The Myths and Electoral History of Ronald Reagan, Part 6: His Crowded Campaign for the GOP Nomination In 1980

 

For most of my childhood and well into the 21^st century, Jimmy Carter was viewed as a joke by pop culture, poorly by a history and a cautionary tale by the Democratic Party as to what not to do as President.  That every primary campaign that has followed the path of Carter’s victory in 1976 is something they choose to ignore.

Over the last decade, Carter’s position in history has been reevaluated. When it came to foreign policy, he was clearly one of the better presidents in the 20^th century. His decision to hand over the Panama Canal back to Panama was a smart one, the Camp David Accords were a major triumph and as I mentioned at the beginning of this series, he – not Reagan – began the policies that ended détente.  His decision to create the Department of Energy was revolutionary in the 1970s and he was one of the last Presidents to openly welcome consumer advocates input like Ralph Nader into the government.  As for the problems with inflation and stagflation, they began at the start of the 1970s in the middle of Richard Nixon’s first term (which was one of the reasons Nixon took us off the gold standard). It is unlikely any President could have handled it any better than Carter did.

So why was Carter viewed so poorly not only at the time but well afterwards? The first reason is, ironically, similar to that of Ronald Reagan. Carter had campaigned as an outsider and against the Washington elites. The press had never warmed to him taking a specific position and were annoyed that the public seemed to like this outsider from Georgia over candidates they preferred. Even after he had been elected President, most of the press never warmed to him.

The other problem was of Carter’s own making. Though both houses of Congress had overwhelming Democratic majorities and indeed many Congressman and Senators had been elected over the last two terms also campaign against Washington, Carter spent the entirety of his administration refusing to accept their input. Part of was a clash of values – most of the Congressman were overwhelmingly leftist, while Carter was more of a centrist. But part was also Carter’s refusal to being willing to give a quid pro quo. Throughout his administration he constantly refused to allow any promises to Senators and Congressmen in exchange for their votes on important issues, implying that they should do so because of moral obligations.  That making these decisions might very well cost them reelection did not seem to enter Carter’s thinking, and indeed voting in favor of the treaty on the Panama Canal cost quite a few Democratic Senators their seats both in 1978 and 1980. The cost was not immediately apparent in 1978 – the Democrats lost fifteen seats in the house and three seats in the Senate. But there were troubling signs even then. For the first time since Reconstruction, the Democrats lost seats in Mississippi. Liberal Republican Clifford Case had lost renomination in New Jersey and Bill Bradley had won election in his spot. Democrats had lost seats in Colorado and Iowa.  This was balanced by gains in Michigan and Massachusetts where Paul Tsongas had defeated Edward Brooke, the first popularly elected African-American Senator in history – and the last for 26 years.

By early 1979 many Democrats thought Carter was unelectable and were starting to lean for Ted Kennedy. Many Republicans smelled blood in the water and began their own campaigns. While Ronald Reagan spent a lot of time shadow campaign, several other Republicans began maneuvers.

Gerald Ford spent 1979 and early 1980 considering whether to throw his hat in the ring – he was constitutionally eligible and he still loathed Reagan enough not to want him to be the eventual nominee.

Phil Crane, a far right Illinois Congressman and Bob Dole, Senator from Kansas and Ford’s defeated running mate in 1976 spent time and energy running but were never taking serious as candidates. More seriously considered by professionals were John Connally, Nixon’s long held favorite for the President and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee.

Ironically the two men who would stay in the race the longest were considered non-starters by both the GOP and the press in 1979. The first was John Anderson. Anderson had been in the house for ten terms but had always been a Liberal Republican, a direction the party had been moving away from ever since he had taken office. Anderson was popular with young voters and the press but no one really thought he would get anywhere.

People thought even less of George H.W. Bush. Bush was the son of Connecticut Senator Prescott Bush. He had been elected to a Texas House seat in 1964 and had served until 1970 when he ran for the Senate. He would lose to Lloyd Bentsen. He had served as head of the RNC, had been head of the CIA and Ambassador to China in both the Nixon and Ford administrations. But he was considered essentially a dilletante and a lightweight as well as too moderate for the increasingly conservative base.  He had been a contender for the Vice Presidency when Ford had taken office but as much as the conservatives hated Nelson Rockefeller, he was considered ‘too incompetent’ to be Vice President, much less President.  Bush was not even considered for the ticket in 1976.

He declared his candidacy in the fall of 1979 and was still considered by most of the base of having no realistic chance. Even the most generous pollsters thought Connally or Baker had a better chance of getting the nomination than Bush did.  Reagan barely considered him worth the time of day.

The problem that dogged the Reagan campaign throughout most of the 1979 was that of overconfidence. John Sears, once again the campaign manager, thought that Reagan had the nomination basically locked up and that the candidate should fundamentally stay away from the campaign trail until at least New Hampshire. Many of Reagan’s advisers questioned that strategy, well into November of 1979 when both the Iran hostage crisis began and Ted Kennedy’s disastrous interview with Roger Mudd took place. The finances were a disaster by that time, morale was dropping, old hands were being thrown aside.

In November of 1979 the Maine straw poll took place which many expected Howard Baker to win easily. Bush ended up the surprise victor 35 percent to Baker’s 33 percent. Reagan had not even shown up. By this point Bush had already won two straw polls in Iowa. Reagan still barely campaigned or debated in Iowa.  Then on January 21, 1980 Bush managed to upset Reagan at the Iowa caucus with 32 percent of the vote to Reagan’s 29.5 percent. Reagan was now trailing Bush by more than sixteen percent in the New Hampshire polls.

What helped Reagan was that there was nearly five weeks between the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary.  Had their been less time, Reagan’s campaign might not have recovered from this blow. As it was, it took a lot of luck for him to turn things around. Bush was getting large crowds in New Hampshire. Reagan, who had sat out all the previous GOP debates to this point, agreed to attend all the debates in New Hampshire. He was going to need the support: in a straw poll in Mississippi, Reagan managed to win with 37 percent but Bush managed a strong second with 29  percent.

On February 20^th all seven candidates debated in Manchester. Reagan did not perform badly but he did not perform well.  Bush had decided to debate Reagan one on one in a debate in Nashua, which upset the other candidates who were beginning to fall out of contention. At that point Sears – now almost certainly about to be fired  - played one last card for Reagan.

He planned to embarrass Bush into letting Dole, Crane, Baker and Anderson onto the sage while making Reagan look magnanimous. Sears tracked down all of the other candidates. John Connally was the only one who couldn’t make it. He knew that Sears was using him and his fellow candidates as props but he liked the idea of sticking it to Bush, who he loathed. “Brilliant idea, but I ain’t coming,” he told Sears. “F--- him over for me.”

That afternoon Sears announced that Reagan was opening the debate to the other candidates. Bush took the bait and refused to include them, saying he had agreed to a two-man debate and played by the rules.

The debate was scheduled to begin at 7:30 pm, but by 8:15 there were still no candidates on stage. There was a private war backstage, with Reagan angry and Bust acting like a petulant child. Reagan had second thoughts and planned to walk out with the other candidates, but Senator Gordon Humphrey protested, saying if he did Reagan would lose the primary. Influenced by his wife, he decided to walk to the stage with the other candidates. Bush came out with the moderator, reporter Jon Breen to subdued cheers. Reagan came out livid. The other candidates came to the stage.

Reagan asked to address the crowd. Breen rudely refused. Breen and Reagan got into an onstage spat and Breen ordered Reagan’s microphone to be turned off. An enraged Reagan shouted out: “I am paying for this microphone, Mr. Green!”

The ‘Nashua Four’ came on stage were photographed with Reagan and shook hands with him…but not with Bush. It has been forgotten by history that the four candidates then left the stage and Reagan and Bush did have a two man debate as agreed at the start. All that mattered were the optics of Bush standing stock still on the stage  giving the perception, as Jules Witcover wrote later, that he had the backbone of a jellyfish.

It also helped that all of the other candidates in the back room, who already hated Bush, spent the aftermath of the debate tearing him apart. All had their own reason to loathe Bush: Dole had humble origins and considered Bush a man of privilege. Connally was a Texan who thought Bush a carpetbagger. Baker was angry because Bush had taken the position of the moderate from him.

On primary day Reagan crushed Bush 50 percent to 23 percent. That day Reagan cut loose three critical members of the Reagan entourage including John Sears. Sears would never work again in national politics. Charlie Blake and Jim Lake would take it hard but eventually work back in Reagan’s good graces, helping him on his reelection campaign. Sears’ never even spoke to the Reagans again. It was a sad end to the career of the man who had done the most to launch Reagan to national prominence.

Bob Dole got out of the race not long after. John Connally would gamble everything on South Carolina. The next primary day of consequence was on March 4^th,  Massachusetts and Vermont. There was a chance to stop or at least slow Reagan’s momentum there and indeed it very nearly happened. Bush managed to win Massachusetts narrowly beating John Anderson by just 1200 votes. Reagan narrowly beat Anderson in Vermont, by 31 percent to 30.  Had Anderson managed to win in Vermont, Reagan would have had a poor day by his standards: finishing second in one state and third in another.  As it was at the end of the day Bush had 36 delegates to Reagan’s 37. There were now people in the media writing Ford to get into the race.

The campaign moved to the South and Reagan would dominate, crushing Connally in South Carolina, forcing him out of the race. Reagan swept through Alabama, Georgia and Florida. Baker would get out soon after and Phil Crane was basically done. It was down to Anderson, Bush and Reagan. Anderson was counting on Illinois to revive his campaign. He would lose to Reagan with 37 percent to Reagan’s 50 and got 26 delegates to Reagan’s 39. Bush only got 2 delegates.

However Bush managed to revive his chances by winning in Connecticut. He lost badly in New York, however, and was overshadowed by Ted Kennedy’s revival of his campaign in which he had swept both primaries over Jimmy Carter.

Bush would continue his campaign until the end of the season but the proportions of so many of the GOP state primaries kept working against him. In Wisconsin, he received 31 percent of the vote but only got three delegates to Reagan’s 25.  He swamped Reagan with 53 percent of the vote in Pennsylvania but only got thirty-three delegates. He narrowly lost to Reagan in Texas with 47 percent to Reagan’s 51, but he only received 18 delegates of the eighty at stake. Even when he routed Reagan in Michigan with 57 percent of the vote, the media almost as a man declared that Reagan had gotten the nomination. Bush spent several days refusing to accept reality before finally dropping out on May 26^th. None of this did anything to improve his position in the eyes of the party.

Still by the beginning of June Reagan was finally the Republican nominee for President. They were eying the carnage between Ted Kennedy and President Carter with delight. Kennedy was well behind in the delegates for the DNC nomination but was refusing to withdraw from the race.  Given Carter’s low approval rating, it looked it would be a cakewalk for the Presidency Reagan had spent twelve years trying to win. But there were still quite a few obstacles to overcome.

In the final article in these series, I will deal with Reagan’s turmoil to choose his running mate, the obstacles he faced in the fall campaign (some of which were his own making) and the multiple errors that Carter made throughout his run to help ensure his victory.