Theodore White’s landmark Making
of the President series are, for the record, as good as everyone tells you
they are. White was a brilliant political journalist and was very capable of
accurately portraying the mood of both America and politics during the 1960s
and 70s. There was a level of evenhandedness when he looked at many campaigns
as well as insights that, even more than sixty years later, still hold up
today. It does not mean he was perfect even in these publications – he never gave
enough significance to outsiders like George Wallace and he never seemed to
grasp just how monstrous Nixon was, even though he had more access to him than
any other journalist did – but the books still read extremely well to this day.
And his inaugural book in the series about the 1960 campaign is one of the best
pieces of political journalism ever created. He was willing to devote time and
energy to all seven candidates who played a role in the 1960 campaign, and
while he spent the majority of his time with Kennedy and Nixon, that did not
mean he didn’t recognize the abilities of men such as Hubert Humphrey and Adlai
Stevenson, both of whom he would later right were among the most qualified candidates
he ever met who never became President.
But White was a human being
and though he may have sworn to a guise of impartiality, it did not make him
immune to the Kennedy charm. I believe that bias have blinded him to certain
events that were going on in the Kennedy campaign himself that overshadowed how
he looked at so many campaigns to come. In particular one can draw a comparison
to how he viewed how conservatives took over the Republican party establishment
to get the nomination for Barry Goldwater in 1964 to the Kennedy approach to getting
the nomination four years earlier.
In the former case, his view
of Goldwater’s campaigners taking the party away from the Eastern Establishment
– primarily led by Nelson Rockefeller – is viewed throughout the book as the equivalent
of a hostile takeover, taking control of the party to promote their candidate
and their agenda. In the latter book, White looks the way the Kennedy clan and
their followers did the same thing from the Democratic establishment with something
that borders on admiration. The contemporary observer might have argued that Kennedy’s
campaign deserved more credit because it led to victory for his party and in
Goldwater’s case, it led to a total disaster for his, and there’s some truth to
that. But aside from that, there is truly no difference between the planning of
the Kennedys and the conservatives. Both groups of followers took the way the power
of the bosses to nominate who they wants and put their candidate in front. And
there’s actually an argument Goldwater’s followers were at least more purely
motivated than Kennedys. The conservatives of that era had a cause in mind and
were determined to take over the party to promote that cause. The only cause
the Kennedys had at the time – and for much of the years to come – was that of
the Kennedys, and as we shall see, they were always willing to do whatever it
took to get there.
Much of this became clear in
the primary campaign against Hubert Humphrey. To repeat a statement I made in
the previous article, Humphrey was a superior candidate to JFK in every way in
1960. He had served as mayor of Minneapolis and was concluding his second term
in the senate in 1960. He had spoken out in favor of civil rights at the 1948
convention at a time when neither party (especially the Democrats) was willing
to do so openly. He was as great a speaker as any of the Kennedys and had far
more principles than they ever did. He also ardently believed in the abilities
of Adlai Stevenson and would have gladly run with him in 1956 had Stevenson not
thrown the convention open – and JFK had stolen the show. The problem was, he
came from Minnesota and in 1960, there was no way that was going to be enough.
Humphrey knew the chances were slim for the nomination – White quoted him as
saying they were one in ten.
So like JFK, he ran in the
primaries. Unlike JFK, he had no money and the Kennedys had millions. Humphrey
said that while campaigning in Wisconsin, a jet flew overhead and he shouted
out ‘Damn it, Jack, play fair!” and that pretty much summed up the real
difference between Kennedy and Humphrey in Wisconsin in particular. Jack had
his family and lots of money, and Humphrey had none. It should not have come as
a shock that Kennedy won Wisconsin by twelve points – the problem was, given
how the districts voted, the victory was essentially viewed as Kennedy only
managing to win because he carried the Catholic vote. Humphrey viewed it as a
moral victory and carried on to West Virginia, a state that at the time was 80
percent Protestant.
Even at the time, it’s worth
noting that even if Humphrey won in West Virginia, he had no chance of getting
the nomination after he lost in Wisconsin: the fact he couldn’t win in a neighboring
state crushed hopes of his electability. Indeed, if Humphrey had gotten out
right then, there’s a real chance the Kennedy machine might have stalled right
there: the primary path that they were travelling would have been meaningless
if there were no viable contenders challenging them. (Nixon, as I said in the
first article, knew that not having a challenger had done damage to his
campaign from the start.) Many in fact urged Humphrey to get out after
Wisconsin, but he kept going. And the Kennedys demonstrated just how willing
they were to destroy anyone they considered a threat.
They used Jack’s war record to accuse Humphrey
of being a draft-dodger. They used Franklin Roosevelt, Jr, a very dirty minded whose
career in elected office had ended years ago but because of his father’s name
was still a force. FDR Junior had no problem utterly maligning Humphrey and
saying that his father would have been proud of Kennedy in a state FDR had carried
four times in landslides. There were also rumors of the Kennedys using their fortune
to bribe voters, precinct captains and union leaders – all to destroy a man who
didn’t have the campaign funds to pay $750 for a telethon. Kennedy destroyed
Humphrey by a margin of more than 3 to 2. It is a measure of Humphrey’s
personality that he was able to graciously concede and work with the Kennedy
family for years to come. (Then again, he was already facing a tough reelection
that year and no doubt he thought he needed all the support he could get.)
By July of 1960, the Kennedys
work had been done and despite the maneuvers of LBJ and the impassioned nomination
speech of Eugene McCarthy for Adlai Stevenson that set off an hour long
demonstration on the floor, Kennedy was nominated on the first ballot. The
choice of LBJ as his Vice President has been debated for decades to come, so it
need not be deconstructed here. I will only repeat that it was done over the
strenuous objects of Robert Kennedy and officially made the feud that had been
simmering between the two for years unresolvable. The course of politics for
the next decade was set in stone as much because of that feud than anything
else.
That said, Kennedy’s choice
of Johnson was probably the only one he could have made to ensure victory.
Kennedy’s weakness was always the South, and considering Eisenhower’s inroads
into it in the last two elections, there was no reason to assume it would
return to the Democratic fold. If ever a vice presidential decision helped lead
a president to victory, it was the choice of Johnson.
Now the Kennedys may have
run one of the most full-blown media campaigns to that point and they had no
problems using it to knock Nixon at every opportunity. They didn’t go nearly as
negative as they could have, but it is worth reminding people of the two
biggest deceptions they were telling America.
The first was, of course,
Kennedys history as a philanderer, particularly with Marilyn Monroe, and more
troubling Judith Campbell, who was at the time also sleeping with Sam Giancana,
one of the biggest mob bosses at the time. You can argue about the press not
revealing his infidelities, but the fact that he was possibly compromised by
his involvement with the Mafia is one that absolutely should have come to light
even then.
The second and more
important one was Kennedy’s health. Kennedy was suffering from Addison’s
disease, an autoimmune disorder that affects the adrenal glands. Even had JFK
not been killed, there is a very real chance that he would have not lived to a
ripe old age or even that he would have been able to get beyond a presumptive
second term without decreased mobility that might have forced him into a
wheelchair before he was even fifty. The Kennedys managed to hide this fact
from the press by stashing medicine that treated the symptoms all around the
country. Every campaign stop JFK made for two years they made sure there was
access to medicine. The press never learned about it until years after the
fact. Considering one of the major factors about Kennedy’s campaign was his
youth and vigor, the fact that this was built on a fundamental deception about
his health is something that too many historians have decided to overlook.
Now at this point its worth
comparing what the Kennedy campaign did right and the Nixon campaign did wrong
to get to what must be the biggest point about the Kennedy myth:
Kennedy’s pick of Lyndon
Johnson as Vice President helped him. Nixon’s choice hurt him. He picked Henry
Cabot Lodge, a Massachusetts republican who was part of a political dynasty of
its own, and whose seat in the Senate Kennedy had narrowly won in 1952. Nixon
clearly hoped Lodge would help him in New England, and it did not – Lodge could
not help the Republicans even carry Massachusetts.
The Kennedy campaign chose
only certain battlegrounds to campaign in. Nixon chose to campaign in all
fifty. Both were viable strategies, but Nixon’s devotion to his may have hurt
him more than it helped.
Kennedy appeared to have won
the first and most viewed of the Presidential debates. The comparative
performance of each candidate in all four is hard to measure, but there’s
little question that his appearance compared with Nixon made him seem like a
more viable choice in the eyes of millions.
Kennedy chose to intervene when
Martin Luther King was arrested and held in Georgia, a choice that Nixon as I
wrote earlier on, chose not to make. Martin Luther King’s father committed to
getting African-American to vote for JFK.
The Nixon campaign did not
use Eisenhower – still the most popular man in the country – to campaign until
the final two weeks. Considering that Eisenhower’s stumping may have helped
boost Nixon in some northern states, Nixon clearly blundered here.
In short, given all of these
decision by both parties you would have thought Kennedy would have won in a
landslide. Yet when all the votes were counted, the difference between the two
men in the popular vote was one-tenth of one percentage point. (Because of the
electoral math, the margin looked slightly bigger: Kennedy received 303
electoral votes; Nixon 219, a Southern Separatist named Harry Byrd took the
remaining 15 .)
People have debated ever
since about the fairness of Kennedy’s victory, particularly in Texas and
Illinois. Some will argue that even if there were questionable decisions in
both states, the recounts made proved nothing. Others will argue just as
strongly that both states were known for corruption in the machines for decades
and were probably good at hiding it. What can not be denied is that whatever
love America had towards JFK was not apparent by the final vote count of 1960.
And from a historic context,
the Kennedy election is one of the least successful victories the Democratic Party
had in the 20th Century. It had been forty-four years since a
Democrat candidate had won by a margin this narrow in the electoral college
when Woodrow Wilson had barely beaten Charles Evans Hughes, 277 electoral votes
to 254. For the remainder of the 20th century only one Democrat
President would end up receiving fewer electoral votes than Kennedy: Jimmy
Carter, who received 297 when he defeated Gerald Ford in 1976. Even in the last
election this close: Harry Truman’s defeat of Thomas Dewey in 1948, Truman had
actually won by two million popular votes. By contrast, Kennedy had won by just
over 100,000 out of 67 million votes cast.
It's also worth noting that
of all the Democratic victories to that point, JFK’s had no coattails. Indeed,
Kennedy had come in with the opposite of a mandate. The Democrats lost twenty-one
seats in the House. It wasn’t as big a loss in a Senate – the Democrats only
lost 2 seats – but it was one of the poorest results for the Democrats to that
point in the twentieth century. Only the massive majorities they already made
their standing basically alright. The Democrats still had 262 seats in the House
and 64 in the Senate. Still, the party elders who must have had doubts about Kennedy
being the head of the ticketed would not necessarily have had them assuaged by
the results of the election. Given how the previous three Congressional
elections had gone for the Democrats, some of them were no doubt wondering what
would have happened if Humphrey or Johnson or even Stevenson had been at the
head of the ticket.
In the next article in the
series, I will discuss the Presidency of JFK. And I have to confess that after
some discussion, my opinions about how much Kennedy achieved – and how much he
didn’t – have been moderated somewhat.
No comments:
Post a Comment