What We Get Wrong - And Right - About Andrew Johnson, Part 2: Why Lincoln Chose Him as Vice President and His Disastrous First Weeks in Office

 

By the spring of 1864, the Confederacy was in its death spiral. After the dual losses at Vicksburg and Gettysburg any chance for victory on the battlefield was long since gone. Europe, which had considered intervening in the early stages of the war on the side of a negotiated peace, had since decided to led the battle play out. The brilliant military commanders of the South were facing the inevitable realities of the agrarian structure – running out of weapons, food, and manpower. The latter predicament was so dire that at one point the Secretary of War received a memo suggested the manumission of slaves and inducting them into the military service.

But while the Confederates hopes for victory on the battlefield were impossible, their independence was still a viable option on one critical outside factor: the Presidential election. In what would be the first Presidential election held in a democracy during the midst of a military conflict, the South’s hopes now lingered on the hope that four full years of bloodshed and hundreds of thousands dead had sickened the minds of the North so fully that they would decide to vote Lincoln out of office.

Those hopes were completely worthy of merit for much of the lead up to the 1864 election. The North was tired of the conflict that showed no sign of ending. Grant was bogged down outside of Richmond and Sherman was similarly bogged down in Georgia. David Farragut, the Union’s top naval commander outside Mobile Bay. Battles in Cold Harbor led to immense casualties for Grant and the Wilderness ended in attrition and a victory for Lee. By the spring and early summer of 1864, Horace Greeley, the most prominent political journalism lamented: “Mr. Lincoln is defeated. He can not be reelected. And we must have another candidate to save us from other ruin.”

Lincoln himself felt similarly certain that he would lose reelection. The Democratic Party had made significant gains in the 1862 election in the House and it was only through the existence of the Unionist Party that the Republicans still controlled a majority In the Senate their commanding majority was due solely to the fact the Southern Democrats were gone. Their were a considerable number of Democratic Congressman, among them Clement Vallandingham and George Pendelton of Ohio, were among the loudest dissenters and criers for a negotiated peace. By the spring of 1864 much of what was left of America was on their side.

The Republicans searched for another standard bearer. Grant, the hero of the Union was sought out, but he emphatically declined when asked: “Mr. Lincoln’s victory…is important as mine on the battlefield.” Salmon Chase, Lincoln’s former Secretary of The Treasury and the son-in-law of Francis Blair, one of the founders of the Republican Party was also considered. Eventually the Radical Republicans, upset with Lincoln’s position on both slavery and the post-war reconciliation, nominated John C. Fremont as their candidate for President.

Fremont had been the very first standard bearer of the Republicans in a Presidential election in 1856, narrowly losing to James Buchanan though he received only a few hundred votes in the entire South. His relationship with the Lincoln administration was stormy. He had served as commander of the West in the early months of the war had been tumultuous, leading him to feuds with Grant on the battlefield and his decision in 1861 to put Missouri under martial law and emancipate all slaves in Missouri. Lincoln had relieved Fremont of command. This attitude put him in line with the Radicals and the party split.

Lincoln knew that whatever chance he had to win the Presidency would only come if he could build a coalition. With the help of some of the War Democrats, the National Union Party was founded and held its convention in Baltimore in June of 1864.

Lincoln’s incumbent Vice President was Hannibal Hamlin and was indifferent to being renominated for a second term. In an effort to widen the appeal of the ticket, Lincoln chose to nominate the most prominent Southern Democrat: Andrew Johnson. With him on the ticket, a message of national unity could be preserved and hopefully the border states would vote for Lincoln’s reelection.

The Democrats were divided between the War Democrats and the Peace Democrats. The peace democrats themselves were divided between those who wanted an armistice or an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Democrats nominated General George McClellan, who believed the war needed to be maintained to preserve the Union. Pendleton was nominated for the Vice Presidency. Over McLellan’s strong objections, a peace platform was part of the Democratic platform.

During the summer of 1864 Lincoln was so sure of his defeat, he drafted a memo and asked the cabinet to sign it sight unseen. After the election it was revealed that it read this: “It is at this time very unlikely that I shall win reelection” and that they would have to work to preserve the union in the four months between November and March.

But in August as military events such as the fall of Mobile Bay began to take place, the tide began to turn in Lincoln’s direction. Fremont was appalled by the Democratic platform and in September withdrew, issuing a public statement in support of Lincoln. With the fall of Atlanta in September, there was no question that a Union military victory was inevitable and nearly at hand.

The election was an electoral landslide for Lincoln, as he carried 212 electoral votes to McClellan’s 21. McClellan only carried three states, New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky. The Republicans also gained staggering majorities in the House, winning 40 seats. Johnson’s presence was no doubt helpful in the Union Party carrying such states as Tennessee, Missouri and possibly Louisiana.

Andrew Johnson had ambitions for the Presidency in the past and he may have indeed had them for the future, but it is worth reviewing some facts that Johnson would have been very aware of for those who might think he chose to the Vice Presidency purely based on those reasons.

First and foremost was that Johnson was all too where of the Vice Presidency being a ceremonial job with no power where most political careers went to die. Daniel Webster, offered the Vice Presidency had declined it by saying: “I do not propose to be buried before I am dead.”

The last Vice President to ascend to the White House in his own right had been Martin Van Buren in 1836 but Johnson knew that it was because Andrew Jackson had anointed him his successor. Van Buren had also had a more important job in Jackson’s administration: Secretary of State. In 1864 that post was considered a more likely path to the Presidency: six former holders of the office had ascended to the Presidency, the most recent being James Buchanan. (No one had any way of knowing that he is, to date, the last one to do so.) William Seward, the incumbent, had been the frontrunner for the Republican nomination that had gone to Lincoln in 1860.

To be sure John Tyler and Millard Filmore had ascended to the Presidency upon the deaths of the President they had served under but both William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor were both relatively old by the standards of the 19^th century (they were both in their sixties) and their age had no doubt exacerbated their sudden deaths. Lincoln, by contrast, would only be fifty six at the start of his term and while he suffered from mental health issues (though no one would know that until decades later) he was in fine physical condition. The idea of someone killing a head of state was unheard of in America and indeed most civilized countries in 1864.

And Johnson knew that even if, God forbid, something were to happen to Lincoln that neither Tyler nor Fillmore had been able to win the nomination in their own right when the next election had come. Tyler had never been a Whig and the Democrats had no use for him either halfway through his term. Filmore had been deeply unpopular and has had no realistic chance of the nomination even after more than forty ballots.

The most Johnson could realistically hope for is that when Lincoln completed his second term (assuming that he chose not to run for a third term; there was nothing in the Constitution that prevented that) and Johnson remained a loyal servant, Lincoln might be willing to anoint him his chosen successor. But Johnson had to know that was highly unlikely given in a post-war world. He was a Democrat who few in the party trusted. There were far more likely Republican candidates in Lincoln’s own cabinet: Seward might have a better chance, Salmon Chase was eternally ambitious and many might turn to Grant, though no one yet knew his political affiliation. No one had any idea what the Democratic party would look like once the South chose to rejoin the Union but they would no doubt remember Johnson’s betrayal and their standing in the party would almost certainly prevent from even being a compromise candidate ever again.

 So Johnson no doubt knew that from the moment Lincoln was reelected that his political life was almost certainly over. And if he didn’t think so at the time, his actions in both leadup too and at the inaugural probably guaranteed it – though much of it was not Johnson’s fault.

Johnson wanted to stay in Tennessee the reestablishment of a civilian government in his home state. He was told by Lincoln’s advisers that he had to come to D.C. to be sworn in. One of his last acts as military governor was to certify the results of a vote on Tennessee’s new constitutions which abolished slavery in the state.

Johnson was suffering from an illness as he traveled. On March 3^rd, he attended a party in his honor in which he drank heavily. Hung over heavily the next day, he asked outgoing Vice President Hamlin for some whiskey and took two stiff drinks.

Lincoln’s Inaugural is remember for his famous address but before that occurred, he had to watch as his new Vice President delivered a rambling and often incoherent address in front of his him, Congress and several dignitaries. When he finally meandered to a halt, Hamlin hastily and perhaps guiltily swore him in.

In the next weeks Johnson spent much of his time hiding from public ridicule in the press at the home of Francis Blair. He had every intention of returning to reestablish his family in Greenville when word came that Grant had capture the Richmond, presaging the end of the war.  Lincoln defended his Vice President from criticism saying: “I have known Andy Johnson for many years; he made a bad slip the other day, but you need not be scared, Andy ain’t a drunkard.”

On April 14, 1865 Lincoln and Johnson met for what would be the first and last time since the inauguration. According to his biographers, Johnson spoke of the treatment of the Confederacy after the war, telling him "not to be too lenient with traitors." Lincoln scheduled to attend Ford’s Theater that night had tended an invitation to Johnson to come with him. Johnson declined, because he was tired, and wanted to retire early.

He did not know that at Kirkwood house  a man named George Atzerodt was planning at 10:15 that evening to knock on his door and put a Bowie knife in his heart. Atzerodt got drunk that night instead.

At 10:15 that night, John Wilkes Booth shot Abraham Lincoln. Simultaneously, a man named Lewis Powell knocked on the door of the house of Secretary of State Seward. He stabbed five other people before he got to Seward and stabbed him five times, three in the neck. Seward tumbled helplessly into his bed and it would be a long time before he recovered from his wounds.

A fellow boarder knocked on Johnson’s door and informed him of the news. He rushed to the President’s deathbed, where he remained a short time. On his return he swore: “They shall suffer for this.”

Some time between 10 am and 11 am the following morning Salmon P. Chase, now Chief Justice, swore Andrew Johnson in before Lincoln’s cabinet, most of whom had not seen him his drunken performance at the inauguration. He asked all the members to remain in their positions.

Then and subsequently conspiracy theorists have speculated  that Johnson had been warned of the assassination. They point to a fact that Booth came to the Kirkwood House and left one of his cards with Johnson’s private secretary. Atzerodt spoke much about the conspiracy before his death but did nothing to indicate the attempt had been a ruse. But the suspicion would linger throughout Johnson’s term, particularly considering his behavior during Reconstruction and beyond.

In the next part of this article, I will deal with what Johnson did absolutely right in the immediate weeks after Lincoln’s assassination – and what he and Robert E. Lee never get credit for.