How Truman Didn't Start The Cold War, Part 5: Potsdam and The Final Meeting of the Allied Leaders

 

Much of the saga of Potsdam focuses on the interactions between the three principal actors: Truman, Stalin and Churchill, who in the midst of the meeting was defeated in the elections that were going on in Britain and replaced by Clement Atlee. And while attention should be paid to their interaction the ultimate outcome of the meeting was happening and the new Secretary of States James Byrnes was playing a critical role.

Truman had not been looking forward to what was his first European trip as President; even by this early point in his administration he was becoming more comfortable with domestic issues. The closer the point of departure came, the more he openly complained about it in letters to his family. On the day of his departure to Europe he confided in his diary: “Talked to Bess last night and the night before. She wasn’t happy about my going to see Mr. Russia and Mr. Great Britain – and neither was I.”

And its worth noting that before this critical meeting neither he nor the American mission didn’t set off with an inclination to be hostile towards the Soviets. However unlike FDR and Harry Hopkins Truman and Byrnes had no intention of winning Stalin’s trust with concessions. Truman made it clear in his diary that “he was not working for any interest but the Republic of the United States.” They saw themselves as representatives of the nations with whom they must deal as their mirror images, practical men with whom a deal could be struck in the best interests of their respective countries.

And both men considered it critical that the settlement in Potsdam be political palatable for America. To that end on July 6^TH a memorandum was drawn up by his advisor about the consensus for the meeting of what they considered important. Most notable was Russia’s entry into the war against Japan, followed by the economic stabilization of Europe.

Among the members of Truman’s advisers, along with Byrnes were State Department officials Ben Cohen and Charles Bohlen, Truman’s press secretary Charlie Ross, Brigadier General Harry Vaughn and naval aide Captain James Vardaman. None of these men served any major role in policy but they were mostly their as officers of morale for the President during the trip.

On the trip about the Augusta. Byrnes met with his aides to discuss the issues to be raised, looking at extensive State department books of papers. Truman met with them each day for briefings to absorb information and ask pertinent question. Bohlen later reported that Truman was not so much a philosopher as a pragmatist. He wanted results and to come out with a relationship to prevent ‘another world catastrophe.”

By the time the Augusta arrived in Europe they had settled on four major issues upon which they would seek agreement beyond Russia’s military support against Japan. The first was to develop ‘procedure and machinery for peace negotiations and territorial settlements’, though no one thought Potsdam would serve as a location for fashioning peace treaties themselves, only the process for preparing them. They were also focused on the principals governing the occupation of Germany as well as reparations from that country. Finally they wanted agreement on carrying out Yalta and ending the friction that had existence since the conference had concluded. And it is well worth noting that Truman believed that Potsdam would be but the first of a series of meetings to secure the peace.

On July 16^th Truman and Churchill met for the first time. Churchill afterward expressed great fondness for the new President. After several minutes of Churchill’s expressing great love for his predecessor, the two men ‘struck a blow for liberty’ by toasting with scotch. After photos were taken, both men took the chance to view the remnants of Berlin. Truman accurately observed: “Hitler’s folly.”

That same day Stalin arrived with Ambassador Joseph Davies acting as go-between. They met on the 17^th. Truman explained he was no diplomat but would give yes or no answers on all questions. He assured the Soviet premier of his friendship. Stalin began with his own agenda: removing Franco’s fascist government in Spain, disposing of Italian  colonies in North Africa, and  obtaining a share of the German fleet. Stalin then maligned the British effort in the Pacific and said that the Russians could offer more than them in the War on the Pacific. Truman came away with the impression that “I can deal with Stalin” and the flawed assessment that ‘he is honest’. He compared him to a political boss in the United States (an incredibly naïve assumption) and made clear he regarded the Soviet premier with respect and admiration. He would even promised to send the battleship Missouri to bring him on a visit to America. When Stalin raised the issue of misunderstandings between the Soviets and America, Truman earnestly responded “that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries.”

Much of this was due to the influence of Davies, who constantly offered a conciliatory approach to the Soviets. That the Americans seemed determined to get ‘the best of a horse trade’ offended him and he constantly tried to inoculate the new Secretary of State from the influence of hardliners like Averill Harriman. Much of the time Davies often took on the tenor of a representative of the Soviets, comparing the recent invasion of Bulgaria and Rumania to the British actions in Greece around the same time. Byrnes and Truman continued to listen to this man far longer than they should have.

Early on the sixteenth Secretary of War Stimson received a telegraph from his aide George Harrison: “Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations.” This cryptic message was in reaction to a report from Colonel Leslie Groves, who in his duties as the military head of the Manhattan Project had just witnessed the first successful test of the atomic bomb.” Stimson with great excitement reported this to Truman who reported it ‘took a great load off his mind’.

Stimson briefed Byrnes the next day and tried to persuade him that the US should now alter its plan to utilize the new weapon. He argued a strong warning about the bomb and a firm assurance of the Japanese retaining the emperor might be enough to cause the Japanese to surrender. However, influenced by predecessor Cordell Hull Byrnes rejected the idea. He was thinking of the use of the bomb and the end of the war ‘purely in terms of U.S. political consequences.”

Byrnes saw two dangers. On the one hand, if he and Truman were to retreat from the position of unconditional surrender, it could be exploited by the Japanese and a sign of war weariness and cause a political firestorm. On the other, if they didn’t take advantage of a measure that could rapidly end the war and prevent the further loss of American lives, both he and Truman would be vulnerable to harsh criticism. Using the new weapon assuaged both concerns, something the President agreed with.

Truman and Byrnes had differing views about this new weapon. Truman was thinking only about the end of the war while Byrnes was thinking in diplomatic terms. He attempted to use the bomb as a diplomatic strategy concerning the Far East in attempt to strengthen America’s hand against the Soviets.

On the first day of meetings Truman placed four crucial items on the three delegations before him. The most explosive was the implementation of the Yalta Declaration in Eastern Europe. Churchill added free Poland to the agenda. The Soviet approach, briefly, focused on obtaining as much as possible from their former enemies while the Americans wanted to provided stability in Europe and a way to reach peace. This was not ground for an easy match.

And it quickly proved to be that way. On July 18^th when Churchill asks his colleagues what exactly constituted Germany, the dispute about the boundaries broke open. The Soviets wanted  to ‘compensate Poland’ by adding an additional 8000 square miles to a territory that they were planning to control. Stalin balked at the idea of reparations as well as the procedures for governing occupied Germany and they disagreed on all the Soviet dominated regimes across Europe.

By the time Churchill, Clement Atlee and Anthony Eden lefts Potsdam to return to London to learn the results of the election (Atlee would end up winning) the conference discussions had bogged down.  During this period, it should be added, Churchill and Stalin were the main debaters and Truman gave little support at the table for the Allies. While he had disagreements with Stalin, he continuously assured the Soviet leader of his genuine hopes for peace, never pushing as hard as Churchill on the issues of Soviet control.

Byrnes, however, was troubled by it more than his President. On July 24, he confided to an advisor that “somebody had made an awful mistake in bringing about a situation where Russia was permitted to come out of a war with the power she will have.” While he did not draw the obvious conclusion as to who was responsible (he blamed England rather than America) he at least recognized Germany’s collapse had allowed the Soviets to expand their influence into Europe and now was concerned about how to arrest this.

On July 26^th America and the UK issued the Potsdam Declaration. It warned the Japanese to surrender immediately or face ‘prompt and utter destruction” The declaration denied any intention ‘that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation…but that ‘stern justice shall me meted out to all war criminals.” It demanded unconditional surrender.

2 days prior Truman met with Stalin and told him about this ‘new weapon’. Stalin merely nodded and said ‘Thank you’ according to Anthony Eden. (Stalin, of course, needed no such briefing as he had his own sources on the bomb including Klaus Fuchs who was at Alamogordo.) Truman made no effort to use this horrible new weapon as a bludgeon against the Soviets.

One day prior Byrnes explained to Churchill his attempt at ‘atomic diplomacy’. He had cabled the Foreign Minister of China and encouraged him not to make any further concessions to the Soviets, encouraging them to continue negotiating, hoping the Russians would delay entry into the war until the agreements were finalized. It was an admirable attempt but Byrnes eventually understood that nothing the United States did could keep the Soviets out of the war and that they possessed the military force to take control of Manchuria and northern China.

After the surprise results of the elections Atlee returned to Potsdam to take over Churchill’s role. Both he and the new foreign secretary Ernest Bevin were fully briefed on the war situation having been part of Churchill’s War Cabinet. In stark contrast to Truman, both of the new leaders of the government were fully briefed on international developments and as a result, while their was a shift from Conservative to Labor in Britain, there was no shift in foreign policy, Indeed while some might have suspected a democratic social party might move towards favoring the Communists unlike those sympathizers for it in America, both men recognized their political philosophy was unalterably opposed to the totalitarianism of Stalin. Bevin in particular had a firm dislike for communism and communists and his confrontational attitude to pushing the Russian won him the regards of Harriman – but not Byrnes and Truman, who were still trying to reach agreements.

On July 28^th Davies met with Burnes and upon learning of the atomic bomb and his intention to use it for leverage against the Soviets, the pro-Russia ambassador challenged the notion saying that ‘any threat of exclusion from participation in this new war weapon’ would create distrust and cause the Soviets to get their backup. Now was the time, in an ironic about face, to get down the horse trading.

Over a series of meetings the negotiators formed the outline of a compromise on reparations. Byrnes gave ground on the cession of German territory to Poland as well as recognition to the Soviet sponsored regimes in Eastern Europe. In turn, he put pressure on Molotov to concede on the issue of reparations, forego reference to a fixed dollar amount and no involvement in the Ruhr valley. When Molotov objected to reneging on that part of the Yalta accord, Byrnes countered by saying that given the destruction of Germany and the Soviets unilateral consignment of that territory to Poland, circumstances changed. According to Byrnes’s account unless Stalin agreed to all three of these, he and the President would leave for America the following day.

Stalin would try to chip away at that proposal on July 31^st but while some concessions were made, Byrnes and Truman made it very clear that the new reality was a quid pro quo. He accepted the deal Byrnes offered and from that point on, the rest of the settlements followed.

Late on the evening of August 1^st, the leaders of the Big Three gathered for the final plenary session. While they went over the accords Stalin continued to make demands for the satellite countries in Europe and Atlee and Bevin objected, while Truman tried to move things along. After the signing of the accords Truman observed he hoped the next meeting would be in Washington. Stalin, a former seminarian unused to invoking the almighty said: “God willing.” Atlee came to the rescue of the President and attended to some of the diplomatic pleasantries including thanks to Stalin for the accommodations and Truman for presiding. Stalin declared the conference ‘a success’. At 8:00 AM, Truman’s plane departed Berlin to return to the US. He would never see Stalin again.

While Truman never suffered from the conceit of his predecessor that he could satisfy Stalin’s demands, he left Potsdam convinced that Stalin was a man of his word with whom the U.S. could do business with. Both he and Byrnes assumed that there would be future meetings and both men judged it a sort of success.” However Byrnes did note the delegation that left Potsdam was not nearly as optimistic as the one that had left Yalta six months earlier.  In his  autobiography Byrnes referred to Potsdam as ‘the success that failed.” Truman held a similar view, although he told the public the meeting had been a success.

Truman seemed to have accepted the idea, like his predecessor, that Eastern Europe would be under the Soviet control and just like him didn’t seem troubled by the idea. Byrnes and Truman genuinely wanted to reach a settlement with the Soviets and maintain a decent and cooperative relationship with their wartime ally into the post-war world. But in order to do that and meet their own objectives, they had to limit their cooperation with the Soviets. Byrnes seemed to have believed that the only way for the two nations to get along was to pull apart. Truman and Byrnes left Germany hopeful the compromise reached there would afford good relations with Stalin going forward.

George Kennan later argued:

If at Yalta certain opportunities were missed, certain points yielded and certain fateful obscurities brought into existence, it was for most part at Potsdam, five months later, that the final lines were drawn…It could well be argued that there was less excuse, this time, for illusions with regard to Soviet intentions or for less hesitation about carrying forward Western desiderata….The war in Europe was over, the danger that the Soviets posed to Germany’s future should have been apparent, Stalin’s purposes and modus operandi should have been clear from the Polish case…here, at Potsdam, one might have thought was the time for a showdown – perhaps not the best time, but certainly the last.”

There is some justification for this cold warrior’s attitude that a more blunt approach should have been adopted. British leaders of both parties were very uneasy about the final compromise particularly in regard to the Polish question. Had the Americans opposed it, they might have placed greater pressure on Stalin to allow for genuinely democratic regimes in Eastern Europe. At the very least they might have refused to be a part of the Soviet domination or even recognize it for what it was.

But Byrnes and Truman were still trapped in Roosevelt’s grand design about the need for continued cooperation with the Soviets and while the experience left them slightly wiser about their dealing, their assumptions were still intact.

Again to be fair both Truman and Byrnes had more important things to consider. They needed to get hoe quickly and had immediate concerns, which had to be about bringing the war in Japan to a speedy end.

The next article will be an interlude of sorts in which I discuss the decisions about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as why those who choose to view it strictly from a position of morality have no view of the other realities at the time – and are making the wrong argument anyway.