Perhaps my sole
objection to Christopher Nolan’s masterpiece Oppenheimer was the famous
encounter between Oppenheimer and Truman as it portrayed in the film. While
Nolan accurately reports Oppenheimer’s famous exchange: “I feel I have blood on
my hands” as well as Truman’s wiping it off with a handkerchief, saying “the
blood is on my hands’ my problem is how Gary Oldman interprets the role.
In this scene Truman
seems incredibly arrogant as if he can barely be bothered to give the scientist
the time of day. When Oppenheimer delivers his line, Truman’s reaction is that
of arrogance: “You think anyone gives a damn about who made the bomb.”
And his uttering of the famous line is that of someone who can barely be
bothered with the decision that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands. He
did call Oppenheimer ‘a crybaby’ but only after the troubled scientist was out
of earshot (though I suspect that was purely for dramatic license).
To give Nolan the
benefit of the doubt the film is seen entirely from Oppenheimer’s perception of
events and is necessary to explain his actions from that point forward. The
problem is it plays in to the general perception of Truman’s use of the weapon
not only by many revisionist historians for more than half a century. And it
speaks to a larger bias about one of the most significant decisions in world
history with the same kind of lens that the left in particular is keen to use.
This may have started
with the fiftieth anniversary of the Enola Gay’s dropping of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima. Countless historians began to argue that the bomb’s dropping was
completely unnecessary to end the war in the Pacific or to save American lives.
These arguments had been a rejection of the ones both Truman and Stimson have
made argued that Japan was on the verge of surrender and that the dropping of
the bombs were solely to demonstrate American might in the face of the Soviet
Union, a decision that seems to justify the start of the Cold War. This changed
the debate from the necessity of the bomb as to why is was used. In this
interpretation Japan was willing to surrender and Truman decided to use the
bomb just to exercise the man of America on the Soviets, killing hundreds of
thousands of Japanese just to flex in front of Stalin.
Fundamentally this
argument operates much in the ideology of leftist dogma when it comes to so
many of the more significant decisions in American history practically from the
founding. It eliminates every other consideration at the time – economic, domestic,
geopolitical – and reduces it strictly to a moral argument, with a right
decision and a wrong one and as always America made the wrong one. Like almost
every argument the left makes it is done with the benefit of hindsight,
particularly those of an academic environment. This is, like every argument the
left makes, fundamentally flawed and in this case, it misconstrues the role of the President.
There are two
fundamental errors in this thinking about Truman’s process during this period.
The first is that the President of the United States has many responsibilities
as the leader of the country. Morality and ethics play a role, it can’t be
denied, but it has always been much lower on the list that the left believes it
should be. And whatever morality he has to consider, it must be what is best
for America and the rest of the world must by necessity play a secondary
role. Truman was the President of the United States, not Germany, not
Russia, certainly not Japan. He had to worry about what they would think of his
decisions, not what the rest of the world would think. And he must consider it
through other lenses.
That leads to the
second fundamental flaw: Truman was acting not as the morality czar, but in his
role as commander-in-chief while America was still at war. America was
entering its fourth year of fighting when he became President and while the war
in Europe was over, the War in the Pacific was still going on and American
soldiers were dying horribly in the Pacific every day. Whatever moral
responsibility he felt had to be for the American lives that were being lost
first as well as the families at home who were worried about their fathers,
sons and husbands. The longer the war went on, more American soldiers would
die. Truman himself said “The Buck Stopped Here” and that was true in this
case. Furthermore Truman himself had seen combat and knew first-hand how
horrible wartime battle was. This had to have entered his thinking as well
So in this brief
interval I will focus on the decision to drop the atomic bombs in the first
place from the role as commander-in-chief. Only then will I ask the question
whether it was a moral decision. I should say, however, that wars are never
thought based on the morality of nations or their leader. Everyone involved,
from the leaders of the countries to the military leaders to the soldiers
involved, is engaged in actions that will led to the deaths of other human
beings which makes them by that definition immoral no matter who is fighting
them. Each nation – not just America or Western ones, but all of them – believe
that they are fighting for their ‘way of life’ and that justifies the slaughter
of residents of other nation’s who are fighting for their ‘way of life’. Any
military struggle is not one by who has the greatest values but the biggest
armies and the best weapons. Morality never enters in to the thinking of the
leaders, and if it does it is only for the soldiers under them. That is as true
for the Soviets and the Japanese as it is for the Americans and the British. So
I fundamentally believe this is a ‘straw man’ argument from the start but
nevertheless I will try to attempt an answer.
First it is worth
noting that the Japanese government or military had made no encouragement in
the leadup to the decision to give either Truman or James Byrnes any indication
that they were willing to surrender. Indeed certain civilian officials in Tokyo
were attempting through backchannels with in enlisting the Soviet Union in a
peace settlement that did not involve an unconditional surrender as America had
demanded and obtained from Germany in May. After the Potsdam declaration was
announced the Prime Minister of Japan publicly dismissed them on July 28th
and two days later, made it clear to a senior cabinet official in which he
questioned that the Allies had the stomach to continue the war. This followed a
six month bombing campaign by General Curtis LeMay which had left no sizable
city untouched.
During that same period
American intelligence had determined that troop levels in Kyushu were building
to a level that Douglas MacArthur’s chief aide feared that they would grow to a
point where when the Americans invaded the home islands, they would be fighting
on even terms. He made clear “this was not the recipe for victory.” Not a
single military leader disagreed with the opinion that the Japanese were
girding for Armageddon and had no intention of surrendering.
It's worth noting that Truman
and the American leaders ‘simply’ considered the atomic bomb another weapon in
their arsenal to use against the Japanese. What revisionists have since
considered alternatives – a naval blockade, continued conventional bombing, the
threat of invasion and Soviet entry into the war – were in fact considered complements
to the use of the bomb. And Truman was very aware that it was only after
every weapon in the arsenal had been exhausted that America would then have to
invade the home islands which was scheduled for the spring of 1946.
The decision, it’s worth
noting, had been considered by a group of scientists as well as military
advisers while FDR was still alive. Truman had made no alterations in his war
cabinet (besides Byrnes) and men such as Henry Stimson, still the Secretary of
War, had been critical in the decision making the decision for the use of the
bomb. And while Truman was returning from Potsdam, he was increasingly aware of
the Navy and Air Force’s relentless attempts to pound the Japanese into submission.
Indeed on route to America, he no doubt learned of the sinking of the U.S.S.
Indianapolis by a Japanese submarine that left barely a quarter of the crew
alive - the worst American catastrophe
at sea during the war. It served as a horrible reminder – as if America needed
any – about the Japanese intention to defend their homeland.
On August 6th
1945, the Enola Gay dropped the bomb known as ‘Little Boy’ on the city of Hiroshima.
When Truman was informed of it, he was deeply moved and proclaimed to the
sailors “this is the greatest thing in history.” An observant reporter remembered
him almost running as he moved about the ship spreading the news. He could not
keep back his expectation the war in the Pacific might at last be over – the only
consideration he should have had at the time.
The real audience for his
thoughts were back in Japan. Provision had been made for a statement back in
Potsdam to be issued as soon as confirmation came through. It gave the basic
details of the attack and an elemental description of the new weapon that allowed America to win “the
battle of the laboratories against the Germans.” (I’ll return to that
later) The statement made it very clear that it was meant to shock and
intimidate the Japanese to surrender unconditionally and that “we shall completely destroy Japan’s
power to make war.” He also made clear that the Potsdam ultimatum had been
issued the spare ‘the Japanese people from utter destruction” but that
the Japanese leaders had rejected it:
“If they do not now
accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which
has never been seen on this earth. Behind the air attack will follow sea and
land forces in such numbers they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill
of which they are already well aware.”
Truman had inherited
FDR’s responsibility the strategy of keeping American losses to a minimum and
he was committed to carrying it out for the remainder of the war. On August 8th
the Soviet Union did declare war on Japan, but it is worth noting they believed
they had to enter the war immediately in case the Japanese chose to surrender
soon after Hiroshima. It was considered a given by Americans that Manchuria was
going to fall under Russian control regardless whatever happened elsewhere in
the Pacific.
On August 9th
Truman address the nation on radio, referring to the Soviet entry to the war
and increasing warnings to the Japanese. By that point the Japanese cabinet had
learned of the bombing of Hiroshima and was aware more bombs might be coming.
The Supreme Leadership
was divided on what to do next. The civilian leaders of the government (the
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Navy Minister) favored the acceptance of
the terms at Potsdam. But the military government rejected such an idea and
made it clear they preferred to fight on unless the Allies agreed to “self-disarmament,
Japanese control of any war-crimes trial and no Allied occupation of Japan.”
As a historian later put it: “these terms would permit, at some later and
better moment, Japan’s warriors to inculcate a myth that they were never really
defeated and only of their own volition laid down arms to spare the world more
ravages of war.”
While they were meeting
the first news came of the second bomb being dropped on Nagasaki. Even then
there was still no consensus of what to do next. Because unanimity was required
for any decision to be presented to the emperor, Suzuki left for the palace
that evening to explain the situation to Hirohito. He advised the Emperor to
convene an Imperial Conference to hear for himself the arguments of the
leadership.
According to the most
measured accounts of the meeting afterwards, the division remained on the same
lines. The civilian government demanded acceptance of terms at Potsdam; the
military wanted to fight ‘to the very last.’ Eventually Suzuki asked the
Emperor to weigh in. He concluded:
“the time has come when
we must bear the unbearable…I swallow my own tears and give my sanction to
accept the Allied proclamation.” The Japanese government agreed on the
condition that the Emperor’s sovereignty remained intact.
Surprisingly the key
American officials were not gathered together in expectation of an immediate
surrender. More tellingly, they didn’t expect one to be immediately
forthcoming. Stimson was actually planning to go on vacation because he was
sure immediate surrender was far from imminent.
The first news of the
offer came courtesy of American code breakers. When Truman heard these reports he
asked Leahy to gather Stimson, Byrnes and Forrestal together at 9:00 am to
review the situation. Leahy and Stimson encouraged the President to accept the
terms but Byrnes held back. According to what he later told an associate, he
pointed out that “they should go further in concessions then when we had no
atomic bomb and Russia was not in the war.” Byrnes intervention proved
successful and the meeting shelved Leahy’s memorandum of accepting the Japanese
surrender which as Byrnes’s point out
later “who have led to the crucifixion of the President.” Instead Truman
accepted the suggestion of Forrestal to draft a reply to indicate ‘willingness
to accept yet define terms of surrender in such a manner that the intents and
purposes of the Potsdam declaration would be clearly accomplished.” He charged
Byrnes with drafting such a reply.
The two men met at noon
and then they prepared for a full cabinet meeting two hours later. They drafted
messages to London, Moscow and Chungking requesting approval of the terms that
set forth ‘from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the
Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander
of the Allied powers.” It called for the Emperor to call on Japanese forces to lay
down arms. These terms were sent to the Allies. The British and Chinese agreed
immediately but the Soviets did more slowly and more grudgingly.
When the Emperor met
with his advisers that day, once again there was major division. Only Foreign
Minister Togo was in favor of immediate acceptance and the War Minister opposed
them. Suggestions that Japan should surrender were met with disbelief and
rejection from the War Ministry and officers in the field. The military was
actively gearing up to reverse any decision made.
The Emperor had to
intervene directly and made a broadcast to his people explaining the necessity
of ending the war. Even this did not end the matter. Military figures
throughout Japan attempted to kill their opponents, seize and destroy the
recording with the Emperor’s broadcast and essentially overthrow the
government. Several soldiers targeted ministers in the civilian government and
the Imperial Palace itself was occupied. But the War Minister refused to
endorse plans for a coup and officers loyal to the emperor managed to put down
the rebellion.
It is worth noting even
Hirohito’s message to the military never included such words as ‘defeat’, ‘surrender’
or ‘capitulation’. It was framed instead in terms of the best interest of
Japan and that because of atomic bomb “should
We continue to fight, it would…result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration
of the Japanese.” The next day an imperial ceasefire order was issued and the
Emperor enlisted the support of his family to ensure the Army and Navy commands
obeyed.
However on August 15th
when Stalin was provided with a copy of the initial order of surrender, Stalin
immediately imposed that the Soviets enlarge their realm by occupying Hokkaido
in the North. Two days later Truman rejected this out of hand, but this didn’t
stop the leader of the Soviet theater commander from seeking Moscow’s permission
to seize the island before the surrender could be made to the Americans. Operations
were slowed due to resistance on Sakhalin, the proposed launching point for the
attack and on August 22nd Stalin told the leader to halt his plans.
But it is clear that the Soviets had every intention of occupying as much of
Japan as possible.
One would think that all
of this would make it unmistakably clear that regardless of revisionists, the
atomic bombs were the most critical tool in bringing about the end of the war
in the Pacific. The Japanese military, even after the dropping of those bombs,
were more than willing to fight until the last man, were more than willing to slaughter
hundreds of thousands of Americans to do just that and were on the verge of overthrowing
the Emperor rather than accept any alternative.
This comes back to the
decision whether the decision Truman made was a morally correct one. As I stated
above Truman’s moral responsibility was, first and foremost to the American
people, both the civilians at home and the millions overseas. Had he not authorized
that attacks, thousands more American military forces would almost certainly
have been lost as well as the thousands of allied prisoners that the Japanese
were planning to execute. Truman would have to deal with a far more moral
struggle had he had let all of those soldiers die with an option that would
have saved them. And that is without considering the hundreds of thousands of
Japanese soldiers and civilians who would have died if their had been an invasion.
This moral criticism
started almost immediately after the bombing of Nagasaki. Truman was disturbed
by the dropping of the bomb but in a defense he pointed out:
“I was greatly disturbed
by the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of
our Prisoners of War. The only language the Japanese seem to understand is the
one we have been using to bombard them. It is most regrettable but nevertheless
true.”
He held to this point
of view long after the war ended, accurately pointing out ‘the double standard
of morality’ by critics of the A-bomb who somehow never criticized the attacks
on Pearl Harbor. In a letter he drafter but never sent to the diplomatic
historian Herbet Feis – who in his typically blunt style he described as ‘the
usual egghead’ he went on to note it was “a great thing that you or any
other contemplator ‘after the fact’ didn’t have to make a decision. Our boys would
all be dead. “
And it is not as though
Truman alone had ‘blood on his hands’. More than fifty million died in World
War II. The old order of morality
crumbled in the crucible of total war. The enemy was not merely soldiers but combatants
who worked in factories, ran the economy, maintained the civic life,
constituted much of the nation, and were the core of national cohesion.” Both
FDR and Churchill approved aerial bombardment of so many horrible cities that
Curis Lemay, no shrinking violet, would confide later that if America had lost
the war, he and all who worked for him would have been tried for war crimes.
All of these bombings – including Tokyo – took place under FDR’s watch.
Yet somehow Truman
alone seems to bear the brunt of the moral assessment of the war. Indeed there
has been a constant deluge of criticisms of American and British actions in the
more than eighty years since, both non-fictional and fictional. (The
fire-bombing of Dresden was the influence for Slaughterhouse Five to use
the most famous example.) And yet the Japanese’s morality never seems to merit
the same consideration. The Japanese perpetrated mass atrocities throughout the
Pacific, particularly in China. Nearly ten million Chinese, the vast majority
non-combatants, were killed during that period. In the last eight months of the
war, deaths at Japanese hands of civilians totaled upwards of 100,000 people per
month.
And it’s worth noting
that, much like the South after the Civil War, post-war Japanese leaders
effectively played up their own roles as victims to induce a certain guilt in a
certain part of the population. This blinds revisionists from the fact that the
military leaders were so devoted to preserving the emperor that they let every
opportunity to end a war that they were losing until it was too late. Why is it only American leaders have to bear
the conscience of the morality of the entire world, including those military in
Japan whose determination was to lead their entire nation on what was going
to be a kamikaze campaign rather than
surrender?
Yes in the dictionary
definition of the term Truman’s actions were immoral. He ordered the bombings
of cities which thousands of non-combatants, among them the elderly, the impaired,
women and children all lived. But isn’t the ledger balanced by the hundreds of
thousands of Japanese lives that were spared by the invasion that was being
planned and the tens of thousands of soldiers whose lives would have lost in
such a battle?
And this actually leads
to one more point that all of this moral arithmetic lays out but which Oppenheimer
makes very clear. The Nazis themselves were working on such a bomb and the
Americans were in a race against them. We hardly need ask the question if
Hitler would have shown the same kind of moral reckoning if a bomb had been
made available to the Nazis as to whether they would have used or that the
leadership would have had any definition of what ‘innocent lives’ were.
That fact played a key
factor in much of what was going on in the invasion of Europe. Stalin was as
aware of the Germans work on the atomic bomb as he was the Americans. One of
the reasons he insisted that the Soviets occupy Berlin – three full months
before Truman told him of America’s successful development of the weapon – was because
he was planning for the future. He knew Berlin had a supply of uranium that
would be useful to the Soviets in a post-war world. And there are many
indications that he would have been willing to engage in conflict with the
Americans in order to maintain it.
This leads to the final
fallacy that Truman dropped the bomb solely to flex his might over Stalin.
Stalin already knew about this weapon well before the Japanese did. And as we shall
see he was already making plans for necessities after the fighting stopped.
In the next article I
will deal with the resumption of the so-called ‘atomic diplomacy’ and how the Americans
certainly didn’t have a picture of a post-war world for much of the first full
year of Truman’s administration.
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