The Myths and Electoral History of Ronald Reagan, Part 4: The 1976 Groundbreaking Primary Challenge to Gerald Ford

 

There has been much written over the years about what went wrong with Reagan’s primary challenge to Gerald Ford, particularly in the early states. There were errors made trying to woo one of the key elected official, a blunder that Reagan made in a speech about the deficit, Ford using – as he would so often – the trappings of the White House to campaign.

I think at the end of the day the simplest explanation is the most likely one.  The Reagan campaign in the weeks leading up to the New Hampshire primary based on the idea of high expectations.  Considering that a strong showing by Georger McGovern in New Hampshire in 1972 and by Eugene McCarthy in 1968 against the front runners in the Democratic race had shown the weakness in both Edmund Muskie and LBJ’s campaigns, the smart move by the Reagan campaign from the start would have been to argue for a relative similar showing. If Reagan and his staffers had argued that, say, thirty to thirty five percent of the vote would be better than they expecting and kept on that message Ford would have spent the entire primary in New Hampshire on the defensive. Considering that for all intents and purposes the final tally was a tie -  Ford would win by less than 1300 votes out of nearly 110,000 cast – you could see how this would have looked from the campaign going forward. Ford would have been revealed as not merely a straw man, but the Reagan bounce would have grown exponentially from there: Reagan would have been able to use to momentum to gain on Ford, win more of the early primaries and perhaps force him to withdraw.

But because the Reagan campaign had been designed on the principle that Ford wasn’t a bona fide incumbent, they had managed their campaign on the premise of an early knockout. They were also misled by several polls showing that Reagan had a lead over Ford going into the final days of the primary campaign, perhaps as much as eight percent. The press and Reagan aides believed that the crowds at his rallies were significant of the momentum he had in New Hampshire. These fed on each other and turned Ford into the underdog. As a result, Ford’s narrow victory revealed that Ford was a legitimate incumbent and it would make him harder to defeat going forward.

And that was what happened for Ford in the next few weeks. Reagan did not even try to actively campaign in Massachusetts and Vermont (Reagan would never have much primary success in New England or the North East) and Ford took both easily. Reagan hoped to regain momentum in Florida, a Southern state which was where his rhetoric had an appeal.  But Reagan never had much of a lead in polling even before Ford’s victory in New Hampshire. After Ford’s victory, Reagan went into the primary trailing by seventeen points in most polls. He would manage a comeback of sorts in the end – Ford would win 53 percent to 47 for Reagan  - but it was still a loss. After he was demolished in Illinois by nearly twenty points, Ford had 166 delegates to Reagan’s 54. Even John Sears, Reagan’s campaign manager, was beginning to think the end might be in sight. He told one reporter: “He’ll survive until Texas. But if he doesn’t win there, he’s through.” Ford sounded out Reagan allies like John Tower to try and get Reagan out of the race rather than embarrass himself further or damage the party’s chance in November. Reagan refused to consider quitting.

In the North Carolina primary, Reagan tore up his Eleventh Commandment (Thou shalt not attack thy fellow Republican) and hit him with every accusation he could think of: détente, the policy of the Panama Canal, and the bloated bureaucracy in DC. Reagan also began a major fundraising speech that he had done for the Florida primary. It worked and Reagan would win with 52 percent to 46 percent for Ford.  The victory was more of a moral triumph then an actual one – delegate selection gave Reagan 28 to Ford’s 26.

A bigger problem for the Reagan campaign, which became clearer near the end, was the lack of money to file for delegates.  In what would be the last major primary before campaigning in all of them became mandatory for a national candidate, the Reagan campaign had chosen to skip several states where they did not think they would do well and concentrate on ones where they could. Therefore while Reagan’s name was on the ballot in several states, he was not eligible for delegates.

This would be a critical problem for the Reagan campaign in two separate primaries. The Wisconsin primary was a crossover primary where members of either party could vote for whatever candidate they liked. This was the kind of primary that Reagan would do exceptionally well in throughout his primary run. The campaign had wanted to go to Wisconsin and file for delegate but at that point the campaign was practically broke. As a result, even though they got forty-five percent of the vote in Wisconsin, they received no delegates.

The campaign would also skip the New York and Pennsylvania primaries, the former was on the same day as the Wisconsin primary; the latter three weeks later.  Later, especially after the Republican convention, there would be allegations that Sears had undermined any chances that his candidate could have gotten the nomination by skipping those states. But Sears defending his decision by arguing that the campaign would have had to spend huge amounts of money on TV and advertising in exchange for relatively little reward. Considering that in the entire 1976 primary Reagan’s campaign would not carry a single state in New England or the Northeast, it is hard to argue his point.  New York and Pennsylvania would eventually net Reagan thirty combined delegates; it’s hard to realistically imagine a full-fledged campaign getting more, particularly in New York, the state of Nelson Rockefeller.

All attention was focused on the May 1 Texas primary. Those of you who read my series on George Wallace earlier might recall that with the collapse of the Wallace primary campaign against Jimmy Carter would lead to tens of thousands of Wallace primary voters being cut loose. Reagan was one of the biggest beneficiaries of them and the full fruition of it came in the Texas primary. Reagan convinced Texas democrats that it would not be a sin to vote for him in the wide-open Republican primary that year. As a result, there was a record turn out for any statewide Republican primary and Reagan benefit. He would sweep all 24 Congressional districts and take all 96 delegates at stake.  The Reagan campaign had been revitalized.

Three days later, Reagan had his best night of the primary season to date. He would defeat Ford handily in Indiana, Alabama and Georgia, getting 129 out of 138 delegates. For the first time in the campaign, Reagan was in the lead in the delegate hunt. The next week things only marginally improved for Ford: while he won comfortably in West Virginia, Reagan would win just as big in Nebraska. People began to think Reagan was the front-runner and he actually began to talk about potential running mates, though he mentioned no names.

For Gerald Ford, everything now depended on Michigan, yet another crossover primary. As I mentioned in the Wallace article, four years previously Wallace had received nearly 800,000 votes in winning the Democratic primary. The question was, would the Democrats from that primary, now turn out in vast numbers for Ronald Reagan?

The Ford campaign knew it and had built up a state party organization. Reagan made an attempt to campaign for crossover, but this time chose to play down his chances. He did not make much of an effort to campaign in the state, knowing there was little to win. As a result when Ford managed to defeat Reagan buy nearly a two-to-one majority, the Reagan campaign downplayed it. Ford also managed to win Maryland, which Reagan didn’t contest, and as a result managed to gain nearly 100 delegates on that day.

The Reagan campaign was not overly concerned by this, nor by subsequent announcements that much of the Pennsylvania and New York delegation announced their commitment to Ford. The focus was on May 25 where the most primaries on the calendar were scheduled, six. Arkansas, Nevada and Idaho were considered safe for Reagan. Tennessee. Which was a crossover state looked like a sure bet. Oregon was the only state that seemed certain for Ford. The battleground state was Kentucky.

Reagan might have been able to take control right then – except on the Friday before the primary he committed a blunder in Tennessee. In 1964 Barry Goldwater had almost certainly lost any chance of carrying the border states when he said that the Tennessee Valley Authority should be sold to private enterprise. In Knoxville Reagan had been shooting a commercial where he was being asked that same kind of question:

“Barry Goldwater once suggested selling TVA, using that same argument: that it belongs in the private sector. If elected President, would you go along with that kind of argument?”

Reagan gave an answer about how the TVA competed against private utilities and made clear that this was his philosophy. He said: “I don’t think I can give you answer.” Then he paused. “It would be something to look at.”

The moment that comment aired, the Ford campaign got Tennessee Senator Howard Baker and local Republican congressmen to make every conceivable argument that Reagan was considering getting rid of one of the greatest source of employment in the region. Reagan tried to backtrack when he realized his mistake, but his remarks were essentially a non-denial denial. He basically said that while he didn’t intend to destroy the TVA if elected President, he still didn’t think it should exist. The flap almost certainly cost Reagan Tennessee: Ford would win it by a narrow margin and in just as likely made sure that Ford would narrowly win Kentucky as well. Ford had been expected at best to win one primary out of six; by winning three (as expected Reagan overwhelmingly won Arkansas, Nevada and Idaho) he had won the ‘psychological battle.

On June 1^st Ford won South Dakota and Rhose Island, while Reagan took Montana. The final day of the primaries focused on three huge delegate rich states: California, Ohio and New Jersey. It was a sure thing that Reagan would take all 167 delegates in the winner-take-all primary in his home state. Reagan wasn’t even on the ballot in New Jersey, so its 67 delegates were safe for Ford.  Ford needed to win almost all of Ohio’s 97 delegates to stay even with Reagan – and he would be helped by another Reagan blunder on an obscure topic for most Americans.

When asked about fighting in Rhodesia against strongman Ian Smith, Reagan made an argument in favor of sending U.S. troops as a token show of strength. For a country that had just gotten out of the war in Vietnam, this was the kind of talk that appalled the press nationwide and the Ford campaign jumped on it. The campaign aired ads essentially saying: “Remember Governor Ronald Reagan couldn’t start a war. President Ronald Reagan could.” By the time Reagan attempted to campaign in Ohio to try and lock down at least some delegates, the reporters refused to let him off the hook. This blow was one that many in the Reagan campaign would never forgive Ford for.

The final primary day Reagan could only gain nine delegates in Ohio, even though he received 45 percent of the popular vote.  Reagan received 176 delegates on the final day to Ford’s 155. The primary battle was over, and neither candidate had close to the 1130 delegates needed to clinch the nomination for President.  After the primary battles  It was agreed that Ford had a slight lead when it came to committed delegates, but no one was sure how much. The consensus after primary day was that Ford would need at least 170 delegates, while Reagan would need 270.

Leading up to the convention in Kansas City in two months’ time, both the Ford and the Reagan campaigns made every effort to try and win over the more than 400 delegates who were uncommitted.  Working through state conventions Reagan had managed to lock down 178 delegates during state conventions, while Ford had managed to get 114 with 64 uncommitted. The battles would go back and forth for the next month, with neither side gaining much of an advantage and neither side able to give an inch.

As the weeks went on Reagan knew that he had to do something daring to try and take the momentum from Ford, who was using all the trappings of the White House to pull delegates in. He then came up with a daring strategy that seemed inspired but ended up costing him the nomination. In the next article, I will deal with the lead up to convention in Kansas City – and why losing the nomination was the best thing that could have happened to Ronald Reagan.