945, the Soviets essentially controlled not just Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, heavily controlled Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Holland and Albania and had a heavy presence in Yugoslavia, Greece Iran and Turkey.

All of this was observed by Americans on site but by and large both FDR’s and Truman’s administration gave it little hearing. Had Stalin been content to stay where he was, he might have been able to avoid the Cold War. Instead he overreached and moved beyond Eastern Europe, into the Mediterranean and Western Europe. When he reached for Turkey even Molotov cautioned that the Western Allies won’t allow it. In response Stalin said: “Demand it!” And when they did on August 7^th, Acheson finally moved into the ranks of the cold warriors and made it clear to Truman that they could no longer ignore the designs of the Soviets.

On August 14^th, he argued the only real deterrent to Soviet plans in Turkey and the Middle East would be the conviction that “pursuance of such a policy would result in war with the United States.” He presented this argument to Truman, along with Forrestal and Kenneth Royall the following day. He asked for authorization to send a firm note of warning to Moscow and to authorize the Navy to strengthen its position in the Middle East. Truman quickly endorsed both measures. Acheson then made it clear that this might only be the start of a series of escalating steps that might end with outright conflict.

In a memorable exchange he asked the President if he understood the significance of this decision. Truman holding that “we might as well find out whether the Russian were bent on world conquest in five or ten years” took out a map of the Middle East and lectured on its strategic significance.

It’s worth noting after both actions were taken the Soviets did not stop their intimidation of Turkey. On the contrary they continued to prepare in the Balkans and sent infiltrators into the region. The American military began to explicitly plan for war with the Soviet Union, having discussions with the British on strategy. When Stalin learned of this – through Donald MacLean, one of the Soviet spies in the British government- Stalin backpedaled.

His strategic blunders didn’t end there. The Turkish episode had pushed the United States further along a course where it would become America’s policy to resist Soviet demands and to create a barrier of sorts of their operations in Eastern Europe. This became very clear in Germany, where the East was already under Soviet control and they were looking to take over the West.

In a speech at the Stuttgart Opera House, Byrnes made it very clear that America would not withdraw from West Germany and leave them at the mercy of the red Army. “As long as there is an occupation army in Germany, American Armed Forces will be part of that occupation ARMY.” And he pointedly confirmed “we do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power.”

This was by far the biggest deviation to date from the policy FDR. The late President had loathed the Germans and had wanted it reduced in the significance it played in world affairs as part of his larger effort to downgrade the importance of Europe. Byrnes by contrast came to terms with the reality that Germany and Europe could not be reduced in significance.

Truman by this point asked his aide Clark Clifford to produce ‘a record of Soviet violations of international agreements.” On September 10^th when Joseph Davies came to him demanding a plan to restore the old alliance, Truman finally stopped trying to reassure him. That same day Henry Wallace came to him and told him about a speech he was planning to give at Madison Square Garden in two days. Truman clearly didn’t read it carefully enough.

Because in that infamous speech he made it clear a  get tough approach “never brought anything real and lasting…The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians get.” He argued incredibly British imperialism was the source of world problems and that America should be impartial between Britain and the Soviet Union’s relationship.

Notoriously this led to a huge imbroglio between Truman, Byrnes and Wallace that took nearly a week to resolve. Forced to choose between the two men in his cabinet, Truman forced Wallace to resign. Truman was even now not completely sure what direction he would take – his indecision between supporting his Secretary of State and the last hold over from FDR’s administration shows that. It was not until September 24^th when Clifford presented his report that made it all too clear of the Soviets basic decision to only abide by agreements as long as it was in their interest and to violate them if it made them stronger.

After Byrnes finished negotiating the treaties that December Byrnes decided he needed to resign due to his failing health. His successor would be George Marshall, a man who for all of his deserved stature during World War II. Not long after that Marshall would initiate a program of limited military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey which would lead to what would eventually become known as the Truman Doctrine. Marshall would draw conclusions from the failures at Moscow that “the Soviets were doing everything possible to achieve a complete breakdown in Europe: Afterwards the State Department policy makers shared their fears that the deep economic problems of Western Europe, combined with its political weakness and psychological exhaustion would leave them vulnerable to the Soviet Union’s power.

This would lead to the program of European economic recovery known as the Marshall plan. It would confirm America’s long term commitment to the continent and would stymie the strategic objective of the Soviets to take it over. Oddly enough there are some who believe the plan was developed to challenge the Soviet Union and contest its hold on Eastern Europe, therefore ‘forcing’ Stalin’s heavy handed response and leading to the division of Europe. They hold to this believe even after the murder of the Czech President Edward Benes and an attempt to install a Soviet government and the blockade the Soviets maintained over Germany that nearly led to another war and it was only through the Berlin airlift that would force Stalin to retreat. By that point Truman would have won an upset reelection and began his second term.

In the conclusion to this series I will look at the myths that still surround Americas towards the Soviet Union in regards to Truman and that any mythologizing about FDR’s grand schemes run against both Stalin’s actions – and FDR’s perceptions.