As I stated at
the beginning of this series a major factor in the sectional crisis was due to
a lack of leadership from the White House. This trend had begun with Zachary
Taylor's election and reached its nadir with Buchanan. Much of the problem was
brought upon his own head when he chose to openly challenge the biggest man in his
party and perhaps in the Senate: Stephen Douglas. That fracture began when
Buchanan chose to ignore the battles that had taken place in Kansas from both
territorial governors he'd assigned
Kansas had essentially
won the right of an anti-slavery status under the first governor but it had
crumbled under the South's determination to produce a pro-slavery
constitutions, get it approved by the Democratic congress and win the state for
the South.
By this point the
southern leaders were emboldened by the institutional victories but were
beleaguered by the rise of the anti-slavery zeal that had come in opposition.
The only way to survive was to expand the country's slave territory to counter
the Republican north. This would include not only Kansas but the Indian
territories south of it and also nearby Cuba, which many southerners wanted
America to acquire through purchase or war.
Buchanan
initially stated by stand by the first
territorial governor but members of his
own cabinet, among them Secretary of War John Floyd of Virginia and Lewis Cass,
now Secretary of State, began to urge that they fire his first governor. That
governor Robert Walker eventually retired after ill-health and was replaced by
Stanton. Buchanan finally decided to argue for partial submission, which would
be a referendum on anti- and pro-slavery forces in the territory.
When Douglas
heard about this he rushed to the White House to dissuade the President from
what he considered a dangerous course that would undermine the doctrine of popular
sovereignty he'd spent most of the decade arguing for. Buchanan would have none
of it and cautioned him that he planned to designed the Lecompton Constitution
and administrative matter when it came before Congress and enforce party
loyalty through tough political sanctions. Thus began the clash between the two
most powerful men in the Democratic party.
It began in
earnest on December 8th 1857 the day after the opening session of
the 35th Congress where the President sent his annual message where
he made this point clear. Buchanan ignored everything that all of the governors
of that territory had said about anti-slavery men and argued the free-state
elements were 'a revolutionary organization' itching to 'put down the lawful
government by force and establish a government of their own'. In it he argued
the vote about the constitution would deal with only the issue of
slavery – and nothing else in the Constitution in Lecompton. In doing so he
ignored everything he had told his various governors in private and didn't care
about how it looked. What mattered was maintaining good relations with the
South..
The following day
Douglas rouse on the Senate floor and excoriating the President in a speech
that would later be considered one of his finest, in part because it was minus
his usual pugilism:
"With
profound respect to the President of the United States…(he has) committed a
fundamental error…which lies at the foundation of his argument. We repealed the
Missouri restriction because that was confined to slavery. That exception was
taken away for the avowed and express purpose of making the rule of
self-government general and universal."
Reviewing precedence
and law when it came to statehood, Douglas argued that no territorial assembly
or convention could establish a state: only Congress could and Congress
couldn't do that until it knew the people of the territory had accepted its
terms. Partial submission couldn't serve that purpose because under that
approach 'men must vote for the constitution, whether they like it or not, in
order to be permitted to vote for slavery." And any reasonable review of
political sentiment made it clear the majority of settlers favored a free
state.
This would
consume the battle over Kansas for the next five months, with hardly any other
business in Congress taken up in the meantime. They unfolded against two
electoral events in Kansas. The first on December 21st was the
controversial referendum on Lecompton to determine whether Kansas would become
a state with or without slavery. Most free-state advocates ignored that
election and the constitution with slavery passed in a landslide. Two weeks
later another ballot that was put into effect by the anti-slavery legislature
on whether Kansas would accept or reject the constitution in its entirety. This
time the pro-slavery forces abstained from voting and the anti-slavery forces
won in a landslide, but with 10,226 votes to the 6,226 that had voted for slavery
in the previous election. Together it was clear anti-slavery was the prevailing
attitude in the territory.
A northern
newspaper made it clear that while the South held the tactical high ground and
could send a pro-slavery constitution for Kansas to Congress, it might very
well be passed. But even allowing for that, it would be a hollow victory with
little chance of the South being able to hold it for long. And if Congress
voted against it, it would be 'tantamount to a decree from the North that there
would be no more slave states, and that the South would have to depend on the
protecting power and grace of the Northern masters'. The writing was on the
wall about the declining power of the South,
In the short-term
the Democrats controlled an overwhelming majority in the Senate but the House
was a different story: while they held a narrow majority with 131 seats, many
Northern Democrats were not happy with the idea of voting Kansas in as a slave
state. Buchanan was going to need 118 votes but he could only count on a
hundred at the most. That meant he was going to have to get the remainder
through cajolery, threats of retaliation or backroom deals, an area the Washington
insider was more than comfortable with.
And he would use
what would one day be called the bully pulpit to make it very clear that this
was not a battle of antislavery or pro-slavery but loyalty to the union or disloyalty
to it. Douglas would take over the opposition, much to the satisfaction of
those in the Republican ranks. Henry Wilson knew he would 'give more weight to
our cause than any ten men in the country'
As expected the victory
came for Buchanan in the Senate with 33 in favor and 25 against. Now it came to
the House where early procedural votes indicated a very close outcome. Fearing
defeat, anti-Lecompton Democrats – somewhere between 19 and 24 – offered to
support the measure, include the slave clause IF Buchana would accept the deletion
of language foreclose any constitutional amendment for seven years. It was an
opportunity to settle the battle finally and decisively on what was mostly his
own terms. But he rejected the offer.
Then Representative
William Montgomery of Pennsylvania dusted off a proposal rejected earlier by
the Senate. It called for the resubmission of the Lecompton document to Kansas resident
in yet another referendum – but a carefully managed one. On April 1, the House
narrowly passed this proposal 120 to 112. The result was a deadlock between a
Senate that opposed resubmission and a House that wouldn't accept Lecompton
without one.
At the center of
much to come was South Carolina, specifically the new Speaker James Orr. He
would cast a tie-breaking vote to lead to a conference between both houses to
work out a compromise. During deliberations Indiana representative William
English (Democrat) found a way for a back door proposal. He suggested adding to
this an original proposal for 23 million acres of federal land to be transferred
and add it to the slavery question. Thus the two intertwined measures could be
submitted to Kansas so they could vote on both. If Kansas accepted the change,
the territory would become a slave state but without the inappropriate acreage.
If they rejected it, Kansas statehood would be placed on hold until the
territory reached a population of congressional districts at the time, roughly
93,000. This would delay the issue of statehood for at least two years.
What followed was
a political spectacle as members scrambled to put the bets face possible on an
ambiguous situation. Buchanan seeking to snatch victory from what seemed
inevitable defeat, endorsed it. Many Republicans initially rejected it but
relented based on predictions of favorable vote. The Democrats coalesced around
it mainly because Douglas was against it and he was already a villain in the
South. In the end on April 30th, Congress embraced the compromise
and the President signed the measure.
Three months
later when the vote took place Kansas yet again rejected the Lecompton constitution
by a resounding margin. The citizens were more than willing to wait for
statehood if they could have peace, security and free elections.
By the time of
the meeting of the 35th congress both Pickens Butler and Preston
Brooks were dead. Butler had died in June of 1857 of dropsy; Preston Brooks had
died in March of inflammation of the throat. Butler's Senate seat would be
filled by that old South Carolina politician John Hammond revered as a scholar
on the subject on slavery.
On February 4th,
Hammond delivered his maiden speech in the Senate, in which he reflected a
demarcation of approach from his predecessor. He made it clear that the institution
of slavery would soon be overwhelmed by northern power and that they could not
trust them but he also pointed out a key flaw in the North's argument – the brutal
wage system.
But when he returned
to South Carolina he gave a speech at Beech Island on July 22nd. No
drafts of the speech survive but according to press reports, in that speech he
made it clear that it would take years for the South to become equal to the
north and it was better to remain part of the union. Even if an abolitionist
became President, he didn't think the South should secede. He felt the
abolitionist's crusade was deteriorating. He declared: "We should address
ourselves to the development of our own internal resources and the achievement
of Southern harmony and the Union."
This speech drew
a huge controversy from disunionists like Barnwell Rhett, whose son argued
Hammond had given 'strength to unmitigated unionists and submissionists."
Three months later Hammond gave a follow-up speech and chose to continue to
expound on it. Yes the South had lost its political parity with the North in
the Senate and that parity would only continue to grow. Not even the acquisition
of Cuba could reverse that. He pointed out that resuming the slave trade was
unrealistic because many southerners were opposed and the north was unanimously
against it. And he rejected as a pipe dream the idea of colonizing Mexico or
Central America.
He repeated that
the South had many strengths and could succeed only if the region failed in its
resolve of to fend off northern encroachment should it turn to secession and
then he would endorse it.
This speech led
many in the North to perk up at the emergence of Hammond as a singular Southern
figure who might emerge as a force for conciliation between the sections. Some
even considered him as a possible presidential candidate in 1860. But the South
assaulted him with ferocity.
Later that year
the second South Carolina senator Josiah Evans died at 71. Once again Rhett was
put forth as a potential replacement but on the tenth ballot it went to 43 year
old James Chestnut. Chestnut was a states-rights man but no fire-eater. He strongly
opposed reopening the slave trade, believed in dealing intersectional tensions
through constitutional means and had been a cooperationist in the battle in the
state a few years earlier. South Carolina now had two relatively moderate
voices in the Senate as opposed to the anti-slavery men in Massachusetts.
While this was
going on Stephen Douglas was beginning to do the work for his run for reelection
to the Senate in preparation to run for the Presidency two years later. This was
initially challenged by the President who was determined to destroy his career.
They had already been destroying his ability to use patronage, refusing to hire
Douglas men for jobs in Illinois and firing the ones that were there unless
they turned against their patron. The next step was to split the party by building
up an anti-Douglas faction within the ranks.
The state
Democratic convention met in April of 21 and awarded him the party nomination
by acclimation. However, a contingent of Buchanan men shunned the convention
and convened their own gathering nearby where they declared themselves to be
the real Democratic party and issued a statement equating support for him as treason
to the party.
The rump party
held a convention in Springfield on June 9th and the anti-Douglas
faction nominated former U.S. Senator Sidney Breese as its candidate for
Douglas's seat. But the delegates represented fewer than 50 percent of
Illinois' counties and Douglas remained optimistic that he could overcome
intraparty fractions by election day.
Still his
predicament gave rise to rumors that he might consider some fusion with the
Illinois Republicans impressed by his adherence to principle to Lecompton and
looking for ways to syphon off Democratic votes in 1860. But it was impractical
and Douglas soon dismissed a man prominent in Illinois politics that he had
crossed the river and burned his boat behind him.
That man was
William Herndon, the law partner and close friend of Abraham Lincoln. And not
long after that Lincoln would enter the national stage for the first time.
In the next
article I will deal with Lincoln's rise to prominence and his battle for Douglas's
senate seat in 1858.
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