Sunday, August 24, 2025

Masachusetts & South Carolina and the Sectional Divide, Part 10: The Election of 1860

 

History is full of ironies and that is frequently true when it comes to American elections.

In 1852 the Democratic Party had won a sweeping electoral landslide that has served as the death knell for the Whig Party, in large because the latter party had fallen victim to sectional divides based on the issues of slavery. Now just eight years later, the Democratic Party was on the verge of a similar sectional fracture only the stakes were far higher for the party and the nation.

One of the major reasons for the Democratic Party's fracture had been because of Stephen Douglas and his own desire to be President. His own career was full of ironies. He had helped salvage the Compromise of 1850 which had seemed to finally put the bed question of slavery. Then just four years later, in large part due to his own ambitions he had introduced the question of popular sovereignty into the national dialogue which had reignited the embers of the debate and assured that they had never fully gone away ever since. His decision to make himself the strong man of the party had undercut the Presidency of Franklin Pierce and he had proven himself the biggest adversary to the new President James Buchanan in so much of the Congressional battles that had taken up the last four years. And in running for reelection for the Senate he had exposed the flaws in his political theory in a way to permanently making himself unacceptable to the South as a Presidential candidate.

By the time 1860 began much of the South was openly hoping for secession. In direct response to John Brown's raid Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis introduced a series of resolutions to protect slavery in all U.S. territory. In one he stated that neither Congress nor the legislatures of any territories 'possessed the power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen…to take his slave into the common territories." He didn't ask for a floor debate, instead placing them before the Senate Democratic caucus. He had no intention of putting it before the Senate floor for the vote, the sole purpose was to get the language into the Democratic platform and crush any hope Douglas might have for popular sovereignty. Under the strategy of Alabama's Bill Yancey (coached by that old secessionist Barnwell Rhett) Alabama's Democratic leaders to demand this language in the platform and failing that bolt the convention. The goal was simple: tear the party asunder causing a Democratic defeat and a likely southern rebellion.

Rhett could see on the horizon the Southern independence he spent a decade hoping for but the course of events had increasingly put South Carolina – and much of the rest of the South on his side. He was hoping events at the upcoming convention, which was to be held in Charleston that April, would prove conclusive.

Buchanan had declined to run for reelection, making Douglas the frontrunner for the nomination. But with both the South opposed to him and the necessity for a two-thirds majority of the delegates to win the nomination, things looked grim. Other men wanted it, including Buchanan's own Vice President John C. Breckinridge but Douglas was the overwhelming contender.

The problems began well before that with the issue of the platform. Douglas was in a bind. If he made the slave code part of the platform, he was told by an Ohio representative that both Ohio and seven other Northwestern states would retire from the convention. If the slave code was spurned, however, seven southern delegations made it clear they would bolt. And it was clear that Alabama and its brethren had no intention of compromising.

The fact the convention took place in Charleston was not lost on most Americans. It was by far the most aristocratic city in the South, and therefore the most determined not to see change its 'peculiar institution'. Some northern delegates would visit the plantations for themselves and would come away with the opinion "the yoke is rather light in these parts" with the slaves 'appearing to be happy and well-contended." It goes without saying the slave masters did everything to put the best possible face on the treatment of the slaves and it likely would not have made a difference with the Democrats in the north. They wanted to modulate the issue in order to prevent the rupture of their party and the disaster they foresaw it might bring. That many of the fire-eaters wanted that very disaster was another reality they chose to blind themselves too.

303 delegates were present when the convention was gaveled into session. 202 votes would be needed to nominate a President, while 152 would be needed for any other decisions. The early votes in procedural demonstrated Douglas and his delegates had the majority support but lacked the 2/3 for most things. By this point some Douglas men were acting thinking that if the ultra-southern delegates left it might be a blessing. If only 30 or 40 men walked out, Douglas might be able to get the required two-thirds.

On April 27th the first test came from the platform committee. A majority report, prepared by two southerners, essentially echoed Jefferson Davis's slave code language as part of the platform. The minority report, by contrast, skirted the issue declaring property rights in states and territories best left to the Supreme Court, essentially arguing the Dred Scott decision had resolved.

The debate for the majority was led by William Yancey. For ninety minutes he delighted his followers castigating his Northern brethren for refusing to defend Southern rights under the principle the constitutions are made 'solely for the protection of the minorities in government." He denied, with a straight face, that he and his colleagues were not 'disunionists, per se" but merely patriotic Americans seeking to redress long-standing grievances."

"Ours is the property invaded; ours are the institutions which are at stake; ours is the peace that is to be destroyed…ours is the honor at stake. Slave code approval was the only basis upon which Alabama can associate with the Democratic Party."

The electrifying eloquence of Yancey was met and surpassed by Ohio Senator George Pugh. He delivered a complete rebuttal that scored southern Democrats for undermining their party in the North with incessant and increasingly outlandish demands and then taunting the northern party for losing political influence as a result of doing so. Now the South was demanded that Northern Democrats 'prostrate themselves with their mouths in the dust. Gentlemen of the South," he famously said. "you mistake us – you mistake us. We will not do it." If the South's party loyalty required this debasement, then the southern dissidents might as well leave.

Despite an adjournment to stop the convention from descending into complete chaos, the following day the minority report passed by a bare majority of the delegates: 165-138. All but 11 of the votes in favor of it came from free states. Immediately afterwards the Southern delegates walked out, led first by Alabama, followed by Mississippi, Louisiana, all but two of South Carolina's delegates, Florida, Texas, some of Arkansas' and a third of Delaware's.

With 50 delegates gone, the Douglas men hoped the walkout wouldn't spread and therefore would enhance their man's chance of getting the nomination. But Chairman Caleb Cushing, while from Massachusetts but with no admiration for Douglas delivered a blow. Rather than allowing 169 delegates to give the nomination (two-thirds of the 253 remaining) he made it clear it would still take 202 delegates. This excluded the possibility of Douglas – or indeed any candidate – from getting the nomination.

Three days and an unprecedented 57 ballots achieved nothing. After ten days the convention adjourned with the stipulation that they would reconvene in Baltimore on June 18th to resume the selection process. By that point it was clear that any nomination Douglas received would be worthless. On the day of the walkout the Southerners planned to have a meeting on June 11th where they would establish a new Democratic Party.

They would wait until after the official party met in Baltimore to select a candidate/ The delegates confronted the question of whether to seat those who had walked out in Charleston or replacement figures chosen by party officials in several states. Again they were forced into a corner. If they sat the walkout men, Douglas's candidacy would be destroyed. If they sat replacements, the party would be. Cushing ducked the controversy by sending it to the credentials committee. After three days struggle, they crafted two separate reports.

The majority report favored seating the replacement delegates from Alabama and Louisiana as well as half of those from Georgia and 2 from Alabama. The convention embraced it. But after that Cushing recognized Virginia delegate Charles Russell, who announced that the majority of his delegation was walking out. So did the majority of the North Carolina delegation and half of Maryland's.

Douglas received the nomination he had hoped for all his life but he knew was the nominee of a shell of the party he had served. His nomination of Herschel Johnson of Georgia as Vice President was meaningless considering the fact that the anti-Douglas faction, held there own gathering in Baltimore. Cushing resigned the presidency of his party and then led the Southern Democrats.

The Southern Democrats (as they would be known in the historical archives) would fully embrace the slave code advocacy and call for the acquisition of Cuba, where they hoped to expand slavery. They would nominate the incumbent Vice President John C. Breckinridge of Virginia as their presidential candidate and Joseph Lane of Oregon (still only a territory) as Vice President. Buchanan would endorse Breckinridge for President as would his predecessor Franklin Pierce.

Many Democrats expected as Charleston dissolved into chaos 'the next President will be named in Chicago." That was where starting May 16th the Republicans would hold their nominated convention.

Going into that convention the overwhelming front-runner seemed to be William Seward. There had been many prominent Republicans leading up to the convention – Salmon P. Chase and Ben Wade of Ohio, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts – but their attempts to build support had fizzled. That left only a single contender – Abraham Lincoln.

The previous February he had given his famous Cooper Union speech in which he made it clear about how slavery was morally wrong. "The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint an opposition to slavery before they cease to believe all their troubles proceed from us. Their thinking it right and our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy."

This speech caused an immediate stir and was published in four New York City newspapers. Editors William Cullen Bryant and Horace Greeley had wanted to get Lincoln to the city as part of a stop-Seward movement. They were part of a  Republican contingent who were skeptical of the New Yorker's chances of carrying Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana and New Jersey. Fremont's failure to carry those four states four years earlier had ensured Buchanan's victory and they did not want to make the same mistake this time. Indeed going into the convention gubernatorial candidates in Indiana and Pennsylvania warned party leaders that if Seward was at the top of the ticket, their campaigns would be hopeless.

Seward's problem was his blunt-toned rhetoric and his embrace of 'higher law' had stamped him as a bit of radical. He was also a scourge of the Know-Nothing movement, which while it was no longer a political party still faced lingering hostility. Lincoln's relative obscurity and his decision to seek the middle ground, made him seem like a moderate. It helped matters immensely that the convention was to take place in Lincoln's home state.

They would pack the convention halls with full-throated loyalists to overwhelm Seward's men and made sure the Seward delegation was scattered to make conferring more difficult. They printed counterfeit admission tickets in order to supplant Seward die-hards with Lincoln men. And Lincoln's campaign leader David Davis cheerfully ignored the candidates admonition that 'no contracts will bind me'. Davis would dangle before the leader of Pennsylvania's delegation a cabinet post for Simon Cameron if it would go to Lincoln on the second ballot. (They would follow through and Cameron would be named Lincoln's first Secretary of War. However, he would quickly prove so incompetent that he would be forced out less than a year into the administration.)

On May 17th the second night of the convention Lincoln's team spent the entire night entreating and cajoling every single delegation they could. Indiana agreed to come aboard with 26 votes. They set to work on Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine and Virginia to demonstrate support from New England on the second ballot. The game was to procure at least 100 first ballot votes with support building in the subsequent tallies. And he urged Lincoln partisans in the convention hall to out scream and outshout Seward's men.

On the first ballot, Seward had 173 1/2 of the necessary 233 for the nomination. (The Republicans needed a simple majority of the delegates to achieve the nomination.) But Lincoln scored 102 votes.

On the second ballot Lincoln gained 79 votes while Seward only managed another 11. Critical were 48 from Pennsylvania. On the third ballot Lincoln moved into the lead with 231 1/2 ballots.

Then David Carter of Ohio rose. His state had gone in behind Salmon Chase but in the second ballot fourteen members of the delegation had gone to Lincoln. Now he transferred three of the remaining votes to Lincoln, earning him the nomination. The vice presidential slot went to Hannibal Hamlin of Maine.

While all of this was unfolding a collection of old line politicians, dismayed by the acidic effect of the strife over slavery gathered at Baltimore to establish a new party. They called themselves the Constitutional Union Party and its members included Southern whigs still clinging to the Union, lingering Know-Nothings from the south and even some slavery issue moderates from a cross the country. They nominated for President John Bell of Tennessee; a Whig whose lack of color belied his resume. Bell had represented Tennessee in the House for seven terms, briefly serving as Speaker. He had been William Henry Harrison's secretary of War and had left after Tyler assumed power. After that he had served two terms in the Senate. His Vice President was Edward Everett of Massachusetts, one the representative of the Cotton Whigs and now completely out of favor in his state. The platform was less 100 words and didn't mention slavery at all.

Looking back it seems strange that of the four candidates for President in 1860 the overwhelming favorite was at the time the most obscure. Lincoln wasn't even on in the ballot in the south and the campaign would quickly divide among section lines. Lincoln vs. Douglas in the North, Breckinridge vs. Bell in the South. Given that Lincoln had an overwhelming position of strength in the North, the only thing that might possibly give any of the three candidates a chance to win was if no candidate could get a majority of the electoral vote. In that case, as in 1824, the election would go to the House of Representatives where the top three vote getters in the electoral college would vie for the prize and each states delegation would get one vote.

The only realistic possibility for that to happen was if the opposition parties could fuse together and pull the anti-Lincoln votes under one banner. Several men who favored Breckinridge in New York met with representatives from Douglas and Everett to do so. A meeting was called on September 9th with particular emphasis on pooling financial resources. However on the 15th it collapsed under the wait of partisan animosity, particularly when the Breckinridge men refused to accept Douglas's faction insisting that any fusion ticket run on popular sovereignty.

The South knew that Lincoln was likely to be the next President and they refused to accept his moderate remarks on the issue of slavery being inseparable from those of the very abolitionists who considered him insufficiently radical on the issue. He went out of his way to make it clear that the Constitution sanctioned slavery, fugitive slave laws were a constitutional mandate and that he didn't place blacks on an equal social footing as whites. None of this mattered. Lincoln thought that slavery was a moral wrong and in their minds that made him no different from Garrison on the subject.

Stephen Douglas knew his path to the Presidency was nearly impossible and in what was unprecedented at that time, he took the stump and traveled the South in particular trying to convince them of fealty to the Union where secessionism seemed inevitable. In a speech in Virginia he made it clear where he stood:

"If Abraham Lincoln be elected President of the United States will the Southern States be justified in seceding from the Union? To this I emphatically answer no. The election of a man to the Presidency by the American people, in conformity with the Constitution of the United States would not justify any attempt at dissolving this glorious confederacy.

If the Southern states secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before he commits an overt act against their constitutional rights, will you advocate or vindicate resistance by force to their secession. I answer empathically that it is the duty of the President of the United States and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States as passed by Congress and the courts expound him….And I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter they may."

It was a fervent speech for the Union. But it did nothing to improve his prospects.

After the returns were counted, Lincoln had been elected President with what remains today the smallest percentage of the popular vote in history, not even forty percent of the vote. Douglas had carried 29.5 percent, Breckinridge 18 percent and Bell 12.6 percent. But electorally the math was different. Lincoln carried Pennsylvania, Illinois and Indiana, three states Fremont had not carried in 1856. Combined with 4 of New Jersey's 7 electoral votes (Douglas carried the rest) they were enough to give him a majority in the electoral college for what would be a total of 180 electoral votes. Douglas would only carry Missouri along with New Jersey's three. Bell carried Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia for 39 while Breckinridge carried the remaining 72 of the South.

Beyond that, it was hard to read the tea leaves in Congress. The Republicans maintained control of the House even though they would lose 8 seats and the Democrats lost six seats but still were tied with the Republicans for control of the Senate. (Only after the South seceded and the majority of the Southern Senators left with their states did the Republicans gain control of the Senate.)

What was clear from the results is that overwhelming the voting people believed in unity. Combined Lincoln, Douglas and Bell accounted for more than 80 percent of the popular vote and Bell had outperformed Breckinridge in many parts of the South. Regardless of the opinions of the scourge of slavery all three of these people believed in the preservation of the Union something Breckinridge and his followers were not inclined to endorse any more.

But to the South all that mattered was Lincoln's victory. On November 7th 1860, with news of the triumph of Lincoln’s victory just a few hours old, South Carolina District Judge Andrew McGrath closed the latest term with a starling announcement: because secession was inevitable, he was resigning his judgeship.

While South Carolina had been at the forefront of the secessionist movement few had thought that McGrath, who had always been on the side of the cooperationist part of the divide in his home state, would be the one to lead the secessionist movement. Yet he was the first member of the first state to secede from the Union.

Three days later the South Carolina state senate approved legislation and called for a convention of delegates to consider secession. Two days after that both South Carolina senators James Chestnut and James Hammond resigned their seats. Barnwell Rhett's dream of secession was about to become a reality.

In my conclusion to this series I will end this series where I began: with how Garrison and Rhett's fates after secession became a reality and how their world view colors both of the extreme parts of political debate to this day.

 

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